

The Great East Japan Earthquake

Joint Review Report on Relief Activities by the Civil Society

-from the Perspective of International Cooperation NGOs



Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
(JANIC)

The Great East Japan Earthquake

Joint Review Report on Relief Activities by the Civil Society

— from the Perspective of NGOs for International Cooperation —

October 2014

JAPAN NGO CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

FORWARD

Three years have passed since the Great East Japan Earthquake. We would like to express our deepest condolences to the victims and the bereaved. Recovery from the damages will take years, and the accident of Tokyo Electric Power's Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant still has a long way to go. However, many of the aid organizations from outside have terminated the activities, and many of the aid workers are leaving. Unless we take this opportunity to record the precious experiences and lessons, they would be lost forever, which recognition urged us to carry out this joint review project.

Although numerous civil society organizations have provided assistance more than ever in this disaster, many issues remain, part of which was analyzed and published in "the Great East Japan Earthquake and NGOs for International Cooperation: Japan's New Possibilities, Issues, and Recommendations (JANIC)" one year after the disaster. This project is intended to follow it up.

The objective of this review was to "identify issues and solutions for making the most efficient use of external aid for a wide-area cascading disaster based on the voices of persons who worked in disaster scenes in many different ways."

There are not many cases of joint evaluation on humanitarian aid in the world due to its difficulties, and we were also faced such difficulties in the course of the project because: we could only review and not evaluate; international NGOs were focused because it was difficult to study every level of relief activities; the review on good practices was insufficient because too much emphasis was placed on the issues and countermeasures, and; the report was not easily understandable for some readers because too much effort was put to disseminate and cover all domestic and international levels. The insufficiencies of this book shall be corrected when research is conducted by the readers or by similar projects.

The UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction, which is the 3rd in Japan, will be held in Sendai in March 2015, during which "post-Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2)" will be adopted as the global disaster policy for the next two or three decades. Domestic and international civil society organizations are currently taking various measures in order to reflect lessons and opinions of the civil society. It will be great if this book can contribute to reflect the knowledge and experiences acquired through the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Many people cooperated with us during planning and implementation of the project. We couldn't have completed this book without participation and cooperation of collaborating organizations and partner organizations as well as the Project Review Committee, NGOs/NPOs, the Social Welfare Council of each district, local administration, and especially the residents of the disaster-stricken areas. We cannot name every single person here but we would like to take this opportunity to express our deepest gratitude especially to the residents of the stricken areas who answered the questionnaire and interviews in spite of the busy schedule for recovery and the staff members of local NPOs and NGOs who made coordination for such surveys.

OHASHI Masaaki
Chairperson
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

March 2014

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

IF YOU DON'T HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO READ EVERYTHING

- The review is outlined on page 8.
- If you are interested only in a particular subject, please choose a theme from Chapter 3 on the table of contents. The reason why the theme was selected, its review method and conclusion are described at the beginning of each theme.

IF YOU ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE

- The Great East Japan Earthquake is outlined in Chapter 2.

IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS

- Opinions of aid organizations and local organizations are introduced in Chapter 3 as part of the review result.
- For more details, the results of the questionnaire survey and comments of the residents of the stricken areas are publicized on the website of JANIC as annex.

IF YOU BELONG TO AN NGO/NPO, SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OR ELSE ENGAGED IN DISASTER PREVENTION MEASURES FOR THE FUTURE

- Chapter 3 contains the review on relief activities by organizations from outside of the stricken areas (external aid).
 - Opinions of the residents and aid workers not contained in Chapter 3 for the space restrictions are introduced in the annex of the JANIC website.
- We hope that those opinions will contribute to creation of a disaster resistant society.

IF YOU WANT TO USE INFORMATION IN THIS BOOK

- You are welcome to use any information from this book for the purpose of improvement of the quality of relief activities or for academic verification, provided, however, this does not apply to the quotations from other books. An Excel file excluding personal information is stored for those who want to use the statistical data of questionnaire survey, etc. for a cross tabulation. The file also contains more Q&As that we were not able to document in this book.
- Please download from the URL indicated in the table of contents or inquire the contact given at the end of this book.

Abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
DV	Domestic violence
JANIC	Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
JCN	Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan
JPf	Japan Platform
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPO	Non-Profit Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
UNISDR	The United Nations Secretariat for International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction
Disaster VC	Disaster volunteer center
Nuclear accident	Explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant related to the natural disaster, the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011
<i>Shien P</i>	The Joint Committee for Coordinating and Supporting Voluntary Disaster Relief Activities
SWC	Social Welfare Council
Sphere Standard	The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Company
<i>Renpuku</i>	NPO <i>Fukko</i> Collaboration Center
JFEO	Japan Federation of Economic Organizations

Definition of the terms frequently used in this book

External aid organizations	Assistance by civil society organizations that conducted relief activities from outside of the disaster-stricken areas (and the relevant organizations)
Local organizations	Civil society organizations such as private organizations and NPO corporations based in the disaster-stricken areas
Residents	Residents of the disaster-stricken areas who suffered damages from the earthquake
Local stakeholders	Local residents and organizations including Social Welfare Councils and municipal offices that are related to assistance

CONTENTS

Forward	3
How to use this book.....	4
Summary	8
Chapter 1. Project Outline	12
1.1. Background.....	12
1.2. Objective.....	12
1.3. Organization.....	12
1.4. Period.....	14
1.5. Targets.....	14
1.6. Methods	15
1.7. Limitations of the project.....	20
1.8. Outline of review methods	21
Chapter 2. Damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and major relief activities.....	26
2.1. Damage	26
2.2. Evacuation of residents.....	28
2.3. Condition of residents	29
2.4. Context of the affected areas	31
2.5. Explanation of stakeholders involved in assistance activities	32
Chapter 3. Assessment.....	40
3.1. Assistance that meets local needs provided?	42
3.2. Comprehensive assistance provided?.....	48
3.3. Assistance brought any further damage to the people?	64
3.4. Accountability to beneficiaries fulfilled?	76
3.5. Opinions of the local stakeholders considered and reflected?.....	80
3.6. Review and improvement constantly made?	85
3.7. Short-term assistance led to long-term assistance?	88
3.8. Staff's safety secured?	96
3.9. Organizations had enough capacities?.....	101
3.10. Collaborated and Cooperated well with other organizations?.....	111
Chapter 4. Recommendations for future capacity development of civil society organizations	130
Appendix 1. Bibliography (partly in Japanese)	136
Appendix 2. Participants List (in Japanese)	140

Annex: Separate collection of documents (published in JANIC's website)

Material 1. Questionnaire survey results: http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix1.pdf

Material 2. Summary of the interim report: http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix2.pdf

Material 3. Materials to select evaluation indicators based on document research:

http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix3.pdf

Accumulated data from questionnaires: http://www.janic.org/eqexamination_survey_reply.xls

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

This project is intended to review the relief activities by civil society organizations that entered the disaster-stricken areas after the Great East Japan Earthquake (referred to as “external aid organizations” hereinafter) and record the issues/problems and their causes in order to provide lessons for similar cases in the future. Focusing on the relief activities conducted in one year after the disaster, we carried out interviews, workshops, focus group discussions and questionnaire surveys with persons who were engaged in assistance of external aid organizations such as residents and staff members of external aid organizations and local organizations, administrative agencies and the Social Welfare Councils. This book categorizes those issues/problems in 10 themes and reviews them based on internationally recognized evaluation criteria.

The following conclusions were derived from the assessment for each theme:

1. Whether assistance was provided in accordance with the local needs

Most of the relief activities met well with the local needs. However, 20% of the residents felt that assistance was insufficient and 30% felt that it was excessive. The factors behind these complaints are (1) aid organizations were not sufficiently aware of the needs, (2) the needs were not sufficiently shared internally, and (3) the project was affected by factors other than needs such as the budget.

2. Whether the assistance was provided in a comprehensive manner

More than 40% of the residents felt that the distribution of assistance was biased against some type of housing, and especially the assistance to temporary rental houses and home was insufficient. Approximately twenty percent of the residents answered that gender considerations were insufficient, pointing out that considerations for women in supply items were insufficient and that it was difficult to have male participants in community projects. Almost 30% of the residents felt that the assistance was insufficient for those who need special support such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, children and foreigners, partly because it was difficult to spot those persons due to the restrictions on personal information.

3. Whether the assistance caused no harm

While some aid workers contributed to recovery taking advantage of the local power, there were many cases of hurting the self-reliance and dignity of the local people. There were also some cases of assistance causing an extra burden to the residents, as it was not easy for some local organizations to accept aid, and biased assistance caused conflict among the residents.

4. Whether accountability to the beneficiaries was fulfilled

It is an internationally common concept that accountability to local stakeholders is as important as that toward fund providers. While approximately 90% of the external aid organizations thought they fulfilled accountability to residents, 20% of residents felt dissatisfied or uncertain because the relief activities were not sufficiently explained. Of the residents who complained to external aid organizations about termination of activities and assistance, 20% did not know if the complaints were reflected on relief activities and 20% were not informed of the details of relief activities.

5. Whether opinions of local stakeholders were reflected

It is important to incorporate and reflect opinions of local stakeholders in order to provide assistance in accordance with the needs so that local stakeholders can have a sense of ownership about the relief activities. However, there was no sufficient mechanism to reflect questions and dissatisfaction of residents. In many cases, no specific measures were taken. For example, a complaints box or counter could have been established. Local stakeholders did participate to a certain extent in planning and implementation at the early stage, but, in some cases, their opinions were disregarded in decision-making such as termination of activities.

6. Whether review and improvement were constantly implemented

The local situation and assistance needs change over time. Therefore, it is necessary to review and improve relief activities in order to meet the needs of disaster victims. However, the progress of the activities was not monitored sufficiently.

7. Whether short-term assistance led to long-term assistance

Local residents have to solve different issues in the process of recovery even after the emergency is over. Since the activity period is limited for many external aid organizations, they must take it into consideration when to plan and implement short-term assistance. Approximately twenty percent of the local organizations thought there were problems in a way external aid organizations terminated their activities. Approximately fifty percent of the local organizations felt that there were problems in the process they took over from external aid organizations, especially in human resource development and capacity building of local organizations.

8. Whether safety of the staff was secured

Some staff members were so exhausted mentally and physically that they could not continue activities. While some organizations successfully systemized the care for the staff members, health/safety management was left up to the staff in many cases. In approximately 50% cases, safety measures for dangerous places including helmets, masks and other safety measures were taken in accordance with a manual that was prepared before or after the disaster, but the remaining 50% conducted their activities without any manual or guidelines. Some 40% of the external aid organizations conducted their activities without clear criteria for protection from radioactive contamination for certain duration.

9. Whether organizations were competent

The competence of an organization significantly affects the quality of assistance. More than 70% of the external aid organizations suffered lack of human resources, and there were problems in communication and information sharing between the headquarters and the field staff in some organizations. More than 50% of the organizations suffered financial deficiency, which includes not only the aspect of budget amount but also other factors such as restrictions on usage and period.

10. Whether cooperation with other organization was established

Much information was shared through information exchange meetings. However, some participants failed to find any purpose or significance in participating in an information exchange meeting because exchanging information didn't result in specific coordination. External aid organizations more or less worked in cooperation with other organizations. However, concerning relationships with local organizations, the assistance didn't reach small organizations in some cases. There were some cases in which cooperation wasn't established with local administrative agencies or Social Welfare Councils because of lack of trust with little explanation about the organization or their relief activities. As for relationships with enterprises and donors, relief activities were hampered in some cases by unfamiliar reporting duty or assistance offer deviating from the needs.

From the above assessment, even areas of capacity development that the Japanese civil society organizations need to strengthen for better preparedness and response to future disasters were identified: project management, needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation, disaster preparedness, safety management and psychological support, accountability, PR/information dissemination, human resources management, fundraising, protection and gender, and coordination of assistance.

The results of the review were presented during the "International Symposium on the Great East Japan Earthquake – Missions and Possibilities of Relief activities by the Civil Society" held by JANIC on March 25, 2014, which is then to be published in Japanese and English and reflected in the development of the post-Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2) in 2015 and also in Japan Platform's capacity building programs for NGOs.

CHAPTER 1

PROJECT OUTLINE

CHAPTER 1. PROJECT OUTLINE

1.1. BACKGROUND

The Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake on March 11, 2011 followed by a series of disasters—tsunami and nuclear accident—was a wide-area compound disaster, later renamed as the Great East Japan Earthquake. At 2:46pm on March 11, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale, the most powerful one ever recorded in Japan and the 4th most powerful in the world occurred. The epicenter was located approximately 130 km off Sanriku, Miyagi Prefecture at a depth of 22km. The earthquake measured a level of seismic intensity (*Shindo*) 7 in Kurihara, Miyagi Prefecture and 5-6 in other parts of the Tohoku region including Fukushima and Iwate Prefecture and some parts in the Kanto region.¹ As of January 10, 2014, 15,884 are dead, 2,640 are missing and approximately 400,000 houses have been totally or partially destroyed.

The administrative functions in the stricken areas were significantly impaired immediately after the quake because of many new duties to take emergency measures. Therefore, relief activities by “civil society organizations from outside the stricken areas” (referred to as “external aid organizations” hereinafter) were absolutely necessary to help the local residents.

In 1998, the Act on Promotion of Specified Non-profit Activities was enacted after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the foundation of civil activities was legally established in Japan. After that, NPOs engaged in resolving domestic social issues and NGOs² for international cooperation (referred to as “NGOs” hereinafter) have been trying to solve diverse domestic and international social issues. Those organizations started relief activities immediately after the disaster taking advantage of their respective knowledge, resources and networks, and have played important roles during the emergency and recovery phases.

1.2. OBJECTIVE

The objective of this project was to synthesize and record the lessons and issues of civil society organizations (especially NGOs for international cooperation) which were engaged in relief activities for the Great East Japan Earthquake, so that Japan and the rest of the world can deal with the threat of disasters more effectively in the future.³

1.3. ORGANIZATION

The project was implemented as follows:

IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONS

Implementing organizations (3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)• Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center (PBV)• CWS Japan
--------------------------------	--

Oriental Consultants helped JANIC in coordination of the project.

COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS

Cooperating organizations (2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Japan Platform (JPF)• Facilitators Association of Japan (FAJ)
-------------------------------	--

¹ For the outline of the earthquake and tsunami, see the website of the Meteorological Agency and “the Great East Japan Earthquake/the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake-related portal sites”.

² In Japan, there is a tendency to divide nonprofit organizations into NGOs (international cooperation) and NPOs (domestic matters). The former refers to organizations engaged mainly in international cooperation represented by assistance to developing countries and the latter in solution of domestic social issues.

³ This project was started in June 2013, the third year after the Great East Japan Earthquake. The stricken areas are still striving for recovery, but the outside aid groups and their members who worked in emergency and for recovery are gradually leaving the sites, and it was feared that the precious experiences and lessons concerning relief activities might be faded over time without being handed over to the next generation.

Japan Platform (JPF) reviewed the development of the capacity building programme for NGOs referring to the result of this project. Facilitators Association of Japan (FAJ) was in charge of facilitation of all of the four workshops.

SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION

Supporting organization (1)	• Give2Asia
-----------------------------	-------------

Expenses for the project were covered by the financial assistance from Give2Asia.

REVIEW COMMITTEE

The Review Committee was established in order to review the direction and the executing methods of the project. JANIC was the secretariat of the Review Committee. The committee members were selected from the organizations that conducted relief activities for the Great East Japan Earthquake with the following qualifications: (1) has already conducted self-evaluation of the project, (2) has professional knowledge on project evaluation, or (3) able to speak from the viewpoint of a domestic NPO or a foreign donor.



Review Committee
The first meeting (left) and the fourth (right)

Meetings of the Review Committee

	Major issues	Participants
1st meeting (July 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sharing of the result of desk review • Review of the project direction (review targets, scope, evaluation approach, etc.) • Selection of workshop participants • Selection of interviewees 	10 committee members 3 secretariat members 13 in total
2nd meeting (September 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Result of workshop (Tokyo) and exchange of opinions • Result of interviews and exchange of opinions • Review of workshop (3 prefectures of Tohoku) • Review of the direction of follow-up survey • Review and revision of the project direction 	6 committee members 3 secretariat members 9 in total
3rd meeting (December 20)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress report of interim report • Q&A on the interim report (targets of the report, check items of safety management, selection of evaluation criteria) • Review of the quality and targets of follow-up survey 	6 committee members 3 secretariat members 9 in total
4th meeting (February 21)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sharing of the result of follow-up survey • Review of the draft final report 	8 committee members 3 secretariat members 11 in total

1.4. PERIOD




Figure 1. Flow of joint review

This project started in May 2013, went through three stages and ended upon presentation in the international symposium “Missions and Possibilities of Disaster Relief Activities by the Civil Society” held in Tokyo on March 25, 2014 (Figure 1). The three stages are as follows:

Stage	Period	Descriptions
Preparation	May – June 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Establishment of systems such as the Review Committee
Joint review	July – October 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four workshops • Interview survey 1 • Summary of interim report
Follow-up	November 2013 – February 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follow-up survey (focus group discussions, questionnaire survey, interview survey 2)

1.5. TARGETS

TARGET ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

This project reviewed the external aid provided by the civil society in the three Tohoku prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima, especially focusing on the activities of NGOs. The targets were specified based on the following dominant opinions in the 1st and 2nd meetings of the Review Committee and interview surveys:

- It is impossible to cover each and every activity, especially if it is conducted by a small private organization that is not legally registered.
- It is difficult to review civil society organizations with diverse scales and missions in one consistent framework.⁴
- There is a great social interest in how NGOs with international experiences functioned in a domestic disaster.

TARGET PERIOD

The target period for this review is March 11, 2011 through July 2013. Emphasis is placed on the first one year (March 11, 2011 through the same date 2012) when external aid was most needed in the event of a mega compound disaster even in Japan relatively well equipped administrative functions. Activities further on were reviewed from the viewpoint of transition from short-term assistance during emergency phase to long-term assistance in recovery phase.

⁴ While many NGOs have terminated activities as of 2013, domestic NPOs are intended to continue providing meticulous support in the next 5 to 10 years. The notable gap in a sense of mission was pointed out.

1.6. METHODS




Figure 2. Flow of the review

The project selected key issues and review methods by desk review at the preparation stage, discussed the major problems, causes and countermeasures in workshops participated by aid workers and concerned persons/parties, and confirmed and verified them through interview surveys, questionnaire surveys, and focus group discussions (Figure 2).

DESK REVIEW

At the preparation stage of the project in May and June, literature review was conducted on relief activities by civil society organizations for the Great East Japan Earthquake for the following purposes:

- (1) To specify the themes to be reviewed
- (2) To consider the most relevant method of evaluation/review to this particular joint review

Concerning (1), we reviewed the bibliography 1-1 through 1-15 and 2-1 through 2-5 in the appendix 1, which were recommended by the Review Committee or based on hearing survey of implementing agencies. As for (2), we reviewed the bibliography 3-1 through 3-23 which include joint evaluation reports on disaster response in the past in foreign countries.

INTERVIEW SURVEY 1

Interview survey was conducted to specific individuals, because in participatory workshops (1) there are things that are difficult to talk about in the presence of others, and (2) limited time does not allow deep discussion. Interviewees were carefully and objectively selected based on the suggestions from staff members of JANIC, the Review Committee and network organizations in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefecture.



interview survey and field site visit

⁵ Concerning measures, not all issues were necessarily discussed. This book introduces the opinions presented during the process of studying problems and causes.

PEER REVIEW WORKSHOPS

OUTLINE

Four participatory peer review workshops were conducted as follows:

Time and date	Location	Site
10:00-17:30 on Thursday, July 18	Tokyo	Conference hall of Nihon Kirisutokyo Kaikan
10:00-17:30 on Thursday, October 3	Tono City, Iwate Prefecture	M-size hall of Hotel Aeria Tohno
10:00-17:30 on Tuesday, October 8	Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture	Training room #1 of Sendai City Silver Center
10:00-17:30 on Thursday, October 10	Fukushima City, Fukushima Prefecture	Multi-purpose hall of Chamber Omachi

For the workshops held in the three Tohoku prefectures, local network organizations, the Social Welfare Councils⁶ and municipalities provided advice on sites and dates and participated as joint organizer, sponsor or cooperator. They also helped making a list of possible participants and inviting them.

Prefecture	Group	Form
Iwate	Tono City Social Welfare Council	Joint organizer
	Tono Magokoro Net	Joint organizer
	Iwate Cooperative Reconstruction Center	Joint organizer
	Tono City	Sponsor
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefecture Social Welfare Council	cooperator
	Miyagi Cooperative Reconstruction Center	cooperator
Fukushima	Fukushima Cooperative Reconstruction Center	Joint organizer

PARTICIPANTS

The workshop in Tokyo was participated by external aid organizations, mainly NGOs. The workshop in the three Tohoku prefectures were participated mainly by local NPOs, intermediate aid organizations, the Social Welfare Councils, local staff members of NGOs and the municipal personnel. The general public was encouraged to participate, and at the same time, persons and organizations related to and knowledgeable about external aid were individually invited following the recommendations by persons who are familiar with the local situations.⁷

The total number of participants was 115: Tokyo (34 persons), Iwate (21 persons), Miyagi (29 persons) and Fukushima (31 persons). The total number of participating organizations was 90: Tokyo (23 organizations), Iwate (19 organizations), Miyagi (25 organizations) and Fukushima (23 organizations) (Figure 3). The types of participated organization were as on Figure 4.




Figure 3. The number of participants and organizations by prefecture

⁶ Private organizations established not for profit but for promoting social welfare activities in the private sector based on the Social Welfare Service Act enacted in 1951.

⁷ Interviewees and members of the Review Committees




Figure 4. The number of participants and organizations by organization type

WORKSHOP PROCEDURE

In participatory group works, problems,⁸ and their causes and countermeasures⁹ of external aid in the Great East Japan Earthquake were discussed. The issues selected through desk review had been distributed prior to the workshop in Tokyo, and for the workshops in the three Tohoku prefectures, what had been discussed in Tokyo was distributed in advance. FAJ played the role of facilitator in the following procedure:

- (1) A participant raises a problem about external aid and shared it in a small group of 3-4 members
- (2) Important topics are described in writing and shared with all.
- (3) Divided into groups, each group discusses and summarizes causes and countermeasures of the issue.
- (4) Sharing and feedback by all (interim presentation)
- (5) Discussion on feedback
- (6) Sharing by all (final presentation)

Participants of the Tokyo Workshop were divided into four groups by the categories of management/improvement system, capacity (human and financial resources), information sharing/coordination,¹⁰ and partnership (relationships with specific partners). On the other hand, in the three Tohoku workshops, the topic was limited to “collaboration system” instead of dividing into groups as above, because although participants were knowledgeable about the situation of recipients, issues within organizations varied depending on the type of organization, which would make joint review difficult. The issue of “problems in collaboration” discussed in the Tokyo workshop was reviewed more deeply in Tohoku by encouraging feedback on their causes and countermeasures.

⁸ A facilitator explained, “Please enter problems of outside supporters and their activities, what you think was good, and what stood in the way of support.” The word “issue” was also used in place of “problem.”

⁹ It was also explained as “a clue for improvement” during the workshop. Both expressions are unified as “countermeasures” in this book.

¹⁰ The word “coordination” was used during the workshop. To be referred to as “coordination” hereinafter.

FLOW OF WORKSHOP



Discussion (small group)

(1) Participants raise problems and share them in a small group of 3-4 members (Iwate workshop)



Discussion (large group)

(4) Divided into groups to discuss causes and measures to solve the problems classified in procedure (3) (Iwate workshop)



Interim presentation

(2) Describe important problems in writing and share them with all (Fukushima workshop)



Final presentation

(5) Share what was discussed to all (Miyagi workshop)



rough classification

(3) Classify the issues that are shared in procedure (2) (Iwate workshop)



final presentation #2

(6) In some workshops, additional presentation was held after discussing feedbacks from sharing (Tokyo workshop)

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

As part of follow-up survey, questionnaire was developed based on what was discussed during the workshops.¹¹ The targets were citizens' groups which came from outside of the disaster-stricken areas (referred to as "external aid organizations" hereinafter), local NPOs and private organizations which had been conducting activities in the stricken areas (including community councils, etc., referred to as "local organizations" hereinafter), and residents who had received some kind of assistance from external aid organizations after the disaster (referred to as "residents" hereinafter).

Answers from external aid organizations and local organizations were collected at the special website or via e-mail to the mailing lists of JANIC, Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN), Fukushima Cooperative Reconstruction Center, Miyagi Cooperative Reconstruction Center, and Iwate Cooperative Reconstruction Center and through announcement to participants of the 4 workshops of this project and of past related workshops. However, as such announcement is difficult to reach the residents or beneficiaries, the members of the Review Committee and local network organizations contacted leaders of community councils and implementing agencies, and two surveyors of the project visited the areas during the answering period to conduct interview to residents to fill out the questionnaire.



Trained staff conducted questionnaire survey in person to the people in the affected communities

During the questionnaire answering period of January 27 through February 27, 2014, replies were obtained from 77 members from 72 external aid organizations, 68 members from 66 local organizations, and 270 residents of the stricken areas.¹² Breakdown of the number of respondents is shown in the table below.

	Iwate	Miyagi	Fukushima
External aid organizations ¹³	45	55	29
Local organizations ¹⁴	21	20	28
Residents ¹⁵	67	123	80

INTERVIEW SURVEY 2

As part of follow-up survey, interview survey was carried out from January to February, 2014. While the interview survey 1 targeted mainly at key persons of NGOs and local NPOs, the interview survey 2 was conducted to confirm the findings at the workshops and to carry out questionnaire survey targeting mainly at leaders of community councils of temporary housing and authorities in charge of village offices representing the ultimate beneficiaries.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

As part of follow-up survey, focus group discussions¹⁶ were held. It is for persons sharing the same features and interests gather together and have deep discussions on them. The selected topics were those who had been

¹¹ Questions and results of questionnaire are described in detail in the annex (publicized on the website of JANIC).

¹² Local organizations and residents helped to distribute questionnaires when related persons visited the stricken areas in Kesennuma and Ishinomaki.

¹³ Other than from 3 prefectures in Tohoku, Tokyo 9% (7 respondents), and others 20% (15 respondents).

¹⁴ Others (2 respondents)

¹⁵ Age and sex of the respondents of residents are as follows: female 56.3% (152), male 43.7% (118), 60th 20.4% (55), 70th 17.4% (47), 50th 17.0% (46), 40th 14.8% (40), 30th 13.3% (36), 80th or over 7.8% (21), 20th 6% (7), 10th 3% (8), and 10th 3.0% (8).

¹⁶ Focus group discussion (Bibliography 3-8, pg105)

identified as lacking information or having priority during the workshops. The draft topics were reviewed during the 3rd Review Committee meeting. Topics or issues that could be or should be covered by questionnaire were excluded from the final selection of the topics.

Date	Topic	Participants
January 31, 2014	Social Welfare Councils and assistance from outside	Miyagi Prefectural Social Welfare Council (3), Ishinomaki City Social Welfare Council (2), Kesenuma City Social Welfare Council (1), Higashimatsushima City Social Welfare Council (2), Onagawa Town Social Welfare Council (1): 9 in total
February 1	Assistance to IDPs (internally displaced persons or evacuees to outside of prefecture spread throughout Japan)	6 evacuees from within 20km from power plant
February 4	Assistance to temporary rental houses	7 members of Yamada Town Social Welfare Council
February 19	International standard of assistance	11 NGO-related participants of the Q& A working group ¹⁷



focus group discussion by members of the Social Welfare Councils (left)
focus group discussion by IDPs (right)

1.7. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROJECT

The results, observations and conclusions in this book must be interpreted taking the following restrictions into consideration:

(1) Prioritization of NGOs: Although the review target is the entire civil society, it is difficult to study countless activities that vary in nature. Respecting such opinion of the Review Committee, the project reviewed mainly NGOs. However, the activities of civil society organizations such as NPOs were not excluded in the process.

(2) Unspecified number of the target organizations: Unlike an evaluation of a specific project by a specific organization, the project reviews “external aid” as a whole targeting at an unspecified number of organizations and activities. This is suitable for flexibly looking at the comprehensive picture of “external aid,” but not for specific and detailed evaluation.

(3) Considerations to ease the burden of local stakeholders: From the desk review at the preparation stage and advice from related persons, it was assumed that the residents were exhausted by researches and interviews by the government, researchers and the press, and that it was becoming difficult for local organizations to receive subsidies and therefore cooperating in survey would cause a burden. Therefore, questionnaire and interview surveys were conducted to persons who were introduced from leaders of community councils and implementing agencies instead of making door-to-door visits. As the result, the answers might be biased to groups that are cooperative to this kind of survey.

¹⁷ Abbreviation of the Quality & Accountability working group which was established in order to share information, learn and develop human resources concerning humanitarian aid regarding to international standard for humanitarian aid.

(4) Limitations of local recognition: The questionnaire was basically designed based on the problems and causes that had been identified at joint peer review workshops, but it also includes some specialized matters. Many residents do not know which assistance came from whom or cannot clearly distinguish those from administrative agencies, NGOs/NPOs or volunteers. Considering this, we took the following two measures: 1) replacing the terms “external aid organizations” and “NGOs” by “non-administrative organizations that came from outside of the area”, and 2) conducting questionnaire to residents through face-to-face interview in which researcher trained on emotions of disaster victims explain the meanings of questions. However, there are still limitations as the residents are not informed on which relief activities are from whom.

(5) The negative cost of focusing on problems and causes: This review is not able to fully capture innumerable good practices at the cost of focusing on “problems” and their “causes.”

(6) Nature of emergency relief activities with no target value: As in any emergency relief activities, this project did not have “target values” that had been developed and agreed at the planning stage. Therefore, it was impossible to evaluate the “achievement level” against such targets and difficult to verify in a quantitative manner (refer to “DAC evaluation criteria”).

1.8. OUTLINE OF REVIEW METHODS

This project is not an “evaluation¹⁸” project in a strict sense, but has been designed to gain understanding by writing in the international lingua franca and by summarizing and analyzing in accordance with the international evaluation criteria¹⁹ for the following reasons²⁰:

- (1) To keep a certain level of objectivity in reviewing criteria of each theme
- (2) To make it easier to compare with and refer to other domestic and international evaluations
- (3) To apply when to make suggestions to improve relief activities in the future

At the preparation stage, 232 issues extracted from documents concerning the measures against the disaster were organized and analyzed. Once the situation of assistance was roughly outlined, 16 indicators applicable to the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake were selected from international evaluation standards, namely, DAC evaluation criteria, “HAP Standard 2010 in humanitarian accountability and quality management” (referred to as “the HAP Standard” hereinafter), the check list of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (referred to as “ALNAP” hereinafter), and Core Standards of the Sphere Project. And then the opinions from the participants of the project were classified into Themes 1 - 10 in order to review the relief activities in the Great East Japan Earthquake.

DESK REVIEW

At the preparation stage of the project of May to June 2013, desk review was conducted to consider what to review in particular and how. In the process of determining what to review, the cases with 232 problems that have been pointed out, good practices and opinions were extracted and organized as sample topics from the existing materials concerning assistance of the Great East Japan Earthquake,²¹ which are classified as follows:

Classification	More specific classification	Number of topics ²²
Internal issues	Decision-making process	15
	Organizational system/management	15
	Human and financial resources (capacity)	17
Collaboration issues	Information sharing	15
	Coordination	35

¹⁸ Here, it means to “measure achievement against the goal.”

¹⁹ Details of international evaluation indexes and the theme are omitted in this book. For more details, see “EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION” (2013) by Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), etc.

²⁰ Precise evaluation was difficult for this project because the review targets are activities of many organizations with different phases and purposes. It is expected that each executing organization shall evaluate its own project.

²¹ Bibliography 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-6, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5

²² The number of extracted topics does not reflect the importance of issue classification.

	Acceptance/management of volunteers	19
	Partnership	74
External environment	Social background/system/policy	42

SELECION OF EVALUATION CRITERIA AND INDICATORS

Themes to be discussed deeply in this project were considered referring to these topics, the above mentioned 4 international evaluation standards and the following 4 criteria based on the aim of the project.

Criteria for selecting themes of the desk review

- **Concreteness:** The problem is actually occurring and specific cases have been reported and pointed out.
- **Generality:** The event is observed widely to a certain extent, not limited to particular individuals or organizations.
- **Feasibility:** It is expected to occur during disasters in the future and it is worth considering measures.²³
- **Importance:** It is prioritized in international standards concerning quality of assistance.²⁴

As a result, the following 10 themes and 16 evaluation indicators were selected:

#	Theme	Indicator	Source
1	Assistance that meets local needs provided?	• Relevance	DAC
2	Comprehensive assistance provided?	• Coverage • Gender equality • Special support	DAC ALNAP Sphere
3	Assistance brought any further damage to the people? ²⁵	• Coping strategies and resilience • Do no harm ²⁶	ALNAP Sphere
4	Accountability to beneficiaries fulfilled?	• Establishing and delivering on commitments	HAP Standard
5	Opinions of the local stakeholders considered and reflected?	• Handling complaints • Participation ²⁷	HAP Standard HAP Standard, ALNAP
6	Review and improvement constantly made?	• Learning and continual improvement	HAP Standard
7	Short-term assistance led to long-term assistance?	• Connectedness	DAC
8	Staff's safety ensured?	• Health, safety and security	People in Aid
9	Organization had enough capacities?	• Human resources and management • Funding base	ALNAP -
10	Collaborated and cooperated well with other organizations?	• Information sharing and coordination ²⁸ • Collaboration	Sphere Sphere

International evaluation standards and check list referred in selection of indicators are as follows:

DAC EVALUATION CRITERIA

In an evaluation of development project in international cooperation, the most common criteria at the planning stage are the 5 evaluation criteria presented in 1991 by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), namely, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The standard method of evaluation is to develop target values at the planning stage accordingly and evaluate the project based on the achievement level against the values. Since around 2000, it is

²³ In discussing probability, "feasibility to take measures" was considered to be one of the criteria. In other words, it was decided. not to select as a theme if taking measures would not be effective at all because the occurrence is largely caused due to external factors.

²⁴ Mainly referring to Bibliography 3-3, 3-14, 3-15, 3-24.

²⁵ Refer to the Principle 1 of right protection. It implies conflicts and violence, but it is reinterpreted in the context of this particular disaster.

²⁶ This indicator was not suggested in the first draft of evaluation indicators, but was added because there were more than one case in which relief activities affected the recipients adversely. The phrase "Do No Harm" often implies that "support might intensify the conflict" (Bibliography 3-22), but here, it is interpreted as "support does not affect adversely" in a wide sense.

²⁷ Based on the ALNAP cross-sectorial themes and HAP's achievement goals.

²⁸ This indicator was not suggested in the first draft of evaluation indexes, but was incorporated in relation with the core criteria of the Sphere Standards. It was also considered in the case of Haiti (Bibliography3-7) but was not incorporated due to the restrictions of time and budget.

becoming a mainstream to use appropriate criteria from the following expanded 7 criteria depending on the context.²⁹

Relevance/Appropriateness		Connectedness
Coherence	Coverage	Efficiency
Effectiveness	Impact	

Although it is recommended to use all of the DAC evaluation criteria, the ALNAP emphasizes the importance to conduct evaluation respecting the context and reality taking the following restrictions into consideration³⁰ in emergency humanitarian relief:

- It is difficult to obtain data or information because of frequent replacement of staff members.
- Activities are often started after a short period of planning without setting goals or indicators.
- It is difficult to identify the cause because the activities are started in confusion and the environment changes quickly.

ALNAP CROSS-SECTORAL CHECK LIST

In addition to the evaluation criteria of the DAC, the ALNAP recommends to consider the following 8 criteria in the guidelines³¹ for using the DAC criteria as the cross-sectoral check list according to the context.³²

The influence and understanding of local context	
Human resources and management	Protection
Participation of primary stakeholders	Environment
Coping strategies and resilience	HIV/AIDS
Gender equality	

HAP STANDARD

The HAP Standard is “international criteria setting goals in order to improve the quality of humanitarian aid, by fulfilling accountability, which is generally limited only to donors, to beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and thereby reflecting beneficiaries’ feedback on planning, implementation and evaluation of the aid programme.” The HAP Standard defines accountability as “the right of those who are affected by exercise of authority” and adds that “accountability to disaster victims helps organizations develop quality programmes that meet those people’s needs and reduces the possibility of mistakes, abuse and corruption.”

In the project’s desk review, in addition to DAC’s 7 evaluation criteria and ALNAP’s 8 cross-sectoral criteria, 6 achievement goals (establishing and delivering on commitments, staff competency, information sharing, participation, handling complaints, and learning and continual improvement) of the HAP Standard were suggested.

SPHERE PROJECT

The Sphere Project was started in 1997 by NGOs of humanitarian aid and International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The purpose is to improve the quality of actions in disaster relief and fulfill the accountability. Sphere is based two beliefs: (1) those affected by disaster have the right to live with dignity and a right to assistance, and (2) all possible steps should be taken to alleviate humanitarian suffering arising out of calamity and conflict.³³ This review referred its Humanitarian Charter, Protection Principle, and Core Standards, in particular.

²⁹ Three out of the 5 existing evaluation reports referred to in the bibliographic survey (Bibliography 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5) are using the evaluation criteria based on the 5 indicators of OECD/DAC bibliographic survey.

³⁰ Bibliography 3-2

³¹ Bibliography 3-3

³² The joint evaluation in Haiti (Bibliography 3-7) applies this form excluding Human Resources and Management and HIV/AIDS.

³³ Bibliography 3-15

OUTPUTS

The review results of the project are compiled in the final report in Japanese and English in March 2014 and distributed to related domestic and international entities. It will also be used for suggestions to the post-Hyogo Framework for Action 2 (HFA2) to be developed in 2015 and reflected on programs to improve the disaster response capacity of civil society organizations.


CHAPTER 2

DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND MAJOR RELIEF ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 2. DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND MAJOR RELIEF ACTIVITIES

2.1. DAMAGE

The Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale on March 11, 2011 was followed by a tsunami and radioactive contamination triggered by a nuclear accident. It was an extensive compound disaster called the Great East Japan Earthquake.



Source : Website of tohoku gakuin university³⁴
Figure 5. Height of tsunami around the coast of Tohoku

An earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale, the largest in the history of Japan's meteorological observation and the fourth greatest in the world, occurred at 2:46 p.m. The epicenter was located 130 km offshore of Sanriku, Miyagi Prefecture, at a depth of 24 km. Kurihara City, Miyagi Prefecture, marked a maximum seismic intensity of 7 and a wide area of the Tohoku and Kanto regions including Fukushima and Iwate Prefecture recorded an intensity of 5 or 6.³⁵ Before long, a massive tsunami triggered off by this earthquake engulfed the Pacific coast, adding to the damage. In less than a quarter of an hour after the earthquake occurred, a 9.3-meter-high tsunami surged toward Souma City, Fukushima Prefecture and a tsunami with a height exceeding

³⁴ The height of the tsunami wave at the places marked in blue was announced by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA). That of the tsunami wave at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was announced by TEPCO. That of the tsunami wave marked in green is the figure released on the website of the "Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake Tsunami Joint Survey Group." JMA's data indicates the height of the tsunami wave estimated from evidence, except for Sekinehama, Mutsu City. Among the heights released by the Joint Survey Group, the figure marked in red is run-up height <http://www.tohoku-gakuin.jp/about/sinsai/record/chap_7/chap-07_07.html>.

³⁵ For the outline of the earthquake and tsunami, see the JMA's website "Great East Japan Earthquake - Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake - Related portal site."

8 meters³⁶ struck the cities of Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture, and Ofunato and Miyako, Iwate Prefecture. A tsunami with a run-up height of more than 40 meters recorded onshore at Omoeaneyoshi, Miyako City, was one of the largest tsunamis in the history of Japan's meteorological observation (Figure 5). Although an evacuation advisory about a massive tsunami was issued, the tsunami caused a great loss of life and buildings.

According to the National Police Agency, the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami is as shown in the table below. The death toll confirmed as of January 10, 2014 was 15,884, the number of missing persons was 2,640, and the number of completely- and partially-destroyed houses amounted to 400,000. Three prefectures in the Tohoku region, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, were severely damaged. There were also a large number of partially-destroyed houses on the coast of the Kanto region including Ibaraki and Chiba Prefecture (Table 1).

Table 1 Damage caused by the great east japan earthquake and tsunami

Prefecture	Human damage (the number of people)		Building damage (the number of buildings)	
	Death toll	Missing persons	Completely-destroyed	Partially-destroyed
Iwate	4,673	1,142	18,460	6,563
Miyagi	9,537	1,287	82,909	155,084
Fukushima	1,607	207	21,225	73,293
Hokkaido and other prefectures in the Tohoku region	6	1	308	705
Ibaraki	24	1	2,628	24,325
Chiba	21	2	801	10,120
Tochigi	4	0	261	2,118
Other prefectures in the Kanto region	8	0	39	445
Total	15,880	2,640	126,631	272,653

Source: National Police Agency, January 10, 2014; prepared by JANIC based on "damage caused by the Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake in 2011 and action taken by police"

The Cabinet Office (the Minister of State for Disaster Management) estimated that the direct financial damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake was 16.9 trillion yen (Table 2). This estimate far exceeded the amount of damage of 9.6 trillion yen from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that registered a magnitude of 7.3 on the Richter scale in 1995. The Great East Japan Earthquake inflicted the most damage on houses, factories, and other buildings. The earthquake caused more damage to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries than the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake did.

Table 2 Estimated damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake

Damage to	Amount
Buildings (houses, housing sites, stores, offices, factories, machinery, etc.)	10.4 trillion yen
Lifeline utilities (water supply, gas, electricity, communication, and broadcasting facilities)	1.3 trillion yen
Infrastructure (rivers, roads, ports and harbors, sewer systems, airports, etc.)	2.2 trillion yen
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (farmland, agricultural facilities, forest land, and fisheries facilities)	1.9 trillion yen
Others	1.1 trillion yen
Total	16.9 trillion yen

Source : Excerpt from "estimated damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake" published by the Cabinet Office in June 24, 2011

³⁶ Height of the tsunami measured on the sea at the automatic tide-gage station. See "Great East Japan Earthquake - Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake - Related portal site" on JMA's website.

An unfortunate coincidence between two events—a natural disaster and a nuclear accident—was one of the principal characteristics of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of the Tokyo Electric Power Company, located in Futaba-gun, Fukushima Prefecture on the Pacific coast, suffered serious damage from the earthquake and tsunami. The reactor cooling system and the power supply were crippled by the earthquake and tsunami. As the water level lowered, the fuel rods exposed to the air were heated to a high temperature and the reaction of hydrogen with steam caused an explosion. The explosion damaged the reactor building, releasing large amounts of radioactive substances into the air.³⁷ Furthermore, a flow of groundwater and rainwater into the building generated a massive amount of contaminated water. The disposal of the contaminated water still remains as an unsolved issue.

Shortly after the occurrence of the accident, an area within a radius of 20 kilometers from the accident site was designated a planned evacuation zone.³⁸ For this reason, a large number of residents were forced to evacuate and there are still many people who cannot return home and internally displaced. Also, the agricultural and fisheries industries have been affected: if radioactive substances in farm and marine products that exceed the guideline values are detected, the government issues a directive for restricting shipment of the products.³⁹ Even if radioactive substances in farm and marine products exceeding guideline values are not detected, the consumers living outside the Tohoku region are reluctant to buy products grown or caught in Tohoku. Damage caused by rumors is one of the factors hindering industrial rehabilitation.

2.2. EVACUATION OF RESIDENTS

Table 3 shows change in the number of evacuees taken based on the data of the Reconstruction Agency. There are 270,000 evacuees living within and outside their prefecture all over the country as of December 2013. The evacuees are scattered in all parts of the country including the Kanto area, Okinawa, and Hokkaido.⁴⁰ There are a predominant number of evacuees in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures. The table below shows that after the designation of the area as a planned evacuation zone was lifted⁴¹ and the restoration progressed, more evacuees were allowed to return to their home in 2013 than in 2012. More than 50,000 residents, however, are still displaced and forced to live outside their prefecture (Table 4).

Table 3. Statistics for disaster evacuees throughout the country Unit: person

Evacuated region	December 2011	December 2012	December 2013
Hokkaido	3,011	2,981	2,728
Tohoku (Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima)	261,710	251,869	215,927
Tohoku (Others)	23,535	19,397	13,130
Kanto	31,272	34,086	30,191
Tokai-hokuriku	3,064	2,898	2,699
Kinki	4,709	4,215	3,752
Chugoku	1,549	1,967	1,983
Shikoku	650	536	480
Kyushu and Okinawa	3,191	3,484	3,198
Total	332,691	321,433	274,088

Source : victim support information in the website of the reconstruction agency compiled by JANIC

³⁷ For the circumstances of the accident, visit TEPCO's website "Outline of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant."

³⁸ Visit the website of the Prime Minister's Office and see the prime minister's directive dated March 12, 2011

<<http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/20110312siji11.pdf>> and that dated April 22 <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/201104220944siji.pdf>>.

³⁹ The prime minister's latest directive was issued on December 18, 2013. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/saigai/pdf/20131218siji_fukushima.pdf>

⁴⁰ "Wide-area evacuees" is a general term for those who are displaced and evacuate outside the local administrative area where their home is located, particular to outside of their home prefecture. Source: "Report on the actual condition of support to wide-area evacuees in the social welfare councils" in August 2013.

⁴¹ For example, the planned evacuation zones in Katsurao village and Tomioka town, Fukushima Prefecture, were reorganized in March 2013 and that in Namie town in April 2013.

Table 4. Statistics for evacuees from three prefectures of tohoku to other prefectures Unit: person

Prefecture	December 2011	December 2012	December 2013
From Fukushima	59,464	57,954	48,944
From Miyagi	8,603	8,079	7,159
From Iwate	1,536	1,674	1,501
Total	69,603	67,707	57,604

Source : victim support information in the website of the reconstruction agency compiled by JANIC

2.3. CONDITION OF RESIDENTS

Dividing the post-disaster period into phases differs depending on the circumstances of the affected areas and people. In this report, we divide it to three phases of (1) emergency period (for 3 months after the disaster), (2) recovery period (3 to 6 months after the disaster), and (3) rehabilitation period (half a year or later after the disaster), considering the number of evacuees under shelter, the number of completed temporary housing, and restoration of lifeline.

EMERGENCY PERIOD (FOR THREE MONTHS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER)

In the emergency period, the residents were faced with very difficult situations because many houses and lifelines were lost in the earthquake disaster. Most of the residents who lost their house evacuated to a temporary shelter or a relative's or acquaintance's house.⁴² There were 390 thousand evacuees in temporary shelters immediately after the disaster. In addition to rescue, improvement of temporary shelters, emergency supplies, and food aid were needed. In this period, as there was a decline in function of the administrative organs in the affected area, citizens' organizations with mobile power extended emergency assistance from outside of the disaster area. Moreover, the Social Welfare Council of each local government launched a disaster volunteer center (disaster VC). The most volunteers were mobilized in this period.

The water supply to 2.56 million houses was cut off immediately after the onset of the disaster.⁴³ Water was supplied by water wagons and the sewer was temporarily repaired in May to enable the residents to drain wastewater away.⁴⁴ The power supply to 480 thousand households was cut off⁴⁵ and the city gas supply to 460 thousand households was suspended until it was almost restored on May 3.⁴⁶ The national roads were almost restored to serviceable condition by April 10, which helped many volunteers enter the affected area. Fixed-line phone was restored to its normal condition by the end of April. Virtually no damage was done to broadcasting except for some areas.

RECOVERY PERIOD (FOR THREE TO SIX MONTHS AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER)

In the recovery period, some evacuees started to move from the shelters to the temporary housing. The number of evacuees under the shelters was about 40,000 in June 2011 but some 30,000 temporary houses were already built. There was a shift from emergency aid to the shelters to assistance to the temporary houses. In addition to relief supplies and food aid, medical care, mental health care, education, and employment support systems were needed.

The city gas almost returned to normal on May 3 and the Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. restored electricity in most areas by the middle of June.⁴⁷ Water supply and sewage system were almost restored by the middle of July. The expressways became serviceable again except for some sections, enabling the transportation of relief supplies.

⁴² Visit the Reconstruction Agency's website "Victim support information."

⁴³ See the "Final report on the Great East Japan Earthquake water supply facility damage survey" prepared by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.

⁴⁴ See the "Reconstruction Policy on Public Infrastructure" by the Reconstruction Headquarters in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake in November 2011.

⁴⁵ Visit the website of Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc. "Power Failure caused by Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake."


⁴⁶ See the "Investigative Report on City Gas Supply in Disaster Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake."

⁴⁷ Visit the Cabinet Office's website "Infrastructure Damage/Recovery Condition (in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures)."

REHABILITATION PERIOD (HALF A YEAR OR LATER AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER)

In the rehabilitation period, more evacuees moved from the shelters to the temporary housing. There were about 3,500 evacuees under the shelter and 50,000 temporary houses were built as of September, half a year after the disaster. The number of evacuees under the shelters continued to decline after then up to 388 in May 2012. However, the rate of temporary housing construction slowed down, reaching only 52,000 houses in total in March 2012.

By the end of March 2013, the basic lifeline of electricity, water supply and gas was restored. The Sendai Airport was reopened to traffic on October 1, 2012 and 68 out of 76 railroad lines were reopened to traffic. During FY2013, the full-scale recovery of the highways under the direct control of the government was completed.



Source : Produced by JANIC on the basis of “disaster victim support information” in the Reconstruction agency’s website and “statistics of the number of commenced and completed emergency temporary houses” published by The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in march 2013

Figure 6. Statistics of evacuees by facility

Table 5 Condition where the residents are placed

		Emergency period	Recovery period	Rehabilitation period
Life line	House building	Evacuate to shelters or inns/hotels. Construction of temporary houses begins.	Begin to move from the shelters to the temporary houses. Supply of some houses is delayed and some residents become wide-area evacuees.	Move from the shelters to the temporary houses, except wide-area evacuees.
	Electricity	Blackout affected about 480,000 households all over the Tohoku region.	The Tohoku Electric Power Company resumed the power supply by June 18 except for some areas.	
	Water supply and sewerage systems	Suspension of the water supply affected about 2.56 million households in 19 prefectures. Emergency water supply by water truck. Sewer system was temporarily restored by May to allow the residents flush waste water.	Restored 98% by July 12, except areas where houses were wiped out by tsunami.	
	Gas	Suspension of the city gas supply affected 460 thousand households in eight prefectures.		
	Communications/broadcasting	The NTT's fixed- phone line exchange and the mobile phone service area were restored by the end of April except for some places. Broadcasting relay station was suspended at 120 for TV and 4 for radio.	As of July 14, only 1 broadcasting relay station out of 56 was functioning in Miyagi Prefecture.	
	Transportation	The national highways were almost restored by April 10.	The expressways were restored except for some sections.	The railroad resumed operation on 67 out of the affected 76 lines by Nov. 29, 2011. Sendai Airport restored its function by October 1, 2012. The highways under the direct control of the government attained the full-scale recovery by the end of 2013.
Assistance required by the residents		Lifesaving (72 hours after the disaster) Daily necessities/food aid	Medical care, education, employment support as well as supplies and food	Assistance that does not interfere with self-sustained restoration.

Source : prepared by janic on the basis of “rehabilitation policy related to public infrastructure” by the great east japan earthquake countermeasures headquarters on November 29, 2011; “victim support information” on the reconstruction agency’s website; “power failure accompanied by the tohoku region pacific coast earthquake” on the tohoku electric power company’s website; infrastructure damage and restoration condition (in iwate, miyagi, and fukushima prefectures) on the cabinet office’s website; “contingency planning study report on city gas supply in the great east japan earthquake” by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2012; and “water supply facilities damage condition investigation final report in the great east japan earthquake” by the ministry of health, labor and welfare in March 2013.

2.4. CONTEXT OF THE AFFECTED AREAS

It is required for the aid organizations to understand the local context of the affected areas and extend assistance that meets their needs. Before verifying each theme, we summarize the characteristics of the Great East Japan Earthquake on the basis of the document study in the following five points.

CHARACTERISTICS 1 : DIASPER IN A DEVELOPED COUNTRY

There is a great difference in the government’s emergency response capacity between developed and developing countries. In a developing country, the United Nations and the external aid organizations such as NGOs play a leading role in launching an assistance mechanism. Differed from a developing country, a developed country has the government and administrative agencies with extremely high response capacity. The system established mainly by the government coped with the earthquake and the administrative agencies began to

construct temporary houses only two months after the occurrence of the disaster.⁴⁸ This is an example of their high response capacity.

CHARACTERISTICS 2 : TOHOKU REGION SUFFERING FROM THE PROBLEM OF AGING AND DEPOPULATION

The disaster-stricken area was suffering from the problem of aging and depopulation because of its higher percentage of senior citizens and its higher population decrease rate than the national average.⁴⁹ The problem of industrial decline and deindustrialization that the community had been faced with before the disaster has been a hindrance to recovery and restoration. The residents of the prefectures of the Tohoku region can be characterized as being reserved.

CHARACTERISTICS 3 : DISASTER-STRICKEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The local governments play an important role in assisting disaster victims. Many administrative agencies were also affected by this earthquake. As an example, a large staff including the mayor in Otsuchi-cho, Iwate Prefecture, fell the victims of the earthquake and many lives of the local administration were lost in Rikuzentakata City, Iwate Prefecture, and Minamisanrikucho, Miyagi Prefecture.⁵⁰

CHARACTERISTICS 4 : WIDE-AREA ASSISTANCE

According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the tsunami flooded area was 535 km². Also, according to the Reconstruction Agency, the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake evacuated to 1,200 municipalities in 47 prefectures all over the country as of January 16, 2014. The number of evacuees from Fukushima, Miyagi, and Iwate Prefectures to the outside of their own prefecture amounted to 48,364, 7,094, and 1,486, respectively. The assistance need to cover wide areas of disaster-stricken area and the evacuees' place of residence.

CHARACTERISTICS 5 : FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND PROBLEM OF RADIOACTIVITY

Radiation disaster caused by the Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and the accompanying damage caused by rumors made it difficult to take some emergency measures such as rescue operations and rubble removal and forced many residents to live in evacuation shelters. Opinion is widely divided on the impact of radioactivity on the human body. Radioactivity has greatly affected the daily life of the residents and the recovery and restoration of the local community.

2.5. EXPLANATION OF STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

(1) GOVERNMENT

First of all, the national government set up a Prime Minister's Countermeasures Office to cope with the Great East Japan Earthquake immediately after the occurrence of the disaster. Then after the Cabinet decision, the government established the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters headed by the prime minister based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law to take emergency countermeasures against the earthquake. On March 12, the government established an emergency operations center (with the Minister of State being chief) in Miyagi Prefecture and an emergency operations liaison office each in Iwate and Fukushima Prefecture. Furthermore, at the 12th Disaster Headquarters Meeting held on March 17, the government decided to set up the Special Task Force in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims under the Disaster Response Headquarters in view of the fact that victims' livelihood support was an urgent issue. This task force was renamed the Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims on May 9. Through this mechanism, the government took

⁴⁸ See the support track record review survey for the Great East Japan Earthquake from overseas. <http://www.idcj.or.jp/pdf/idcjr201402.pdf>

⁴⁹ See the White Paper of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. <http://www.mlit.go.jp/hakusho/mlit/h22/hakusho/h23/html/k1125000.html>

⁵⁰ <http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-05/index.html>

countermeasures against the Great East Japan Earthquake and at the same time promulgated and enacted on June 24 the Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake that stipulated the basic idea concerning reconstruction from the disaster and the duties of the central and local governments. The government set up the Reconstruction Headquarters in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake on the basis of this act and decided the Basic Policy on Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.⁵¹

In parallel with the constitution of the framework of the government and law, the primary supplementary budget of 4.0153 trillion yen was approved on May 2 for the expenditures on emergency response to the Great East Japan Earthquake needed within the fiscal year. The budget includes the expenditures for the provision of emergency temporary houses, the disposal of waste and rubbles generated by the tsunami, and the recovery from damage to public facilities such as schools. On July 25, the second supplementary budget of 1.9988 trillion yen was brought into force for the expenditures concerning the Atomic Energy Damage Compensation Law, the expenditures to solve the overlapping debt problem, and the natural disaster victim relief financial aid/subsidy. On November 21, the third supplementary budget of 11.7335 trillion yen was approved as a budget for full-scale recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and nuclear disaster toward the implementation of the above-mentioned Basic Policy on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.⁵²

Also, the government conducted the following direct assistance activities: large-scale rescue and relief activities in cooperation with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Police Agency, Japan Coast Guard, and Self-Defense Forces; procurement and transportation of supplies to victims; financial assistance to the local governments for prompt emergency restoration; provision and clear explanation of information to NGOs/NPOs engaged in victim relief activities and support of their activities.⁵³

The Reconstruction Agency will have been set up in the Cabinet until March 31, 2021 to help the Cabinet Secretariat attend to the Cabinet's affairs concerning the recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and smoothly and promptly conduct administrative affairs concerning the recovery.⁵⁴

(2) LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

The administrative agencies of the affected prefectures and municipalities implement the Basic Policy on Reconstruction in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake formulated by the government and provide assistance to the victims utilizing the supplementary budget. The annual revenue of nine specified affected prefectures⁵⁵ is about 8.6% of that of the central government.⁵⁶ According to the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, the FY2011 total revenue of the nine specified affected prefectures was 12.1024 trillion yen, an increase of 3.4502 trillion yen (39.9% up, or 4.2% up across the country) on a year-on-year basis. The FY2011 total expenditure was 11.6440 trillion yen, an increase of 3.2196 trillion yen⁵⁷ (38.2% up or 3.9% up across the country) on a year-on-year basis. You can see that the revenue and expenditure sharply increased, compared to those before the occurrence of the disaster. Also, the FY2011 total revenue of 227 cities, towns, and villages designated the specified affected municipalities⁵⁸ was 7.2430 trillion yen or an increase of 1.2661 trillion yen (21.2% up, or 1.7% up across the country) on a year-on-year basis. The total expenditure was 6.8282 trillion yen or an increase of 1.0983 trillion yen (19.2% up or 1.5% up across the country) on a

⁵¹ See the Cabinet Office's disaster prevention information.

⁵² See the Cabinet Office's disaster prevention information. Also, for the second and third supplementary budgets, see the "Outline of FY2011 supplementary budget (No. 2)" and "Outline of FY2011 supplementary budget (No. 3)."

⁵³ See the Cabinet Office's disaster prevention information.

⁵⁴ Article 3 of the Law to Establish the Reconstruction Agency (Law No. 125 dated December 16, 2011)

⁵⁵ Prefectures, or the local governments in the specific disaster area which are defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of "Law concerning special financial aid and subsidy to cope with the Great East Japan Earthquake (Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Chiba, Niigata, and Nagano Prefecture).

⁵⁶ Compared with the revenue of nine specific disaster-stricken prefectures, with the FY2010 national revenue of 100 trillion 534.5 billion yen.

⁵⁷ The FY2010 revenue of three heavily damaged prefectures, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, totaled 2 trillion 473.1 billion yen. Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima accounted for 731.1 billion yen, 8.835 billion yen, and 8.585 billion yen, respectively, whereas the expenditure of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima was 7.311 billion yen, 8.484 billion yen, 8.264 billion yen, respectively. The figures of the revenues and expenditures are based on the "ordinary account settlement" for Iwate, the "FY2010 general account settlement" for Miyagi, and the "data on the financial condition" for Fukushima. The numbers were rounded off to the nearest 100 million yen.

⁵⁸ Municipalities, which are specified disaster-stricken local governments defined in Appendix 1 of the "Government ordinance that defines the municipalities in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2 of the law concerning special financial aid and subsidy to cope with the Great East Japan Earthquake" (Government Ordinance No. 127 in 2011) and municipalities other than the specified disaster-stricken local governments defined in Appendices 2 and 3 of the same ordinance (227 municipalities in 11 prefectures including 33 organizations in Iwate, 35 organizations in Miyagi, 59 organizations in Fukushima).

year-on-year basis. Although the increase rate in total revenue and expenditure of the specified affected municipalities is lower than that of the specified affected prefectures, both show an increase of about 20%.

In the affected area, the local administrations must take the following emergency measures⁵⁹: to determine the damage condition immediately after the occurrence of the disaster and conduct lifesaving activities; to request a wide-area assistance; to operate the temporary shelters and support the evacuees such as the provision of supplies; to resume the operation of important systems such as the issuance of passports, to make an emergency repair on the road and water supply and sewerage systems. However, the mayor of Otsuchi Town, Iwate Prefecture, was killed by the tsunami and the Basic Resident Register data was lost in Rikuzentakata City and Otsuchi Town, in Iwate Prefecture and in Minamisanriku Town and Onagawa Town, Miyagi Prefecture owing to the tsunami. When the public service personnel in charge of emergency response suffer disaster, it may be impossible to ascertain the residents' safety or determine the number of missing persons for some time.

(3) SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL

The Social Welfare Council (referred to as "SWC" hereinafter) is a private social welfare corporation involved in activities for solving community welfare problems with the residents, welfare service business operators, and welfare participants for the purpose of promoting community welfare.⁶⁰ The SWC consists of three organizations: a municipal Social Welfare Council that conducts activities in each community; a prefectural/designated city Social Welfare Council that supports the above; and a nation-wide Social Welfare Council that performs nation-wide liaison and coordination.⁶¹ A municipal SWC, which is often involved in relief activities conducted by an external aid organization, plays a role as a community social welfare activity base. In time of peace, a municipal SWC provides home-help and catering service; organizes "salon activities" through the cooperation of local volunteers where the elderly, the physically-challenged, and the parents and children can participate; provides advice on volunteer activities and introduces volunteer activities; and provides welfare education support to elementary, junior, and senior high schools.

In the latest great earthquake, the prefectural and municipal SWCs in the affected area played a leading role in setting up and operating the disaster volunteer centers⁶² (referred to as "disaster VCs" or "DVC" hereinafter) and conducting relief activities for the disaster victims in the temporary shelters such as preparation of hot meals, cleanup of damaged houses, and provision of supplies to the evacuees.⁶³ As a result, the SWCs opened 84 disaster VCs all over the country to support more than 1.17 million volunteers as of March 2013.⁶⁴

(4) INTERNATIONAL NGO

The international NGO (referred to as "NGO(s)" hereinafter) is organizations that cope with the global problems such as poverty, starvation, and environment across national, racial, and religious borders without pursuing their own interests from the perspective of the private sector different from that of the governments or international bodies.⁶⁵ Their activities can be roughly divided into four fields: development, environment, human rights, and peace. They play an active role particularly in education and childcare, healthcare, vocational training, gender equality and active participation of women in society, afforestation, and reconstruction assistance.⁶⁶ Some of them conduct advocacy and fair trade activities. The form of their activities includes financial assistance to overseas needy areas, emergency relief, provision of information to Japan, and global citizen education (development education).⁶⁷

There are more than 400 NGOs⁶⁸ in Japan. Although the exact number of groups engaged in relief activities in the Great East Japan Earthquake is unknown, about 38% (59 organizations) of the 157 full and supporting

⁵⁹ See the "Handbook about service continuation of local governments in the event of an earthquake and explanation."

⁶⁰ See the local welfare activity policy (guidelines) of the disaster area "Look into the future."

⁶¹ See "What is a social welfare council?" on the website of Japan National Council of Social Welfare.

⁶² According to the page of the Cabinet Office Disaster Prevention Volunteer, a disaster volunteer center refers to a base set up at the time of disaster to smoothly conduct disaster prevention volunteer activities in a disaster-stricken area. In recent years, a disaster volunteer center has been launched and operated in almost all the areas hit by a catastrophic disaster.

⁶³ See the "Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster Volunteer Center Report."

⁶⁴ See the "Volunteer activities at the time of disaster" on the website of Japan National Council of Social Welfare.

⁶⁵ Excerpt from the website of Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC).

⁶⁶ Excerpt from the website of Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC).

⁶⁷ Excerpt from the website of Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC).


⁶⁸ See "International cooperation" on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

members of JANIC has participated in some activities to cope with this earthquake.⁶⁹ JANIC is the largest NGO network organization in Japan. Twenty three groups out of the 59 JANIC members, or 40%, set up a new office and 17 groups dispatched the staff as resident agents.⁷⁰ The NGOs have conducted a wide range of relief activities in the Great East Japan Earthquake such as funding, food distribution, preparation of hot meals, distribution of relief supplies, health and mental care, operation of the temporary shelters, cleanup, education/public health, water/hygiene, transportation/logistics/communications, legal assistance, coordination/information sharing, temporary housing assistance, employment assistance, volunteer dispatching.

(5) NPO

The NPO is a general term for organizations which conduct a variety of social activities and do not intend to distribute the proceeds to their members. A corporation which obtains corporate status in accordance with the Law Concerning the Promotion of Specific-Non-Profit Organization Activities is allowed to represent itself as a specified nonprofit corporation. The NPO has basically a meaning similar to the NGO. However, since the NGO was first used as a term for the organizations other than the UN member states, it is often used for organizations involved in cross-border activities. In Japan, an organization involved in international cooperation and environment is called NGO.

The number of NPOs engaged in activities in Japan has been steadily increasing since the Law Concerning the Promotion of Specific-Non-Profit Organization Activities was enforced in 1998 and reached 48,611⁷¹ as of December 31, 2013. The number of NPOs as of December 2013 in the three disaster-stricken prefectures was 447 in Iwate Prefecture, 342 in Miyagi Prefecture, and 777 in Fukushima Prefecture. Let us look at the number of increased NPOs from 2007 when the disaster occurred to 2011 in the three prefectures. The NPOs increased most in 2011 in each prefecture, which suggests that many NPOs were launched on the occasion of the earthquake to step up civil activities (Figure 7).



Source : Prepared by JANIC from the data on the NPO website “Revised Law Concerning the Promotion of Specific-Non-Profit Organization”

Figure 7. Statistics of an annual increase in the number of NPOs in the three disaster-stricken prefectures

According to the survey conducted by the Japan Finance Corporation Research Institute in 2012,⁷² the average of the FY2010 total revenue was 33.49 million yen and the median was 14.30 million yen. The NPOs with a total revenue of less than 5 million yen accounted for 24.9% and those with a total revenue of less than 10 million yen 41%. This shows that there are many organizations operating with a budget scale below the average. The breakdown of their total revenue is as follows: the largest proportion consisted of the revenue from business activities on their own (37.3%), followed by programs commissioned by the administrative agencies (26.7%), subsidies/grants (14.3%), operating revenue from activities other than specified nonprofit activities (7.6%), contributions/supporting sponsorship fees (4.2%), membership/admission fees (4.2%), programs commissioned by the private sector (3.9%), and other proceeds (1.7%).

⁶⁹ Bibliography 1-2.

⁷⁰ Source: JANIC (November 2011)

⁷¹ For the description and statistics of NPO, see the Cabinet Office’s NPO website and the basics of NPO.

⁷² Tatsunori Fujii, Head researcher at the Japan Finance Corporation Research Institute “Reason for the existence of NPOs and their management challenge” Collection of papers No. 16 by Japan Finance Corporation (August 2012)
http://www.jfc.go.jp/n/findings/pdf/ronbun1208_03.pdf

Although the exact number of NPOs involved in activities to cope with the Great East Japan Earthquake is unknown, the number of NPOs in Japan registered on the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN)⁷³ amounts to 807 (including non-registered voluntary groups), while the number of organizations registered with the NPO Iwate *Fukko* Collaboration Center, NPO Miyagi, and NPO Fukushima is 10,⁷⁴ 5,⁷⁵ and approximately 90,⁷⁶ respectively. The NPO *Fukko* Collaboration Center (what we call *Renpuku*) is a network organization among supporting groups launched in the three disaster-stricken prefectures.

(6) PRIVATE SECTOR

The assistance of a disaster-stricken area provided by the business world has a history of nearly 20 years. According to the Report on the Disaster-Victim/Area Relief activities of the Business World in the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (JFEO) launched the 1% Club in 1990 to promote social contributions such as enterprises' and individuals' donations and volunteer work. Also, JFEO set up a policy planning committee called the Social Contribution Promotion Committee in July 1990 to provide information on contributions for the relief of the earthquake sufferers to the member companies and collect them through the 1% Club news every time a large-scale natural disaster occurs at home and abroad and many companies have made contributions.

Immediately after the earthquake occurred, JFEO set up the Great East Japan Earthquake Countermeasure Headquarters headed by Chairman Yonekura as Chief, making good use of the experience of conducting these disaster relief activities, and began to conduct the following three relief activities. The first support activity was to provide the victims and assistance activity groups with funds. Four hundred thirty eight companies and organizations made a contribution of approximately 53.8 billion yen. The largest proportion consisted of a donation of 35.8 billion yen given directly to the victims, followed by a contribution of 13.8 billion yen offered to the volunteer activity funds. The second activity was to provide relief supplies. Companies and organizations negotiated with the government for smooth transportation of subsistence goods and fuel. As a result, the procedures for the transportation were simplified and the relief supplies including food and daily commodities were provided. The third activity was to offer human resources, service, and knowhow. Companies extended assistance to the earthquake sufferers, utilizing their expertise. For example, company employees visited the disaster area as volunteers to remove rubble, provide Information and Communication Technology (ICT) -related equipment to the temporary shelters, local governments, temporary houses, etc., and install the equipment. In addition, companies are involved in marketing activities such as direct sales from company to consumer and providing company condominiums.⁷⁷

(7) DONOR

According to the above-mentioned breakdown of the NPOs' revenues, the subsidies/grants accounted for 14.3% of the total revenue, the third largest revenue source. The donors of these subsidies and grants include the central and local governments, nonprofit corporations such as NGOs, private companies, independent administrative agencies, and international organizations.⁷⁸ The subsidies⁷⁹ offered by these donors to the civil society organizations such as NPOs refer to funds without an obligation to repay provided for specific purposes. Usually, the purpose for which the funds are used is specified. There are three types of grant: grantee restricted type, open type, and requirement type. In the first type the grantor selects grantees in advance. In the second type, the grantees are widely invited from the public. In the third type, some skills, performance, or qualifications are required of the grantees. Those who apply for a grant are required by almost all the grantors to submit an

⁷³ JCN is a nationwide liaison network among cross-sectorial private organizations for disaster assistance in which NPOs, NGOs, companies, volunteer groups, victim groups, evacuee groups, and other organizations involved in victim/evacuee relief activities in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake participate. See the website.

http://www.jpn-civil.net/2013/about_us/

⁷⁴ Excerpt from the FY2011 business report of the NPO Iwate *Fukko* Collaboration Center.

<http://fields.canpan.info/data/organizations/109/109769/1097698565/files/S9PakVOV.pdf>

⁷⁵ Excerpt from the outline of organization on the website of the NPO Miyagi *Fukko* Collaboration Center.

<http://www.renpuku.org/wp/?p=99>

⁷⁶ Excerpt from the member information on the website of the NPO Fukushima *Fukko* Collaboration Center.

<http://f-renpuku.org/team>

⁷⁷ See the "Report on Disaster Victim/Area Relief activities in the Economic World in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake."

⁷⁸ See the "Basic Investigative Report on the FY2009 Civil Activity Organization" prepared by the Cabinet Office.

⁷⁹ There is no distinct difference between subsidy and grant. The term "subsidy" is used throughout this section.

application form and attached documents. Awarding of the grant is decided through screening of the documents. In many cases, the grantees are obligated to submit a report at some stage, for example, after the project is completed or the grant awarding period is over.⁸⁰

Let us take as an example three donor organizations that offered the grants for the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake: domestic NGOs/NPOs; Japan Platform (JPF), which provided relief funds for the programs of other organizations; the Central Community Chest of Japan; and the Nippon Foundation. Among the three organizations, JPF provided the largest amount of grant. JPF raised approx. 7 billion yen through public contributions as of March 2013 and financed JPF's own projects with 300 million yen and JPF-registered NGOs (40 NGOs as of June 2013) with 5 billion yen. Also, it granted a sum of one billion yen to *Tomoni Ikiru* (Stand by Together) Fund including non-member organizations.⁸¹ Nippon Foundation offered the second largest amount of grant. The foundation's "Relief activities by the People for the People (The Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Relief Fund)" granted 36 projects a sum of approximately 4.6 billion yen as of January 31, 2012.⁸² Also, as the "Disaster Volunteer/NPO Activity Support Fund-Raising (Volunteer Support)," the Central Community Chest of Japan granted a total of 2,500 residents-assistance activity programs a sum of 2.8 billion yen by December 2013. The breakdown is as follows: a total of 900 million yen for livelihood relief activities such as temporary house watching and children-learning-relief activities; a total of 1.3 billion yen for reconstruction relief activities leading to town planning and community renovation; a total of 302.35 million yen for victims' mutual relief activities.⁸³

(8) INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEER

Volunteer activities in a natural disaster area have become popular since the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. A total of 2.166 million volunteers⁸⁴ participated in the relief activities for five years after the earthquake occurred. The year 1995 came to be known later as the dawn of volunteer activities. Afterwards, a large number of volunteers assembled to participate in relief activities in the areas which were hard hit by a natural disaster such as an earthquake or typhoon or by a disaster caused by a maritime accident such as the 1997 Nakhodka oil spill. The role played by the volunteers in these areas is important because public assistance is generally bound by laws and institutions whereas the volunteer activities are very flexible and the volunteers can conduct activities that meet the residents' needs. In some circumstances where the administrative agencies cannot staff the temporary shelters sufficiently to operate them, the volunteers can cope with the situation promptly in great numbers.⁸⁵ Although most of the volunteers who assemble in the disaster areas do not have specialized experience, some of them can provide professional support service because they are familiar with disaster volunteer activities and have a certificate for health and medical service or other national qualifications.⁸⁶ Also, there are some volunteer groups who visit the victims living in the temporary shelters to provide special service or supplies such as a footbath team. The footbath team offers a footbath to the victims and listens to their troubles.

The Great East Japan Earthquake devastated a wide area of eastern Japan. Despite paralyzed traffic and a concern about the influence of radioactive substances generated by the nuclear power accident, approximately 1.33 million volunteers⁸⁷ participated in the activities in three disaster-stricken prefectures by December 31, 2013.

(9) NETWORK GROUP

Various multi-stakeholder network groups were organized by administrative agencies, experts, NGOs, NPOs, etc. after the disaster occurred. These groups held information-exchange meetings⁸⁸ to share information on the participants' activities, local needs, government policies, and subsidies. Some groups shared information on the activities in each area or each specialized field and coordinated various opinions as intermediary aid organizations. The field-level examples are shown below.

⁸⁰ See "Research/study group" page on the Cabinet Office's NPO website.

⁸¹ Excerpt from JPF Great East Japan Earthquake Victim Support Special web site <http://tohoku.japanplatform.org/support/reports.html>.

⁸² Excerpt from the Nippon Foundation ROAD Project. <http://road.nippon-foundation.or.jp/cat8023055>.

⁸³ Excerpt from Central Community Chest of Japan. <http://www.akaihan.or.jp/er/p3.html>

⁸⁴ See "Estimated Number of Great Hanshin and Awaji Earthquake General Volunteer Activity Participants" by Hyogo Prefecture

⁸⁵ See "Role of Disaster Volunteers."

⁸⁶ See "Role of Disaster Volunteers."

⁸⁷ See "Disaster Area Support/Disaster Volunteer Information" of Japan National Council of Social Welfare.

⁸⁸ An information-exchange meeting is called a liaison conference, regular meeting, committee, etc. and each has a different purpose. The term "information-exchange meeting" is used in this report.

Table 6. Example of networks holding information exchange meetings

Network	Outline
Four-party coordination meeting	Coordination meeting by four parties including “the government, Self-Defense Force, and NPOs including SWCs.” In Ishinomaki City, the administrative agencies, SDF, and NPOs held a discussion to allocate the temporary shelters in charge among them and prepared up to about 30,000 hot meals a day.
NPO <i>Fukko</i> Collaboration Center Regular meeting	The NPO <i>Fukko</i> Collaboration Center, commonly known as <i>Renpuku</i> , was launched in each prefecture of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The <i>Renpuku</i> organizes/holds a regular meeting to form a network among aid organizations participating in prefectural activities, launches subcommittees by theme and region, and operates the secretariat.
Kesennuma NPO/NGO Liaison meeting	The liaison council assembles 20 to 30 organizations including the administrative agencies and SWCs involved in the activities in the Kesennuma City, Miyagi Prefecture, and holds an information exchange/subcommittee meeting every week to meet together and coordinate various opinions. A temporary housing subcommittee, a child support subcommittee, a work support subcommittee, etc. are held in each activity field.
Wide-area evacuee support network	The Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN) holds a meeting in many parts of the country for the purpose of sharing assistance methods, ideas, and other information with nationwide evacuee aid organizations and self-help groups and circles consisting of the residents who evacuated from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear accident.
Ishinomaki Disaster Recovery Assistance Council	Citizens’ groups involved in relief activities around Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, launched the Ishinomaki Disaster Recovery Assistance Council. The council worked with the Ishinomaki SWC to accept volunteers and arrange for preparation of hot meals.
Tono City Disaster Relief Network (Tono <i>Magokoro</i> Net)	The Tono City Disaster Relief Network coordinated the assistance to the coastal disaster area from Tono City, Iwate Prefecture, slightly distant from the coastal area. The network cooperated with the Tono City SWC and Junior Chamber of Commerce (JCC) to accept volunteers and external aid organizations and study countermeasures and provided assistance while always sharing the victims’ needs among organizations and individuals.
3.11 Victim Support Iwaki Liaison Council (<i>Minpuku</i> Network)	The <i>Minpuku</i> Network promotes cooperation among the aid workers of Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, to exchange information and coordinate various opinions. The network holds a round-table conference open to anyone in cooperation with the Fukushima Prefecture SWC, Iwaki City SWC, and Futabagun Hachomura SWC as well as the member groups.
Japan Nuclear Disaster Aid Association (311 <i>Ukeire-zenkoku</i> Association)	Forming nation-wide network of victims of nuclear disaster still living the affected areas, evacuees, external support/aid groups, Japan Nuclear Disaster Aid Association provide them with information and advice on retreat programs and relocation, and conducts retreat programs. It consists of 46 organizations nationwide as of January 22, 2014.

CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT

CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENT

STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER 3 AND GUIDE FOR READING

STRUCTURE

- Comments on [issues/reasons/measures] made by participants in this project are all summarized in ten separate themes (Table 7, Figure 8). Individual theme sections present our assessment in order of “Results” → “Discussion” → “Conclusion.”
 - Results: Opinions and comments made by the participants in this project and results of questionnaire surveys
 - Discussion: Supplementary information from desk review and other sources, and discussion of the results.
 - Conclusion: Conclusion of the themes based on the results and discussion
- The individual theme sections begin with the overview of each section which summarizes “Justification for selecting this theme,” “Assessment method” and “Conclusion.”

Table 7. Evaluation indicators related to the themes

#	Themes	Relevant indicators	Source
1	Assistance that meets local needs provided?	• Relevance	DAC
2	Comprehensive assistance provided?	• Coverage • Gender equality • Special support	DAC ALNAP Sphere
3	Assistance brought any further damage to the people? ⁸⁹	• Coping strategies and resilience • Do no harm	ALNAP Sphere
4	Accountability to beneficiaries fulfilled?	• Establishing and delivering on commitments	HAP Standard
5	Opinions of the local stakeholders considered and reflected?	• Handling complaints • Participation	HAP Standard HAP Standard, ALNAP
6	Review and improvement constantly made?	• Learning and continual improvement	HAP Standard
7	Short-term assistance led to long-term assistance?	• Connectedness	DAC
8	Staff's safety secured?	• Health, safety and security	People in Aid
9	Organizations had enough capacities?	• Human resources and management • Funding base	ALNAP -
10	Collaborated and cooperated well with other organizations?	• Information sharing and coordination • Collaboration	Sphere Sphere




Figure 8. Each theme's relations with stakeholders and their activities and how themes are related each other

⁸⁹ Refer to the Principle 1 of right protection. It implies conflicts and violence, but it is reinterpreted in the context of this particular disaster.

SOURCES

- Figures and tables have been prepared by JANIC based on the information obtained in this project, unless otherwise mentioned.
- “JANIC’s data” refers to information that has been already published in “Great East Japan Earthquake and International Cooperation NGOs: New Possibilities and Issues in Japan and Proposals for Them (issued by JANIC) (Bibliography 1-2)”
- If you see a phrase like “We received comments...” in the following sections, those comments reflect one of those made in (1) workshops, (2) interviews, (3) group discussions or (4) remarks in questionnaires.
- Details of the results in workshops and the remarks in questionnaires are summarized in a separate collection of documents.⁹⁰
- Excerpt comments are all quoted in quotation marks (“ ”) or bulletized.
- The source of excerpt comments from the participants in this project are shown in parentheses as follows:
 - (Tokyo): Workshop in Tokyo (July 18, 2013)
 - (Iwate): Workshop in Iwate (October 3, 2013)
 - (Miyagi): Workshop in Miyagi (October 8, 2013)
 - (Fukushima): Workshop in Fukushima (October 10, 2013)
 - (Hearing): 1st and 2nd hearing surveys
 - (Remarks): Remark sections in questionnaire surveys
 - (FGD): Specific group discussions
- In the parentheses, further attributes are described after slash (/) mark, when it is necessary to show the identity of the speakers.
 - e.g., Comments made by those who belong to local organizations in Miyagi: (Miyagi / local organizations)

DATA DESCRIPTION

- When we refer to how many responses we have received in our multiple response questionnaires, we express such ratio with the “the number of responses/the number of valid respondents: ”
- When we refer to how many people have responded to our multiple response questionnaires, we express such respondents with the number of “valid respondents” and such total number of responses with the number of “valid responses.”

OTHERS

- All numbers in the figures/tables and texts are rounded to the tenth. If you need the exact numbers, please refer to the “questionnaire survey results” (Material 1) in the separate collection of documents.
- Respondents to our questionnaire surveys include local residents who are not familiar with assistance-related terminology. Thus, some of the questions are more descriptive and longer sentences to make the intention of our questions clearer. For this reason, some of the question descriptions in our questionnaires might be partially omitted in the texts or figure titles as long as its original meanings are retained. To know expressions which have been actually used in our questionnaires, please refer to the “Questionnaire survey results” in the separate collection of documents (disclosed in JANIC’s website).

Separate collection of documents (published in JANIC’s website)

Material 1. Questionnaire survey results: http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix1.pdf

Material 2. Summary of the interim report: http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix2.pdf


Material 3. Materials to select evaluation indicators based on document research:

http://www.janic.org/mt/pdf/eqexamination_appendix3.pdf

Accumulated data from questionnaires: http://www.janic.org/eqexamination_survey_reply.xls

⁹⁰ There are differences in expressions between the separate collection of documents and this report, even if they have common opinions. These differences have been caused by the differences of the formats they use. Some meanings might become vague through the process in which we handled these formats to adjust them to each case. If necessary, we add to such information supplementary one that explains backgrounds or modify its expressions accordingly, while checking the meaning in original documents once again.

3.1. ASSISTANCE THAT MEETS LOCAL NEEDS PROVIDED?



⁹¹ Five items in the DAC evaluation define relevance as the one that can be assessed based on “whether local needs and priorities are reflected in relief activities.”

3.1.1. RESULTS (RELEVANCE)

(1) EXCESSIVE OR INSUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED?

In a questionnaire that we asked the residents about external assistance, 20.9% chose “found the assistance insufficient,” while 29.5% chose “found the assistance unnecessary.” Therefore, more than 70% of the residents felt neither excess nor deficiency as to external aid. Moreover, most of them added that “I am grateful for external aid organizations and not dissatisfied with their assistance” (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Any excess or deficiency in assistance felt by the residents
Have you found the assistance insufficient? (263 valid respondents)
Have you found the assistance unnecessary? (254 valid respondents)

■ With regard to these, we received the following comments:

- Some aid workers tried to do what they wanted to, even if their assistance differed from local needs (Iwate, Miyagi).
- Some relief activities did not reflect beneficiaries' needs (Tokyo).

THERE WAS DEFICIENCY IN ASSISTANCE.

The residents who answered “found the assistance insufficient (20.9%)” in the above question (Figure 9) commented as follows: “Necessary supplies including blankets were not provided, when they were needed”; “A lot of food was provided, but prefabricated houses were not provided to store it”; “A temporary shelter was littered with waste materials, because there were no toilet facilities installed”; “Most of the food supplies were hot cup noodles”; “Some people received more assistance than others”; and “I wanted the government to continue its emergency employment programs in which I participated for a longer time.”

Those who “found the assistance insufficient” said that they experienced more deficiency in the first 3 months and half a year or later than 3 to 6 months (Figure 10). Some of the residents commented that “I wanted the government to continue its employment programs for a longer time” and “I wanted more assistance in physical exercises in temporary housing.” Many of their comments on insufficient assistance were concerned with assistance they received at temporary shelters.




Figure 10. Period during which the residents found the assistance insufficient or excessive
Insufficient assistance (multiple answers allowed. 63 valid respondents, 91 valid responses)
Excessive assistance (multiple answers allowed. 76 valid respondents, 95 valid responses)

SOME OF THE ASSISTANCE WAS UNNECESSARY.

The residents who answered that they found some of the assistance unnecessary (30%) mostly commented on goods supplies saying, “Aid supplies were too much to consume (food and drink, toilet paper, clothes, etc.)”; “Too old clothes were included in aid supply”; and “Some of the aid supplies contained goods that were inappropriate in the season, such as summer clothes in the autumn.”

Other comments include “We received some visitors whose intention was unclear”; “Some listening volunteers were so inquisitive. Those unfamiliar volunteers came to talk directly to the residents every day. However, their listening support was not always helpful. All the residents were not able to tell unfamiliar people about anything. Some of the residents were reminded of the earthquake disaster by talking with them, and felt uncomfortable with their inquisitive questions”; and “Some of the industry support was actually unnecessary. It could have been handled by human resources in the local community without any trouble.”

Differed from the insufficient assistance, over 70% of the respondents found some of the assistance unnecessary “from half a year after the disaster (Figure 10).” They commented that “In early days, food supplies were of great help in any way. However, some of the aid supplies contained goods that were inappropriate in the season. For example, cup noodles still arrived, even after local shops were reopened, and summer clothes were sent in the autumn”; and “In early days, even one tiny thumbtack or a single plastic bag was precious.”

(2) WHAT CAUSED MISMATCHES OF AID AND NEEDS?

CAUSE 1. POOR UNDERSTANDING OF NEEDS

To the question to the external aid organizations, “Did you feel any difficulties in understanding beneficiaries’ needs?” over 70% responded “felt some difficulties” in all the three periods: for three months after the disaster, for half a year after the disaster, and for the subsequent period from half a year after the earthquake disaster (Figure 11).




Figure 11 Did you feel any difficulties in understanding beneficiaries’ needs, when you implemented relief activities?⁹² (valid respondents: 66 for three months after the earthquake disaster and for half a year from three months after the earthquake disaster, 69 for the subsequent period from half a year after the earthquake disaster)

The following were raised as the causes for their poor understanding of needs: “There was a shortage in human resources who were capable of conducting appropriate needs assessment surveys (Tokyo)”; “There were not enough funds that could be used for needs assessment surveys (Tokyo)”; and “There was not enough time to spend for needs assessment surveys (Tokyo).”

■ The residents also commented as follows:

- People do not always tell total strangers about what they are thinking. People’s needs cannot be understood only by superficial hearing surveys (Remarks).
- People in Tohoku is known for their patience to endure deficiency, even if they really need something (Remarks).
- I do not remember that I was asked what I needed. I just received what aid worker gave to me (Remarks).
- I could not have opportunities to tell aid organizations about my needs, because I worked in the daytime when relief activities were conducted. External aid workers did not bother to come to listen to my needs (Remarks).

CAUSE 2. FLAWED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM BETWEEN LOCAL AREAS AND A HEAD OFFICE

We had a comment like “Even if field staff understood the needs, there was no process or means to inform them to their head office due to unclear role assignments. Therefore, just sensuously-perceived information was communicated (Tokyo).”

To the question to the external aid organizations, “Do you think that there was smooth communication or information sharing between field staff and head office staff?” 74.2% (49 persons) of them answered, “had smooth communication,” while 5.8% (17 persons) of them answered, “had slightly poor communication” or “very poor communication” (Figure 12).

⁹² The question includes the two interpretations; “I felt enormous difficulties” and “I felt some difficulties.”

To a further question to whom answered “had a little poor communication” or “had very poor communication,” the most respondents of 73.9% (17 persons) chose “local needs” as the information hindered most (Figure 13).




Figure 12. [left] Do you think there was smooth communication or information sharing between field staff and head office staff? (66 valid responses)

Figure 13. [right] When you had poor communication, what kind of information was not fully shared? (multiple answers allowed. 23 valid respondents, 66 valid responses)

CAUSE 3. UNBALANCED FINANCIAL AID/SUBSIDIES

- Even when aid organizations understood the residents' needs, they could not implement their activities without enough funding. Many aid organizations obtained their operational costs from donor organizations, but the permitted usage of these funds imposed by donors did not necessarily match with the residents' needs grasped by aid organizations. In that case, aid organizations had to modify their assistance to suit the purpose of the funds, which resulted in mismatches between assistance and needs (Miyagi).

■ The following reasons were raised to explain the above:

- Individual organizations are accountable to donors who fund their activities. Likewise, donor organizations are also accountable to their financial sponsors including individuals, companies and religious institutions. Therefore, donor organizations preferred and tended to fund activities that could readily achieve goals and show the results in figures relatively in a short term (half a year/single year). They less likely invested or subsidized in vocational assistance and midterm assistance whose results cannot be easily seen. As a result, in order to earn new funds, aid organizations sometimes put an emphasis on how easily they could show their achievements, when they decided the details and areas of their assistance activities (Iwate, Miyagi).

CAUSE 4. TOO MUCH FOCUS ON THEIR OWN SPECIALIZED AREAS OF ASSISTANCE

- Some external aid organizations stucked to their own specialized areas of assistance, such as childcare disabled, elders and foreigners, and failed to address immediate needs that the affected local communities were facing (Hearing / local organizations).

(3) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (RELEVANCE)

MEASURES 1. IMPROVE STAFF'S ABILITY FOR NEEDS ASSESSMENT SURVEYS

- It is necessary to improve the quality of needs assessment surveys to better understand the needs. Training for staff to learn needs assessment techniques should be offered (Tokyo).
- Organizations that have no knowledge to conduct training can send their core staff to relevant seminars, who can share what they have learned with their colleagues in the organizations (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF NEEDS ASSESSMENT SURVEYS

- Conduct needs assessment surveys in collaboration with other organizations as much as possible to comprehend the needs in a huge disaster (Hearing)
- Encourage local organizations or local people who are familiar with local needs to get involved in the process of needs assessment surveys (Hearing)

MEASURES 3. INCREASE SELF-FUNDS

- Increase self-funding to create an environment which allows each aid organization to form its operational structure that is not influenced by donor organizations' single-year budgets or government subsidies and obligations set forth by them (Tokyo, Miyagi).

MEASURES 4. BUILD PARTNERSHIPS WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

- Consider partnerships with private businesses (Tokyo).
- Develop a good relation with donor organizations to enhance mutual understanding with them before a disaster actually happens, and build friendly relationships which allow aid organizations to let them know about necessary assistance and convince their donors (Tokyo).
- There are differences in capacities between developing countries and developed countries. There are also huge differences between disaster victims and communities' needs and how long the communities want assistance to be provided. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly provide relevant information to donor organizations to gain their understanding on these matters (Tokyo).

MEASURES 5. AVOID TOO NARROW SCOPE IN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

- Each organization has to utilize its own specialty, but it is sometime preferable to be free of it and flexible to address other needs (Hearing / local organizations).

3.1.2. DISCUSSION (RELEVANCE)

IN MANY CASES, THERE WAS NO EXCESS OR DEFICIENCY IN PROVIDED ASSISTANCE, WHICH ASSISTANCE MET LOCAL NEEDS.

The fact that 80% of the residents said that there was no deficiency in assistance⁹³ suggests that assistance was relatively well. Furthermore, 70% said that no unnecessary assistance was provided. From these, we can assume that assistance was in accord with local needs in many cases.

SOME ASSISTANCE DID NOT MEET MINIMUM STANDARDS.

However, we cannot neglect that about twenty percent of the residents felt some deficiency in assistance provided. Area of concerns that the residents matches with the Sphere Project's minimum standards to be met in humanitarian assistance; for example, "Necessary supplies including blankets were not provided, when they were needed." is concerned with "temporary shelters and non-food"; and "A temporary shelter was littered with waste materials, because there were no toilet facilities installed." is concerned with "water supply and sanitation" in the area of night-soil treatment. Many of these matters are basically handled by the government in Japan. Thus, people are divided over excess or deficiency of assistance depending on their views on how much private external aid was expected to cover, but it should be considered in any rate.

Table 8. Minimum standards to be considered in emergency relief of the Sphere Project

Items	Minimum standards to be considered
Water supply and sanitation	Water supply, sanitation, enhanced sanitation, night-soil treatment, measures against pathogens and vectors, drainage, etc.
Ensuring food supply and nourishment	Ensuring food supply, feeding infants, managing acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiency, etc.
Temporary shelters and non-food	Safe shelters, clothes, bedding, stoves, fuels, etc.
Health-care activities	Medical supplies, infection control measures, injuries, mental health, etc.

Source: Prepared by JANIC based on Bibliography 3-15

⁹³ 75.7% (202 persons) answered "No" to the question "Did you assume that support would be provided by organizations other than the government from outside of the region, when the disaster happened?" Unlike support from the government, it seems that external aid organizations were likely to be more appreciated, because the local residents did not expect them to come to support them.

SOME ASSISTANCE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE UNNECESSARY, BECAUSE IT DID NOT MEET THE PHASE IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY.

It is worth noting that 30% of the residents considered some assistance to be unnecessary. Many residents lost almost all their belongings due to the tsunami. However, they had received a variety of supplies and assistance by half a year after the earthquake disaster. Local shops, various services and employment had also been restarted. It seems that this answer was made against the background like these. Some of the responses answered that there had been excess or deficiency in assistance. It is assumed that those responses included the assistance which did not match with priorities on the ground, because aid workers could not catch up with rapidly changing local needs.

IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE NEEDS.

Figure 11. shows each organization had difficulties in understanding changing local needs correctly. It seems that organizations needed to increase their resources and to pay meticulous attention to building relations with the residents, in order to conduct effective needs assessment surveys. A number of residents pointed out that they might not have let their voices fully heard. Therefore, it is expected that more detailed assessment will be conducted in the future.

The international NGO ADRA Japan's aid was one of the examples which achieved successful results in needs assessment surveys with small investment. It provided its housing support, when Yamamoto-cho rented private housing for the evacuees. ADRA Japan sent return postcards to the evacuees to investigate their needs and to make sure what kind of supplies were needed, before it sent necessary supplies.⁹⁴ This method allowed aid organizations to reduce the number of human resources required for the investigation, as well as beneficiaries to choose whether or not they would write back these postcards. Therefore, it could also alleviate the respondents' psychological burdens.

STAFF SHOULD HAVE FREQUENT COMMUNICATION WITH EACH OTHER.

Miscommunication within the external aid organizations was pointed out as a cause of mismatches of aid and needs. Many of the external aid organizations which performed relief activities had their head office in Tokyo or other areas far away from the disaster areas. That hindered smooth communication between field staff and head office staff, and might have prevented field staff from informing their head office of the residents' needs correctly.

3.1.3. CONCLUSION (ASSISTANCE THAT MEETS LOCAL NEEDS PROVIDED?)

It can be said that most of the assistance met local needs. However, 20% of the residents found assistance insufficient, and 30% of them found it excessive.

The reason for these was (1) aid organizations had insufficient understanding of the needs, (2) needs were not fully shared among aid organizations, and (3) the aid organizations were influenced by other factors than the needs including budgets in organizing a project.

⁹⁴ Bibliography 1-2, P. 27

3.2. COMPREHENSIVE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED?

Justification for selecting this theme
This disaster was the complex disaster that happened in a wider area. Even under such circumstances, aid worker were expected to create a situation where no one would miss their assistance.



Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicators	Verification in this joint review
Coverage	Assistance provided regardless of where you lived?
Gender equality ⁹⁵	Men and women sometimes have different needs as to safety and protection. Any attention paid to gender differences in relief activities?
Special support	Assistance focusing on those who needed special support provided?

- We assessed [coverage], because there was inequality from prefecture to prefecture and depending on type of housing after the earthquake disaster.
- We summarized comments made on whether any attention had been paid to [gender equality] and [special support⁹⁶] (assistance to those who could become vulnerable to a disaster except for gender-based support) in this project.



Conclusion
<p>[Coverage]</p> <p>Fukushima Prefecture received relatively less assistance than the other prefectures. In spite of this, it was only about ten percent of the people who found any inequality in assistance provided to the prefecture. However, more than forty percent of the residents felt that there had been inequality in assistance depending on type of housing. In particular, they felt that sufficient assistance was not provided to those who lived at deemed temporary housing or at home. There were also differences between temporary shelters or temporary housing depending on their size and accessibility.</p> <p>[Gender equality]</p> <p>Only about twenty percent of the residents felt that sufficient attention was not paid to gender. However, some of the aid organizations provided relief supplies lacking attention to women. Those aid organizations had difficulties in involving men in community programs. As far as activities to protect women including domestic violence (DV) concerned, there was collaboration between aid organizations and the government.</p> <p>[Special support]</p> <p>Nearly thirty percent of the residents felt that sufficient assistance was not provided to those who needed special support, such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, children and foreigners. Regulations related to personal information protection, etc. made it difficult that civil groups listened to the voices of these people all by themselves. Thus, it is important that they collaborate with the government and other organizations. However, the civil groups have not been able to maintain full collaboration with them, due to the unclear scope of their activities and inadequate communication.</p>

⁹⁵ This refers to (The differences in men's and women's security and protection needs) in Page 6 of Bibliography 3-25.

⁹⁶ HAP Basic Principles defines equality as "prioritizing the most urgent needs and providing humanitarian support which meets the needs without any discrimination based on gender, age, race, disability, ethnic background, nationality and political/religious/cultural/organizational affiliation."

3.2.1. RESULTS (COVERAGE)

(1) ANY DIFFERENCES IN ASSISTANCE FOUND FROM PREFECTURE TO PREFECTURE?

■ We received the following comments:

- Our prefecture received less external aid than the other prefectures, and it made us feel that our prefecture was left out from external aid (Hearing / residents in Fukushima Prefecture).
- We receive assistance from TEPCO, which keeps our financial situation stable. However, I am afraid that the people would have a tough time with no life lines in the areas devastated by the tsunami including Rikuzentakata and Minamisanriku (Remarks / residents in Fukushima Prefecture).
- Iwate Prefecture could survive, only if it recovered things which had been washed away by the tsunami. However, Fukushima Prefecture has been suffered from complicated issues related to the nuclear accident. We are afraid that the people there would face difficulties, not being able to start working on recovery (Remarks / residents in Iwate Prefecture).
- After we entered Miyagi and Iwate Prefecture in the initial response, we gradually developed relations with local stakeholders through our activities. We could not even think of assistance to Fukushima Prefecture, before we got the situation there under control (Hearing / NGO).

To a question to the residents, “Have you felt that your prefecture received less assistance than the other prefectures?” 88.3% (227 persons) answered “No” and 11.7% (30 persons) answered “Yes.” About ninety percent of the residents answered that they did not find any deficiency in assistance, compared with the other prefectures (Figure 14).

As a reason for this, many respondents commented, “we did not know what kind of assistance was provided in the other prefectures (Remarks).” Some of the residents in Fukushima Prefecture also said, “Fukushima Prefecture is more accessible from the areas located south of the Kanto region and closer to the Tokyo metropolitan area than the other prefectures. In spite of this accessibility, Fukushima Prefecture received far less assistance, because aid organizations were concerned about health risk to human bodies caused by the nuclear accident (Hearing).”





Figure 14. Have you felt that your prefecture received less assistance than the other prefectures?
(257 valid respondents)

“Selection of activity areas” was ranked third in the multiple choice questions which asked the biggest difficulties felt by the external aid organizations in the questionnaire conducted in November 2011 (Figure 15).



Source: JANIC's data (surveyed in november 2011)

Figure 15. Biggest difficulties in the activities for this earthquake disaster
(multiple answers allowed. 72 valid respondents, 87 valid responses)⁹⁷

⁹⁷ The number of valid respondents is unknown.

(2) WHAT CAUSED UNBALANCED ASSISTANCE AMONG THE PREFECTURES?

To the question to external aid organizations asking why they selected their action areas, the largest number of respondents (58.4% or 45 persons) chose the “severity of the damages in the areas,” and the next largest number (57.1% or 44 persons) chose “there was a shortage of assistance in the areas.” By contrast, 3.8% (3 persons), the smallest number of respondents, chose “smaller effects of radioactive materials” (Figure 16).




Figure 16. Why external aid organizations selected their action areas (multiple answers allowed. 77 valid respondents, 208 valid responses)

Forty percent of the external aid organizations answered that they “conducted their activities without any definite criteria” on the safety of radioactive materials in relation to the nuclear accident (Figure 17).




Figure 17. How did you determine the safety of radioactive materials in relation to the nuclear accident, when you dispatched your staff or performed activities? (56 valid respondents)

(3) ANY INEQUALITY IN ASSISTANCE FOUND AMONG DIFFERENT TYPE OF HOUSING AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER?

■ We received the following comments:

- We could not provide full support to small voluntary organizations and welfare facilities which primarily needed assistance (Tokyo).
- While assistance was likely to concentrate on large-scale temporary housing with a better accessibility, other places were less likely to receive it (Miyagi).
- There were differences in assistance among evacuees depending on where they lived; temporary housing, temporary shelters, homes or deemed temporary housing (Bibliography 1-4).

In a questionnaire to the residents asking, “Have you found any inequality in assistance depending on type of housing?” 44.8% (112 persons) answered “Yes.” About half of the residents said that they found some inequality in assistance depending on type of housing (Figure 18).




Figure 18. Have you felt that there were any differences in assistance depending on the difference of type of housing, such as temporary housing, temporary shelters, homes and deemed temporary housing? (250 valid respondents)

The table below summarizes typical remarks made by the residents (Table 9).

Table 9. Attributes which brought differences to assistance depending on type of housing after the earthquake disaster (the entire table shows remarks)

Attributes	Details of differences
Size Accessibility	People were likely to receive assistance at temporary housing and temporary shelters with a large number of residents.
	People were likely to receive assistance in areas with high accessibility including areas near a city center.
At home Deemed temporary housing	Those who lived in a house affected by the earthquake disaster, (not temporary housing, etc.) were less likely to receive assistance.
	Those who lived in an apartment or house rented after the earthquake disaster were less likely to receive assistance.
Provision of information	People were likely to receive assistance at a place with those who could send information of assistance needed.

Source: Prepared by JANIC integrating the residents' remarks

The residents responded to the question asking, “Have you been dissatisfied with or had any doubt about assistance?” 46.5% (114 persons) said, “No dissatisfaction or doubt in particular,” followed by 31.0% (76 persons) who pointed to inequality in the distribution of relief supplies (Figure 19).




Figure 19. Have you been dissatisfied with or had any doubt about assistance? (multiple answers allowed. 245 valid respondents, 364 valid responses)

■ We received comments on inequality depending on type of housing as follows (all comments are the remarks to the above question):

- I was not able to receive soup runs or supplies distributed at temporary housing, because they said that I lived in deemed temporary housing (rented house) or my own house.

- I was told that supplies were preferentially distributed to disaster victims because of their limited amounts. I cannot agree with this reasoning. It is not true that those who rent an apartment have not been affected by the disaster. Some people were compelled to rent a house, because it took a long time to build temporary housing for them. It is not fair that assistance was not provided to those who evacuated far away from the disaster areas or rented a house for the sake of their family's living.

- I received nothing, while the residents at particular temporary housing received expensive products which could be sold for tens of thousands of yen including home electronics and bicycles. I envied those who were given such charity, although I did not desperately need those things.

- Some residents have received compensation from TEPCO or a set of home electronics consisting of six kinds of appliances distributed by the Japanese Red Cross Society. However, some of those who did not receive them felt inequality in assistance provided by these specific organizations other than civil groups. I wanted these organizations to get relevant information and try to minimize differences in their assistance.

- A temporary housing was built next to a gymnasium used as a temporary shelter. The temporary shelter has been inhabited by those who did not win the lottery for the temporary housing. Subsequently, I am not sure, but it seems that a rule, which stipulated that relief supplies should be distributed only to temporary shelters, was laid out. Since then, the residents in temporary housing have seen the supplies sent to the temporary shelter one after another. This situation gradually brought about conflict between the residents.

- Some victims stayed at home and lived there. They were isolated without any community around them. However, it seems that much assistance had not been provided to them, except for patrolling launched under the city's employment programme.

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- There were cases where timing of intervention was delayed until aid providers had enough goods and services for every single beneficiary by placing too much emphasis on equal distribution (Tokyo).

(4) WHAT CAUSED INEQUALITY IN ASSISTANCE AMONG DIFFERENT TYPE OF HOUSING?

CAUSE 1. IMBALANCE IN SCALE AND ACCESSIBILITY

- We had limited time to spend on transportation (Hearing / volunteer organizations in Tokyo⁹⁸)
- Locations with better accessibility had more information. I suppose that is a reason why more surveys were conducted in such locations (Miyagi).

CAUSE 2. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSISTANCE TO THOSE WHO LIVED AT HOME AND DEEMED TEMPORARY HOUSING

- It was difficult to collect information about the needs of the residents who lived in small-scale temporary housing, temporary shelters, homes and deemed temporary housing (Tokyo).
- Regulations under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information made it difficult to collect information of those who were entitled to receive assistance. (Tokyo, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).
- Information has not been fully shared between aid organizations and the Social Welfare Councils. Therefore, we could not obtain information of the residents who were entitled to receive assistance; where they lived, what kind of assistance they needed, etc. without conducting a needs survey, even if they lived in an area or community which had already been surveyed by other organizations (Fukushima).

CAUSE 3. DIFFERENCES IN THE RESIDENTS' ABILITY TO SEND OUT INFORMATION

“Supplies were not gathered well, even though the community members of temporary housing, temporary shelters and residents' associations directly requested people across the country to provide assistance (Tokyo).” A number of examples were given in this regard: “Especially right after the disaster, how easily assistance goods

⁹⁸ These organizations implemented activities at random times, using the two days at the weekend, etc., without setting up a local office.

were gathered depended on whether a community had someone who could use internet tools, someone who had good relations with the outside or influential people, or community council directors who were well connected to the outside (Tokyo),” and “assistance was concentrated on locations which were covered by TV news (Iwate).”

■ We also received the following comments:

- It was a major factor which brought about inequality in assistance whether there was the ability to send information in an area or community which was supposed to receive assistance (Fukushima).
- Although we wanted to support small local organizations and communities, we had no information about them (Tokyo / NGO).

(5) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COVERAGE)

MEASURES 1. REMOVE ANY GAP IN ASSISTANCE THROUGH COLLABORATION

- A single organization cannot provide assistance in a broader area so that collaboration with other organizations, the government, SWCs, and others is inevitable. If the Act on the Protection of Personal Information or other laws and regulations prevent them from sharing local needs, it may be necessary to advocate the government to flexibly respond to emergencies in the future disaster (Hearing).

MEASURES 2. ENHANCE THE ABILITY TO SEND INFORMATION IN THE COMMUNITY

- There were no standards of radiation when NGOs/NPOs dispatched their staff. This prevented them from dispatching their staff due to safety concerns and caused inequality in their assistance. The external aid organizations should make it clear why they could not provide assistance (Hearing).


3.2.2. DISCUSSION (COVERAGE)

IT IS LIKELY THERE WAS GAP IN ASSISTANCE AMONG LOCATIONS.

Take a look at damages caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake in each prefecture. In the comparison of the damages by death toll, the numbers were 4,673 persons in Iwate, 9,537 persons in Miyagi and 1,606 persons in Fukushima, respectively. Damages in Fukushima Prefecture were about one-sixth of those in Miyagi Prefecture. However, when they were compared in terms of the number of evacuees, those numbers were 25,747 persons from Iwate, 25,489 persons from Miyagi and 23,979 persons from Fukushima. As you can see from these numbers, there was not much difference between the three prefectures (Reconstruction Headquarters, as of June 2011).

In spite of the fact that the major three prefectures were each devastated by the disaster, it is already pointed out that there was inequality in the absolute amount of aid from civil groups. For example, JANIC surveyed 59 organizations which had engaged in relief activities for the earthquake disaster in 100 municipalities. According to its survey results as of November 2011, their assistance was distributed to Miyagi Prefecture (43%, 43 organizations), Iwate Prefecture (30%, 30 organizations), Fukushima Prefecture (17%, 17 organizations) and others and head offices alone (10%, 10 organizations). Moreover, the numbers of volunteers dispatched by JANIC's member organizations were 31% (12,311 persons) to Iwate Prefecture, 66% (26,408 persons) to Miyagi Prefecture, 3% (1,437 persons) to Fukushima Prefecture, respectively, from March to June 2011 during which the largest number of volunteers were deployed for relief activities (Figure 20). As you can see from these numbers, Miyagi Prefecture, the first volunteer destination, received 18 times as many volunteers as Fukushima Prefecture, the last volunteer destination.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ The situations were different in each of the three major prefectures affected by the disaster. In addition, some volunteer activities may meet the needs, but the others not. It is impossible to conclude that there was inequality in support as a whole, when these matters were taken into consideration. Many organizations set up their offices which allowed them to deploy many volunteers in Miyagi Prefecture including PEACE BOAT Disaster Relief Volunteer Center (PBV). There were also large-scale volunteer centers based on Ishinomaki Senshu University in the prefecture. We have to consider these factors as a reason why so many volunteers were deployed to Miyagi Prefecture.



Source: JANIC's data (November 2011)

Figure 20. Number of volunteers deployed by JANIC's member organizations

External aid organizations selected their action areas based on the criteria (Figure 16); “enormous damages” and “insufficient assistance.” This disaster was so big that it is assumed that they could easily find areas which fell into these criteria all over the place in the early stage. During this period, there were numerous areas where there were “relevant people and organizations even before the earthquake disaster (46.8%, 36 persons)” and the “needs which could be handled with their own expertise (41.6%, 32 persons)” in Iwate Prefecture and Miyagi Prefecture alone. Therefore, in the early stage, it seems that 42.9% (24 persons) of the organizations, which performed their activities without any definite criteria on the safety of radioactive materials, were able to select the areas suffering from huge damages and insufficient assistance, even if they did not enter Fukushima Prefecture (Figure 17).

In the meantime, temporary housing and temporary shelters were located in different areas. Some were built along the main street in the heart of a town. Others were built deep in the mountains. Many of the small-scale temporary housing were located away from an urban area and had poor accessibility. Aid organizations have an intention to achieve maximum results (number of beneficiaries) for their limited investment. This intention was one of the factors which motivated them to gather and provide assistance at large-scale temporary housing and temporary shelters with so many people who needed assistance. If each aid organization had selected places which they could easily support, this might have become a factor to cause inequality in assistance and create vacuum areas with no assistance.

THE RESIDENTS CARED MORE ABOUT INEQUALITY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD THAN AT A PREFECTURAL SCALE.

Most of the residents said that they did not feel any inequality in assistance provided at a prefectural scale in a questionnaire. They explained this as “We do not understand a big picture of assistance which covers several prefectures. We, as aid recipients, just got information of the other prefectures on TV, etc. (Remarks)”

In this regard, the residents seem to be more sensitive to inequality in the neighborhood which they could see daily at temporary shelters, temporary housing, and deemed temporary housing or homes. Some people pointed out that “inequality in assistance brought about conflict (Remarks).” Divisiveness in the community possibly weakens the power of community. This point will be discussed more in detail later in Theme 3.

IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION OF THE RESIDENTS FROM A MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVE.

We can know that the situation differed from resident to resident from the comments we received so far. All of the social circumstances also should have been considered to balance each of them, such as disaster situations, local communities' ability of self-help and mutual assistance, assistance from the national and local governments, and compensation from TEPCO. If you lacked such consideration, you might provide imbalanced assistance and cause conflict among the residents and gap in support. It will be required that aid worker understand the situation of the residents from a multilateral perspective in their future assistance as well.

COLLABORATION IS REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE INEQUALITY IN ASSISTANCE.

Collaboration and coordination between individual stakeholders are indispensable to alleviate and eliminate inequality in assistance. We have to avoid a situation which prevents us from providing assistance to other places and people and creates gap in assistance, by focusing on the places with more people in need.

IN EMERGENCY RELIEF, WE SOMETIME NEED TO PUT MORE EMPHASIS ON SWIFTNESS THAN FAIRNESS.

Fairness or equity is important in assistance, but some assistance was delayed in this disaster because too much focus was placed on ensuring fairness to start providing assistance to all the residents or disaster victims. It was observed in the assistance not only by civil groups, but also by the government. We need to put higher priority to “swiftness” than “equity” in a certain circumstance in emergency relief. This has to be considered while planning and implementing assistance.

3.2.3. RESULTS (GENDER EQUALITY)

(1) ATTENTION PAID TO GENDER EQUALITY WHEN TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE?

■ We received the following comments:

- Issues unique to women were disregarded at temporary shelters (Tokyo).
- Even if we hold an event, we do not receive a limited range of participants. Men in their 50s and 60s are not accessible, and many of them stay inside their home and won't go out. We are worried about them, because many middle-aged men committed suicide in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Hearing, Remarks).

To a question to the residents asking, “Did you find some assistance lacking attention to gender differences?” 17.3% (43 persons) answered “Yes” and 82.7% (206 persons) answered “No” (Figure 21). There was no significant difference in answers between men and women.¹⁰⁰ Eighty percent of the residents said that they did not feel any lack of attention to gender differences regardless of gender, while 20 percent felt some sort of lack of attention.




Figure 21. Did you find some assistance lacking attention to gender differences?
(249 valid respondents)

(2) WHAT KIND OF PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LACK OF ATTENTION TO GENDER DIFFERENCES?

Comments made in questionnaires are summarized below (the entire table shows remarks in questionnaires).

Table 10. Issues in which the residents thought sufficient attention was not paid to gender differences

Living in temporary shelters ¹⁰¹	It cannot be said that living in temporary shelters is a comfortable environment for women. There was no choice but to sleep on the floor with total strangers regardless of gender, endure the bathroom stink, change clothes in front of strangers or be afraid of suspicious individuals. Although simple partitions were installed, drunken men, etc. feared the women there.
Relief supplies	There were shortages of women's sanitary products, etc. in some places. Relief supplies contained unwelcome products like used underwear. Supplies for women were first selected by elderly women, and then the rest of them were distributed to younger women in large quantities.
Labor	There were a limited number of places where women could work. In particular, women with children had difficulties in working with no nursery centers available.
DV	There were reportedly a number of DV (domestic violence) cases at temporary housing, etc. I thought that not only the government but also specialized organizations should perform a wide

¹⁰⁰ 17.1% (19 persons) of men and 17.4% (24 persons) of women answered “Yes” respectively.

¹⁰¹ Except for the emergency period, a few days right after the earthquake disaster, temporary shelters put a complete end to their operations at the end of 2011. Some evacuees spent at evacuation centers for a maximum of nine months, until temporary housing was built or for some other reasons.

	range of follow-up assistance.
Men's involvement in community programs	There were a number of programs offered to form a community, such as knitting circles and tea parties. However, many of them seemed to be intended for women, and men felt some difficulties in participating in them.
Concerns over damages to human bodies caused by radioactive materials	Some women said that they did not want to go through childbirth in Fukushima Prefecture. In spite of its highly scientific and sensitive nature, some of the staff from the external aid organizations and volunteers gave their careless account of this matter directly to local women through their research and conversation.

(3) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (GENDER EQUALITY)

MEASURES 1. MAKE SOME ADJUSTMENTS FOR DIFFERENT TARGETS

• We should solve this problem in which men are not going to participate in tea parties, etc., not putting an emphasis on forming a community, but connecting these events and activities with their daily life, such as delivery of supplies, sales of vegetables and lunch boxes or a sort of job opportunities. These examples really encouraged men's participation, and are expected to help improve the situation. In order to prevent elderly men from staying inside their home, other attempts offered recreational activities which were designed to match with the target people's interests, such as *Go* (Japanese chess) and karaoke. These activities also really helped increase men's participation (Hearing).

3.2.4. DISCUSSION (GENDER EQUALITY)

DISASTER AND GENDER-RELATED SYSTEMS IN JAPAN

According to the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office, the disaster and gender-related systems have been changes as follows.

In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, it is said that more women were dead than men by 1,000 or so. In particular, elderly women suffered from huge damages. In response to this, the Gender Equality Bureau sent its staff to Niigata Prefecture, etc. as the first "female perspective" personnel on the ground and set up counseling desks for women in the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake in 2004. In the light of reports from these dispatched staff, the director of the Gender Equality Bureau made recommendations to the Director General for Disaster Management to go through a certain process in formulating the Basic Disaster Management Plan, reflect a female perspective in disaster response manuals of local governments and increase the number of female staff in disaster prevention departments.

In 2005, a perspective of gender equality was incorporated into "Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations" at the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe. As a result of these, a perspective of gender equality is reflected in the current systems of the government and local municipalities, including the Basic Disaster Management Plan and the section of disaster prevention (reconstruction) of the Basic Plan for Gender Equality. Since the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government has provided assistance as follows:

Table 11. The government's assistance to the residents with a perspective of gender equality

Assistance to the residents with a perspective of gender equality
Requesting to respond to a disaster based on the needs of women and child rearing
Sending staff on the ground from the Gender Equality Bureau
Requesting to set up desks to provide counseling services to women and support for violence victims
Providing assistance information which can be used for employment of women, etc.
Implementing new projects for the Great East Japan Earthquake using the 2011 budgets

Source: Excerpts from the materials of the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office¹⁰²

¹⁰² <http://www.gender.go.jp/kaigi/renkei/zentai/29/pdf/siry03-1.pdf>

Table 12. Good examples of the government's assistance at temporary shelters which reflected a female perspective and women's needs


Good examples of support at temporary shelters which reflected a female perspective and women's needs
Setting up "changing rooms only for women"
Creating employment to support residents
Designing temporary shelters which pay attention to women and child rearing
Building a system to run temporary shelters which reflect women's needs, etc.

Source: Excerpts from the materials of the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office¹⁰³

EFFORTS FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN THIS DISASTER

There were a number of organizations which specialized in support for women in this disaster.¹⁰⁴ For your reference, we summarize what kind of assistance was provided based on the information of the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office.

Figure 22 shows the results which summarize what was talked about in telephone and face-to-face counseling in the "Counseling Programme for Women and Violent Cases in the Areas Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake" implemented by the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office in 2012 (from February 11 to March 31, 2012) and 2013 (from February 11 to March 31, 2013).¹⁰⁵



Source: Prepared by JANIC based on the reports of the Gender Equality Bureau's Counseling Programme for Women and Violent Cases in the Areas Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake

Figure 22. What was talked about in the Counseling Programme for Women and Violent Cases in the Areas Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake¹⁰⁶

(multiple answers allowed. valid respondents (counseling service users): 1,465 persons in 2012 and 5,573 persons in 2013. valid responses (consultations offered): 2,990 persons in 2012 and 11,568 persons in 2013)

¹⁰³ <http://www.gender.go.jp/kaigi/renkei/zentai/29/pdf/siry03-1.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ In a questionnaire to external aid organizations, there was a question asking what kind of activities they had engaged in. The two organizations which selected "others" chose that they engaged in "prevention of DV" and "support for women."

¹⁰⁵ This program was led by the Cabinet Office in association with the three prefectures of Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate. Osaka Gender Equality Foundation ran its secretariat, and several cities and civil groups participated in it as partner organizations. Partner organizations in 2011: NPO Cooperation Participation Planning-Iwate, Morioka Women's Center, Iwate Prefectural Branch of the Japanese Midwives' Association, Iwate Coop, Morioka City, Hearty Sendai, Sendai City, Kesennuma City, Natori City Support Group for Women's Self-reliance, Koriyama City, Iwaki City, National Shelter Net for Women, Japan Feminist Counseling Society, the Japan National Council of Women's Centers, Single Mothers' Forum. Partner organizations in 2012: NPO Cooperation Participation Planning-Iwate, Morioka Women's Center, Iwate Prefectural Branch of the Japanese Midwives' Association, Iwate Coop, Morioka City, Hearty Sendai, Kesennuma City, Women's Space-Fukushima (formerly Support Group for Women's Self-reliance), Koriyama City, National Shelter Net for Women, Japan Feminist Counseling Society, the Japan National Council of Women's Centers


¹⁰⁶ Refer to data on the website of the Gender Equality Bureau of the Cabinet Office. <<http://www.gender.go.jp/policy/saigai/bo-reports.html>>

In 2012, major services provided in this project include “attentive listening (83.1% or 1,218 persons)”;

“provision of general information (32.6% or 481 persons)”;

“advice (28.7% or 421 persons)” and “psychological guidance (8.9% or 239 persons).” Major services offered in 2013 were “attentive listening (93.1% or 5,189 persons)”;

“advice (40.0% or 2,172 persons)” and “provision of general information (22.3% or 1,242 persons).”



Source: Prepared by JANIC based on the reports of the Gender Equality Bureau’s Counseling Programme for Women and Violence Cases in the Areas Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake

Figure 23. Assistance provided in the Counseling Programme for Women and Violence Cases in the Areas Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake

(multiple answers allowed. valid respondents: 1,465 persons in 2012, 5,573 persons in 2013, valid responses: 2,672 persons in 2012, 10,832 persons in 2013)

3.2.5. RESULTS (SPECIAL SUPPORT)

(1) ADEQUATE ATTENTION PAID TO THOSE WHO NEEDED SPECIAL SUPPORT?

■ We received the following comments:

- Proper attention was missing for pregnant women, the elderly who needed nursing care and persons with disabilities (Iwate).

To a question to the residents asking, “Have you found special support missing for pregnant women, the elderly who needed nursing care and persons with disabilities?” 72.9% answered “No” and 27.1% answered “Yes” (Figure 24).




Figure 24. Have you ever felt that special support for pregnant women, the elderly who needed nursing care and persons with disabilities insufficient? (236 valid respondents)

We summarize remarks made by those who answered “Yes” to the question above as follows:¹⁰⁷

Table 13. Remarks made by the respondents who chose “special support was insufficient”

General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I have a chronic disease, but no information is available about good doctors near the temporary shelter. • I found it missing especially at a temporary shelter. Full facilities and support were not available. • I felt that psychological care was fully provided, but physical support was insufficient (rarely seen). Physical support was offered only by relatives or helper services. Therefore, I heard many people talking about a variety of hardships. • A stressful environment contributed to an increase in the number of suicides. Full mental care support was not provided. • I share the same room with the elderly who need nursing care at temporary housing. Life with such people gives me a tough time psychologically. • I struggled to live right after the disaster and paid less attention to the elderly and persons with disabilities. • There is a shortage in assistance to those who live alone, so I would like to improve support for them. • I wish there were more beds and a little more space for nursing care available at temporary shelters and temporary housing.
Children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Families with children who speak loud are likely to leave a temporary shelter or temporary housing, worrying about disturbing other people around them. The government cannot look after them that far. I think that it is what should be done by external aid to assist in the areas where the government cannot reach out. • Schools to which children used to go were devastated by the disaster. Therefore, they now go to another school which integrated several schools in the vicinity. They have been exposed to more stress in a new environment. Their parents were so preoccupied with rebuilding their life that they wanted outside help that would provide child care. Some organizations held cheerful events, but my children were not so good at such occasions. Thus, they were not able to feel comfortable with them. • The effects of radiation are totally unknown. The parents with children playing on the ground have some fears about them. I think it was a good recreation programme to give opportunities for children to play outside Fukushima Prefecture.
Persons with disabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I wonder they would appreciate the assistance offered by organizations specializing in the elderly and persons with disabilities. • Personalized support was needed to meet specific disabilities. • There was an increase in abuse against them. They cannot manage to evacuate by themselves. Those who suffered from autism had to have a tough time in a new environment, so more assistance was needed. Local organizations were tied up with their own affairs and could not take care of them. • It is difficult that persons with physical difficulties, serious illnesses, developmental disabilities and mental disorders live in a temporary shelter. I think many of them would spend time in a car for a while. Even though it was inconvenient, they were compelled to stay at their own home or their relatives' home, but living at home meant that they were not going to receive supplies, etc.
The elderly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The elderly who had difficulties to go out all by themselves could not participate in tea parties, etc., even if they were invited to them. • Support should be provided to connect the elderly with others and confirm their safety. The government is also required to get involved in assistance to them. • Before assistance arrived, the elderly looked so cold at temporary shelters without enough blankets. • Some organizations had less knowledge about support for the elderly. Even if they are

¹⁰⁷ Not only this question but also the other questions were basically asked and heard by our staff in the questionnaire surveys for the residents. We were also careful not to cause any misunderstanding of our questions among the residents. However, many of the residents did not understand which support was provided by the government or external/local civil groups. Therefore, some complaints against the government are included in the comments made by those who answered “Yes” in this question.

	<p>crippled, it is not good for the elderly that aid worker do everything for them. By doing so, they won't move and are getting frailer.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People suffered from economy-class syndrome through the evacuation process, which was tough especially for the elderly. Some of them passed away during the evacuation process. • Many of the elderly living at a rented apartment (deemed temporary housing) won't go outside. • Families who needed nursing care for the elderly (at that time) had a tough time. They were at a loss, with almost nothing available including toilets and diapers. • The elderly who can neither do not change a diaper nor have toilets are isolated. The residents in their 70s and 80s living at a rented apartment (deemed temporary housing) have gone out less frequently than they used to.
Pregnant women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We were faced with a situation where we were not able to believe all the government information about the effects of radiation on women's body. I wanted civil society organizations to tell us about them in a little more clear and easy-to-understand fashion. They seemed to be completely divided on this this issue, and I had no idea about how to determine the situation. • I hope that some attention would have been paid to breast-feeding at a temporary shelter. • Even if they are not pregnant, young women are worried about pregnancy. They still need psychological care. • There were no necessary clothes available. Meticulous assistance was needed. • I have no idea about what is going to happen next to my body. However, I am dissatisfied with responses given. I think that the elderly, persons with disabilities and their families would have a tough time, not being able to make their physical situation understood. • Pregnant women left Fukushima Prefecture, but they were badly treated in the other prefectures. They were sometimes even rejected at hospital, while they took refuge.
Foreigners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some of the foreign nation-wide evacuees were worried about DV. I referred them to aid organizations.
Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to a few local staff of the external aid organizations, even staff from specialized organizations had difficulties in treating alcoholics, not knowing how to keep a proper distance from them. When they were drinking, they disturbed the others in a community space or at work. In such a situation, local staff could not protect their safety, but at the same time, they had to encourage them to become independent. Therefore, they tried to keep a proper distance from them for a number of reasons. However, there were examples and reports that later these alcoholics would not go out from their home and committed suicide.

(2) WHAT CAUSED DEFICIENCY IN SPECIAL SUPPORT?

CAUSE 1. UNCLEAR SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

- We expanded our scope of activities, not knowing how far we should get involved in assistance at all (Hearing / NGO).

- SWCs responsible for welfare of the elderly and persons with disabilities were tied up with running disaster VCs. That was one of the reasons why sufficient care was not provided to those who needed special support. I do not mean that running VCs is not part of their own job, but it is true that they were tied up with it (Hearing).

CAUSE 2. REGULATIONS TO PROTECT PERSONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMATICALLY LIMITED INFORMATION SHARING.

- Regulations related to handling of personal information prevented organizations from building a mechanism for information sharing, in order to know where and who needed special support (Hearing).

This is further discussed in Theme 10 [Sharing information and collaboration].

CAUSE 3. VOICES OF THOSE WHO NEEDED SPECIAL SUPPORT UNLIKELY SURFACE.

- Some of the families with disabled children and foreigners who were not good at speaking Japanese lived an isolated life at deemed temporary housing. They did not live in a temporary shelter or temporary housing, caring about the other's eyes. It is difficult to survey the evacuees living at home or deemed temporary housing in a systematic manner and understand their needs (Hearing / SWCs).

CAUSE 4. INSUFFICIENT COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING¹⁰⁸

- Some organizations were more interested in gaining subsidies and securing human resources in emergency relief which did not require special support. Thus, they could not take care of special support (Hearing).

(3) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (SPECIAL SUPPORT)**MEASURES 1. SHARE ROLES THROUGH DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES AND COLLABORATING WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

- Each stakeholder is required to make full use of their specialty and expertise and define their scope of activities. In order to do so, it is necessary to clarify their scope of activities, saying what their organizations can do (or are specialize in) or how far they can do (or cannot) (Hearing).

- In the field of social welfare, SWCs and the government provide support. Therefore, if they collaborate with these organizations or make up for the parts of which these cannot take care, I suppose that the number of those who cannot receive support will decrease (Hearing).

MEASURES 2. CREATE A TOWN SENSITIVE TO DISASTER PREVENTION FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

- Some facilities for persons with disabilities could escape the tsunami, because they were built on the heights. Others like a facility where my wheelchair friend lived were washed away by the waves which were flown into through a river far away from the coastal area. It is required to create a town focusing on disaster prevention for persons with disabilities, making full use of this lesson (Remarks).

3.2.6. DISCUSSION (SPECIAL SUPPORT)**IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THAT A DISASTER WILL INCREASE VULNERABILITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES.**

According to the results of a questionnaire, 30 percent of the respondents said that there were shortages in assistance to those who needed special support. It is also reported that the death toll of persons with disabilities was twice as many as that of all the residents in the Great East Japan Earthquake.¹⁰⁹

It is pointed out that persons with disabilities are exposed to greater risks at a time of disaster and often left out from the relief and recovery process.¹¹⁰ The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) stipulates in Article 11, “Evacuation routes and shelters should be prepared to ensure the safety of persons with disabilities in natural disaster including fires. They should be treated in the same way as the others, in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law.” At the same time, ISDR (Secretariat for International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction), a United Nations organization, released tentative results of its 2013 survey¹¹¹ which collected answers from 5,450 persons in 126 countries including Japan as follows.

It is estimated that those who have some sort of disabilities account for about fifteen percent of the world population. Only 20% of all the respondents in the questionnaire said that they feel no difficulties in emergency evacuation, while 6% of them said that they “cannot evacuate at all,” when a disaster actually happens. In the meantime, the results show that the percentage of those who feel no difficulties in emergency evacuation increases to about 38%, when they are able to have enough time. However, 58% still feel some difficulties, and 4% cannot evacuate, even if they are able to have enough time.

It is expected to encourage persons with disabilities to get involved and reflect their comments in all the processes of disaster prevention planning and disaster drills, in order to further improve responses to them in an event of disaster. As pointed out when major social and economic development activities were implemented in the Hyogo Framework for Action,¹¹² it seems to be critical to enhance reconstruction plans including psychological

¹⁰⁸ Insufficient information sharing was also raised as one of the reasons. More details of information sharing will be discussed in the section of Theme 10 “Information sharing and coordination.”

¹⁰⁹ Survey in the major prefectures affected by the disaster in “Persons with Disabilities Left Out” aired on NHK (September 11, 2011). The holders of the Physical Disability Certificates, the Intellectual Disability Certificates (for persons with intellectual disabilities) and the Mental Disability Certificates (for persons with mental disabilities) are defined as persons with disabilities. The numbers differ depending on the situation in each prefecture and municipality.

¹¹⁰ Bibliography 3-15, etc.

¹¹¹ <http://www.unisdr.org/archive/35032>

¹¹² The Hyogo Framework for Action will be revised in 2015.

and social training programs to alleviate post-disaster mental damages of the vulnerable, especially children, as well as a safety-net mechanism to support vulnerable disaster victims, such as the poor, the elderly and persons with disabilities.

IT IS EXPECTED TO ENHANCE COLLABORATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE.

Although the municipal governmental agencies were also affected by the disaster and their functions were weakened, these public institutions played an extremely significant role. In particular, it is difficult that only civil society organizations respond to the issues, which are related to personal information protection and cannot be easily identified, such as worries of persons with disabilities and domestic violence. Active collaboration and exchange of opinions should be facilitated between public institutions and civil society organizations in not only responses after a disaster, but also through the decision making process in disaster prevention. In some cases like activities to protect the elderly, taking systematical measures deserve consideration, such as easing regulations of sharing information on those who need special support in providing emergency relief.

Activities of AAR Japan (Association for Aid and Relief, Japan) are one of the good examples of coordination and mutual understanding with local organizations, when external aid workers take a step on the ground. This NGO focused on assistance to those who needed special support and nursing care in its activities from the emergency stage to the recovery stage. As one of its characteristics, it is reported that this association played a supplementary role of the government, making full use of its assistance experiences abroad and its characteristics of "swiftness" and "flexibility." It loaded three to ten vehicles with relief supplies including food and necessities every day and delivered them to persons with disabilities in the disaster areas and facilities for the elderly, as well as evacuees who lived in homes, secondary shelters and temporary housing, while making sure of their safety. The Welfare Division for Persons with Disabilities in Miyagi Prefecture provided information of welfare facilities in the prefecture to AAR Japan, and built a relation through which AAR Japan could also provide the division with information obtained through confirmation of the safety of the residents.¹¹³

ORGANIZATIONS HAVE TO SHOW THEIR OWN SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES FOR A BETTER COLLABORATION.

Table 13 shows comments made by the residents in the disaster areas. Some of the comments surpass the scope of responsibilities of civil society and include issues that should be handled by the government. There was no definite standard to define the scope of responsibilities that should be covered by the government or civil society organizations including external aid organizations in a broader sense. In the field of welfare, it is crucial to define each role and responsibility in collaboration with the government or SWCs.

SPECIALIZED ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED ALONG WITH ITS DETAILED EXPLANATION.

Highly specialized assistance is required for those who need special support. In this disaster as well, 41.6% (32 persons) of the stakeholders of the external aid organizations raise "local needs for which they could use their own expertise" as a reason to select their action areas.

In the discussion over specialty, however, comments were divided into two. The one comment said, "Every external aid organization engaged in the same activities, such as debris removal, soup runs and distribution of supplies, for a while after the disaster happened. It did not implement specialized activities based on its own principles, and its expertise was completely wasted (Hearing)." The other comment points out that "some organizations were too specialized in one field (Hearing)." To come up with better ways to communicate with other organizations under different settings is probably required to get their understanding.

3.2.7. CONCLUSION (COMPREHENSIVE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED?)

[COVERAGE]

In spite of relatively small amounts of support provided in Fukushima Prefecture, about 10 percent of the residents felt inequality in assistance at a prefectural level. However, more than 40 percent of the residents felt inequality in assistance depending on type of housing. They found that insufficient assistance provided especially to those who lived at deemed temporary housing or at home. There were also differences in assistance provided at temporary shelters and temporary housing depending on their size and accessibility.

¹¹³ Bibliography 1-2, P.61

[GENDER EQUALITY]

Only about twenty percent of the residents found attention to gender insufficient. However, some activities lacked attention to women in providing relief supplies, etc. Aid organization found some issues that made it difficult to involve men in community programs. There was collaboration with the government in activities to protect women against DV, etc.

[SPECIAL SUPPORT]

Nearly 30 percent of the residents felt that insufficient assistance was provided to those who needed special support, such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, children and foreigners. Regulations to protect personal information made it difficult for only civil groups to listen to the voices of these people. Therefore, it is critical to collaborate with the government and other organizations. However, sometimes such collaboration was not fully achieved due to their indefinite scope of activities or insufficient communication.

3.3. ASSISTANCE BROUGHT ANY FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE PEOPLE?

Justification for selecting this theme
The residents and communities have the abilities to cope with disasters on their own. Assistance should never hinder these abilities. Furthermore, special attention should be paid, in order to avoid negative impact on the ground in any way.



Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicators	Verification in this joint review
Coping strategies and resilience ¹¹⁴	Assistance provided not weakening the abilities of local residents and communities to cope with disasters on their own?
Do no harm	People exposed any further damage by assistance other than [Coping strategies and resilience] ¹¹⁵
<p>[Coping strategies and resilience]</p> <p>The following three points were verified:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Independent spirit of the residents,2. Resilience of a local community, and3. Local private businesses. <p>[Do no harm]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• We verified other aspects besides [Coping strategies and resilience] concerning this theme.	



Conclusion
<p>[COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE]</p> <p>Some assistance helped recovery and reconstruction, making full use of local power. On the other hand, some of the activities including delivery of supplies often deprived local people of their independent spirit and dignity, because aid workers lacked this perspective.</p> <p>[DO NO HARM]</p> <p>Overlapped investigation and volunteers' words and actions distressed the residents, while inequality in assistance caused conflict between them. Some assistance resulted in creating burdens for the residents. Moreover, local organizations sometimes felt burdened in accepting assistance.</p>

¹¹⁴ The principles of protection of rights 1 define them as "support and protection efforts which will not weaken self-protection abilities."

¹¹⁵ They refer to the principles of protection of rights 1 in Bibliography 3-15.

3.3.1. RESULTS (COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE)

(1) PROVIDED ASSISTANCE PAID ATTENTION TO INDEPENDENT SPIRIT OF THE RESIDENTS?

SOME ASSISTANCE ENCOURAGED THE RESIDENTS TO RECOVER ON THEIR OWN AND HAVE INDEPENDENT SPIRIT.

- I was uplifted, when things I made were purchased, such as knitted wool scarves and accessories. Although such income did not help my living, it made me happy. I could feel, as if I were appreciated by someone. Moreover, I would like to make some contributions to organizations which have supported us, by making good results (sales). I could become happier than I just received someone's charity (Remarks / participants in NGO's employment programme for women).

- I sometimes had a tough time. However, I have had a tougher time in my pre-disaster job than when I did nothing for a while after the earthquake disaster. Therefore, it can be said that my present life is getting back to the one where I used to be (Remarks / participants in NGO's employment programme for women).

- I got involved in emergency employment activities including debris removal and distribution of supplies, jobs closer to volunteer work, and received salaries. I could feel positive about myself, through these activities which gave me a feeling that I worked and supported my family, as well as I contributed to local recovery efforts. I could forget hardships, while I was working (Remarks / participants in NGO's employment programme for women).

- Since we got out of the emergency stage, we have seen people engaged in town development or community development more often. We get involved in these activities, with a positive view that we will create our future in the community on our own (Remarks).

- Men in their 50s and 60s are not readily accessible, and many of them stay inside their home and won't go out. Having a job often plays an integral part in making sure of their *raison d'être* among these male age groups. In order to hire jobless people, both emergency employment programs and re-employment support were offered at the same time (Hearing, Remarks).

SOME ASSISTANCE DISCOURAGED INDEPENDENT SPIRIT AND RESILIENCE OF THE RESIDENTS.

- While continued assistance helped the residents' livelihood, it is also true that it created a situation where they were so accustomed to receiving assistance that they took it for granted. Such assistance damaged independent spirit and resilience of the residents (Miyagi).

- Since the second half of 2011, the number of volunteers activities from outside of the prefecture to help agricultural or fishery work of local people was growing, but possibly this efforts took away job opportunities in the community and undermined motivation of the local people (Miyagi).

- Some assistance might prevent the residents from becoming independent (Hearing / external aid organizations, local organizations, SWCs).

- There were a wide variety of industrial support offered, such as donation of fishery equipment, purchase of products and assistance in actual work. One young man said, "I worked at an aquaculture facility of *wakame* (brown seaweed) every year as a part-time worker. This year, however, the facility rejected me, saying that it did not need me, because volunteers worked there for free (Remarks / external aid organizations, SWCs)."

- There was nothing for the residents to do, because volunteers dealt with the areas which should be handled by the residents (Remarks / residents).

- We cut grass in order to implement an emergency employment programme and accepted volunteers. However, a local silver human resource center pointed out that cutting grass in the area used to be done by the elderly who were hired by the center. It said that our work would cause reduction in the silver human resource center's jobs. Therefore, we made arrangement with the center (Hearing / external aid organizations).

- Excessive assistance (in terms of quantity and period) flooding into temporary housing, etc. caused a situation where the residents took provided assistance for granted. It also hindered their mental recovery including their independent spirit (Remarks / residents: deemed temporary housing).

- Fishermen need manpower during the period of harvesting *wakame*, etc. Therefore, they really appreciated volunteers' help. However, it had another impact on the local community in a different perspective. The elderly who were still able to work and those who lost a boat had nothing to do but to stay idle, losing things to do. On the other hand, some assistance activities had good relations with local residents, limiting their assistance to painting a boat which did not directly violate local interest (Hearing / local welfare personnel).

(2) PROVIDED ASSISTANCE PAID ATTENTION TO RESILIENCE OF A LOCAL COMMUNITY?

SOME ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED A COMMUNITY WHICH WAS DIVIDED AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER.

- Right after I moved into temporary housing, I did not know anyone around me. However, I could make new acquaintances, participating in tea parties and radio exercise held by an organization from Tokyo (Hearing / residents).

SOME ASSISTANCE PAID INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO A LOCAL COMMUNITY.

- Transportation service was offered in marginal villages along the coastal area. This service was of great help for the elderly who had difficulties in moving and other people. In part of Miyagi Prefecture, however, there was a culture in which neighbors offered a lift for those who were going to hospital. This service made more convenient the lives of many people including the disabled elderly. However, it contributed to the loss of a culture which allowed the residents to help each other and opportunities to have communication between them, as well as weakened the “safety net of caring for each other” which used to be there. As this organization emphasized the significance of self-help and mutual assistance,¹¹⁶ I expected that it would pay a little more attention (Hearing / local welfare personnel).

- Some people repaired their house affected by the disaster and live in it. However, these people are isolated, because familiar neighbors are not back home (Hearing).

(3) ASSISTANCE BALANCED WITH LOCAL PRIVATE BUSINESSES?

SOME ASSISTANCE DISTURBED LOCAL PRIVATE BUSINESSES.

In a questionnaire to the residents, 10.2% (25 persons) said that free supplies / assistance activities hindered the recovery of local businesses (economic activities) (Figure 19).

■ With regard this, the following comments were given:

- When supplies arrived from outside of the prefecture, we tried to consult with local merchants (Remarks / local organizations).

- Volunteers, who offered haircut, massage or bicycle repair service for free, disturbed local businesses which complained about these volunteers. As a last resort, I told the volunteers to offer their services at least at 100 yen or a small amount of money (Remarks / director of a residents’ association at temporary housing).

- A large amount of clothes arrived as supplies for the evacuees and partly contained expensive ones. Thus, people no longer buy clothes for themselves. I have made a decision to close my business, considering a variety of factors including a newly opened large-scale retail store in the vicinity (Remarks / former boutique owner).

- An external aid organization held a soba event for newcomers.¹¹⁷ Although it was a high time to receive many customers under ordinary circumstances, we had few customers during that time (Remarks / local restaurant owner).

- Employment programs run by the government or NGOs were sometimes better than the local standards, offering better salaries, no uncompensated overwork, etc. We restarted our food-processing company in the neighborhood, but received no applications for our job offers. Many people received unemployment insurance benefits and did not work or left for the other prefectures. Such a situation might be a reason for this (Hearing / local food-processing company).

(4) CAUSES OF PROBLEMS RELATED TO COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE

CAUSE 1. AID WORKERS’ INSUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING ON NEGATIVE IMPACT OF SUPPORT

- The understanding of aid organizations was so shallow that they did not understand that as people got accustomed to receiving assistance, assistance would hinder their independent spirit and recovery (Miyagi).

¹¹⁶ The “Survey Report on Fires in the Southern Hyogo Prefecture Earthquake” of Japan Association for Fire Science and Engineering shows the survey result on who saved people buried in the earthquake. According to the result, 90 percent of them were reportedly saved through self-help and mutual assistance in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

¹¹⁷ A Japanese custom of giving out soba to new neighbors after a house move (*hikkoshi soba*).

CAUSE 2. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY AID WORKERS WITHOUT ANY UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESIDENTS' SITUATION

- A system to inform aid workers of the aid recipients' needs was so weak that aid workers provided one-way and self-pleasing assistance, not understanding the situation and prospect (Miyagi).

CAUSE 3. AID WORKERS' UNDERSTANDING THAT "INSUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE IS MORE GRAVE CONCERNS THAN EXCESSIVE ASSISTANCE"

- They understood there were comments saying that no more relief supplies were required. However, when they talked to local people, they heard them saying that there was a shortage in this and that. A number of organizations kept distributing relief supplies throughout the process, based on their judgment that "it was imperative to avoid a situation where some people were unable to receive necessities." The same thing happened to their employment programs (Hearing / external aid organizations).

CAUSE 4. ASSISTANCE TO DISTRIBUTE SUPPLIES IS EASILY IMPLEMENTED AND UNDERSTOOD.

- We are not a large organization enough to establish a local office. Therefore, we carried out our activities with determination to "do whatever we could do from Tokyo." As a result of discussions, we found that it was the easiest way to listen to what local people needed and sent it (Hearing / external aid organizations).
- We implemented activities, receiving financial aid from a number of companies. We sometimes distributed their products as supplies to the residents. We did not think that those supplies were indispensable from a perspective of local people because local shops were already reopened. We told about it to persons in charge at the donor companies, but could not gain much understanding from them (Hearing / local organizations).

(5) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE)

MEASURES 1. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE PAYING ATTENTION TO INDEPENDENT SPIRIT OF THE RESIDENTS.

- Hold training for aid organizations on what kind of attention should be paid in providing assistance in (after) a disaster, and include respect for independent spirit of the beneficiaries in the training (Miyagi).¹¹⁸
- The residents need to gather together and raise awareness of solving issues on their own initiative. External aid organizations also have to understand the significance of doing so and to be careful not to disturb their attempts (Miyagi).
- Build a system to support self-help efforts of aid recipients (Miyagi).

MEASURES 2. THE RESIDENTS THEMSELVES COMMUNICATE THEIR OWN NEEDS.

- The residents should take initiative to communicate their own needs and external aid workers should provide assistance to the residents based on them (Miyagi).

MEASURES 3. SHARE ROLES AND MAKE COORDINATION BETWEEN AID ORGANIZATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RESIDENTS.

- It is a good idea to define their role and scope of activities between the government, the residents and external aid organizations in order to prevent their assistance from putting pressure on local private businesses. Some aid organizations tried to procure supplies from local vendors with the help of commerce and industry associations and chambers of commerce in the municipalities, when they procured and distributed supplies.¹¹⁹
- We experienced a decrease in the number of applicants for our employment programme around half a year after the earthquake disaster. Around this time, one of the participants in our employment programme left our organization and participated in the government's employment programme. He consulted with us and said that he was unable to make his mind. According to him whose one-year contract with our programme did not expire, the wage of our programme was slightly higher than the local standard of manual labor. However, the wage of the government programme was much higher in spite of its short contract term of two weeks. We had difficulties in

¹¹⁸ Paragraph 2 in the HAP¹¹⁸ Standards sets forth, "Organizations have to make sure that their staff have adequate abilities to fulfill their responsibilities." Paragraph 2 in the HAP Standards also stipulates, "They have to conduct a coherent assessment of the abilities of their staff on a regular basis, in terms of knowledge, skills, actions and attitude required to fulfill their responsibilities." "They have to provide continued education to their staff so that they can fulfill their responsibilities more effectively."

¹¹⁹ Bibliography 1-2, P27

deciding our wages, being torn between the lower wage level of local private businesses and the higher wage level of the government programs. We wish that there would have been a place to coordinate these (Hearing / external aid organizations).

3.3.2. DISCUSSION (COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE)

ASSISTANCE PAYING ATTENTION TO INDEPENDENT SPIRIT OF THE RESIDENTS

In this disaster, many of the assistance activities intended to stand by the disaster victims and provide direct or indirect assistance to recover their independent spirit. These activities often aimed to provide the residents with a place where they could find some work and activities, or to ensure an environment with job opportunities to offer by supporting local industries. As a result, they were expected to bring about positive effects, which would allow the residents to feel “satisfied” with their life and positive about their future life. They offered a variety of programs which covered different people and made necessary arrangements for different situations.

Table 14. Overview of assistance activities which possibly made the residents feel “satisfied”

Details of the programs	Main participants
Making and selling of accessories and daily necessities (knitting, etc.)	Women, elderly women, persons with disabilities, foreigners
Local contribution activities (Debris removal, taking care of the elderly, cleaning photos tainted by the disaster, etc.)	Men and women in their prime
Industrial assistance (fishery assistance, etc.)	Men and women in their prime
Town development/community development	Men and women of all ages including junior high-school and high school students

Source: Prepared by JANIC

Table 14 summarizes about ten examples in each prefecture that possibly made the residents feel satisfied with their jobs. These programs were effective in the following points:

In many activities, accessories and daily necessities produced by the evacuees were purchased through volunteers and tourists from across the country and event websites outside of the prefecture. These activities had a mechanism which returned part of the profits to the producers. Although many of these products cannot make money enough to make ends meet in their own right, they satisfied the esteem needs of the producers, while supplementing the producers’ income. If you want to keep implementing these activities and want individuals outside the prefecture whose interest in the disaster areas were waning to keep buying your products, you have to have sophisticated PR, marketing and production capabilities to respond to a large amount of orders. The facilitators will be required to manage both business and assistance aspects carefully.

However, these activities were varied in terms of scale, ranging from small ones, which used a meeting place in temporary housing and were implemented as part of rehabilitating the elderly and building a community, to big ones, which made substantial profits and even offered quasi-employment opportunities by developing products, involving advertising agencies and companies. There are also some comments that “participants (producers) were under pressure from external aid organizations, which too much focused on profitability in the light of self-reliance, as their activities were nearing an end (Hearing).”

Employment programs implemented activities close to general volunteer work done by those came from other prefectures. It seems that the residents could maintain their pride and dignity through these activities, where they helped other residents and their help was appreciated. It is assumed that this could be also true for the residents who got involved in industrial assistance like fishery. It was expected that “the number of suicides committed by men in their prime would increase after the earthquake disaster” from the experience in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The government has concerns over this as well.¹²⁰ Local contribution activities and industrial assistance had an advantage in involving these groups of people. Activities for town development and community

¹²⁰ First Liaison Council on Suicide Prevention in Sendai City Document 2 (September 10, 2012)
<http://www.city.sendai.jp/kenkou/shougai/ikkatu/241030PDF/siryou2.pdf>

development do not primarily intend to create jobs and “satisfaction.” However, as a result, it can be said that they provided jobs and satisfaction as their by-products.

ASSISTANCE PAYING ATTENTION TO RESILIENCE OF A LOCAL COMMUNITY

This disaster also left huge scars on human relations which had originally existed in the community. Those who were forced to evacuate moved to various places to live, such as temporary shelters, their own homes which could avoid being totally destroyed, rented houses and houses of relatives or friends. Furthermore, although the construction of temporary housing was started, the community was further divided, because the number of them was limited, and who could live there was decided by lottery or priority. These circumstances caused a number of problems: “Although we moved into temporary housing, there are few old acquaintances in the neighborhood”; and “We repaired our house and restarted to live in it, but familiar faces never come back.” Thus, restoring a divided community became a big issue.

It was meaningful to launch several projects to build a new community, in order to solve this problem. Examples of these projects include; small- and large-size events which included sports and performing arts, “tea parties” held on a regular basis at a meeting place in temporary housing, operation of community spaces set up by aid organizations. As far as community spaces concerned, for example, there were many different types of them. Some activities focused deeply on temporary housing in a specific area. Others provided a space set up in a corner of a supermarket which participants could feel free to drop by or a space which was offered only to those who used to live in a specific area, before it was divided. These community spaces provided a place which allowed different groups of people to gather, talk with others and exchange information. Human relations were maintained or newly built through these spaces. They were expected to become a vital foundation of a local community at the recovery stage in the future.

If external aid organizations engaged in transportation service had focused on indirect assistance, local people would have been able to work. Assistance replacing local industries and unbalanced assistance focusing on only some fishermen would cause conflict between the residents and hinder the development of their ability to help each other. It is difficult to express doubts about these issues, because they are concerned with economic interests. However, external aid organizations, which are likely to focus on “near-sighted assistance,” should bear these issues in mind.

ASSISTANCE BALANCED WITH LOCAL PRIVATE BUSINESSES

The Sphere Project makes it clear in its core standard 1 that it will use projects which employ local workforce and environmentally sustainable resources and fulfill social responsibilities, if possible, in order to benefit the local economy and facilitate recovery.

Industrial assistance activities promoted local independent spirit and led to recovering dignity of the local economy and the residents in this earthquake disaster as well. There were a number of activities which put an emphasis on local procurement and distributed supplies, consulting with local merchants. Those activities can be highly regarded as an example which provided assistance and maintained a good balance with local private businesses. On the other hand, as frequently pointed out in the field of international cooperation, there were some examples in which gratuitous assistance put pressure on reopened private businesses in the community.

If distribution of free food continued, the residents would no longer shop at local merchants and economic activities would slow down, even if the disaster areas recovered to a certain level. If services continued to be provided for free, it would become difficult that the residents, who used to make a living on those services before the earthquake disaster, rebuild their independent living with their own earnings. In order to avoid such a negative impact, in some overseas assistance, cash or vouchers (coupons) is offered to purchase food and necessities instead of providing them for free, when the local market functions.¹²¹ In the Great East Japan Earthquake, however, this experience was not fully utilized.

Removal of disaster waste (debris, etc.) should also become a job of builders in the disaster areas, and could possibly become an engine of economic recovery at the recovery stage. Therefore, special attention must be paid except for matters of urgency.

Unless there is a concept of respecting independent spirit of the residents in the society as a whole, including unemployment insurance systems of external aid organizations and the government and individual volunteers, it is

¹²¹ Bibliography 3-15

feared that excessive assistance will arise somewhere. However, the assistance to the vulnerable population who have more difficulties in being independent (the socially vulnerable, etc.) is a different story; we need a careful consideration for them, which would eventually improve the quality of assistance.

3.3.3. RESULTS (DO NO HARM)

Except for coping strategies and resilience of the residents, damages that assistance activities inflicted to local stakeholders can be divided into “burdens on the residents” and “burdens on local organizations” (Table 15).

Table 15. Classification of negative effects caused by assistance based on the assessment results

Do no harm	Burdens on the residents
	Burdens inflicted by duplicated surveys (Miyagi)
	Conflict between the residents caused by assistance (Tokyo, Hearing)
	Burdens inflicted by volunteers’ words and actions (Iwate, Miyagi, Hearing)
	Burdens on local organizations
	Burdens with accepting assistance (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Hearing)
	Burdens with procedures for subsidies and financial aid (Tokyo, Iwate, Fukushima)

Source: Prepared by JANIC

(1) ATTENTION PAID TO PREVENT ASSISTANCE FROM BECOMING BURDENS ON THE RESIDENTS?

DUPLICATED SURVEYS INFLECTED BURDENS ON THE RESIDENTS

The residents said that duplicated surveys in which “various organizations asking the same question many times (Tokyo)” became burden. In a questionnaire to the residents, 16.3% (40 persons) answered that they felt frustrated or doubtful about surveys and interviews made by various organizations (Figure 19), and some commented, “Although they came and conducted hearings many times, I heard nothing from them later. I felt a sense of distrust, not knowing how those surveys were used (Remarks).”

ASSISTANCE CAUSED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RESIDENTS

- There were a wide variety of assistance offered including distribution of supplies. However, inequality in such assistance caused conflict between those who received some and nothing or between those who received more and less (Tokyo).

Some 31.0% (76 persons) of the residents said that relief supplies were distributed unfairly (Figure 19).

The residents claimed that “When I received nothing, I envied those who received expensive products which could be resold for tens of thousands of yen (home electronics, bicycles, etc.), whether or not I need them (Remarks)”; “In fishery assistance, fishery equipment and related supplies were provided only to some fishery workers. Fishery workers who received nothing pointed out lack of fairness (Hearing)”; and “Inequality in assistance was obvious especially in relation to money. For example, the amounts of benefits differed from temporary shelter to temporary shelter. Benefit standards per household or per capita were not clearly defined (Remarks).”

This kind of inequality can be seen in a comment saying, “Assistance was provided only to those who were a group leader’s favorites. Those who received such assistance had difficulties in living in the community.” This example tells us inequality in assistance sometimes resulted in a chasm between the old residents in the community with strong ties in it. Some of the aid recipients were also under psychological pressure. Inequality between the residents were also caused in part by unbalanced assistance which arose from the difference of type of housing (refer to Theme 2’s [Coverage]).

VOLUNTEERS’ WORDS AND ACTIONS SOMETIMES DISTURBED LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

The external aid organizations brought many individual volunteers into the disaster areas. They made effective use of these volunteers to alleviate a manpower shortage. However, some of their words and actions reportedly disturbed the residents, and 14.2% (35 persons) of them answered “disturbed by volunteers’ words, action and

behavior of volunteers brought by organizations (Figure 19).” The residents also commented that “Volunteers disturbed us, throwing a peace sign and taking a commemorative picture in the area where a lot of residents died (Miyagi / residents)”; “They held parties at midnight. The neighbors were disturbed by the noise of them (Iwate / residents)”; and “One of the families found their ring gone after volunteers came (Remarks).”

(2) WHAT MADE ASSISTANCE BURDENS ON THE RESIDENTS?

CAUSE 1. ACCOUNTABILITY TO DONORS

- Aid organizations as a listener need accurate information in order to gain social trust in their own information or fulfill accountability to their donors. They also have different interests (Tokyo).

CAUSE 2. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN AID ORGANIZATIONS

- No mechanism or place was specified beforehand to share and accumulate information effectively (Tokyo).
- There was a regulatory constraint, which prevented information of aid recipients from being shared, in relation to personal information protection (Miyagi, Fukushima).
- More emphasis was placed on swift provision of aid than information sharing among organizations, especially right after the disaster (Tokyo).

CAUSE 3. COORDINATION FUNCTION WAS NOT FULFILLED BY INFORMATION SHARING MEETINGS.

- In information sharing meetings,¹²² people focused only on reporting their activities, and were not willing to coordinate to reduce duplicated aid (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).

CAUSE 4. ORIENTATION OR TRAINING TO THE VOLUNTEERS WAS INSUFFICIENT.

- Lack of orientation or training to the staff and volunteers of the external aid organizations resulted in low awareness of the knowledge, understanding and attention to their assistance (Tokyo).

(3) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (DO NO HARM TO THE RESIDENTS)

MEASURES 1. COORDINATE ACTIVITIES AMONG AID ORGANIZATIONS.

- Develop professional staff who coordinate aid and volunteers at a different level in an organization or area (Miyagi).
- Share information, making full use of coordination meetings (Miyagi).
- Residents inform local needs correctly to coordination experts and individual volunteers (Miyagi).

MEASURES 2. CREATE RULES OR A MECHANISM FOR VOLUNTEERS.

- Prepare a memorandum and an agreement on job specifications and have volunteers sign them (Miyagi).
- Make it clear which jobs should be done by experts or non-experts. Specialized activities should be performed only by experts. Enforcement of rules is required in these activities. Especially activities related to healthcare should not be handled by anyone but those who have qualifications (Iwate).
- Create a mechanism which offers preparatory orientations before departure and meetings on the ground every day, as well as develops volunteers on a routine basis and helps volunteers continue their involvement (alumni reunions, fund raising activities, Habitat Café,¹²³ etc.) (Iwate)

MEASURES 3. COMMUNICATE WITH VOLUNTEERS.

- Local stakeholders also should make it clear what they want volunteers to do or don't want to (Iwate).

¹²² They could be called in various ways, but this report calls them information sharing meetings consistently.

¹²³ A social event hosted by Habitat for Humanity Japan, an international NGO. This event gathers those who are interested in this NGO's efforts or international cooperation and those who participated in activities at home or abroad as volunteers.

(4) EXTERNAL AID PAID ATTENTION TO AVOID BURDENS ON LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS?

■ We received the following comments:

- Acceptance of aid required enormous energy, and we went through a lot of difficulties in selecting the recipients of such assistance (Miyagi, Fukushima).

- As a local liaison office receiving external groups coming into the local area, local NPOs, SWCs, etc. played a role which connected those who needed assistance on the ground and aid workers, through sharing information of local needs and introducing contact persons. However, these organizations said that acceptance of external aid organizations sometimes required enormous energy and obstructed their core business¹²⁴ (Miyagi, Fukushima).

In a questionnaire to local organizations, 76.1% (51 persons) chose “supported or accepted external aid organizations (civil groups coming from outside of the disaster areas to provide assistance on the ground) after the Great East Japan Earthquake (Figure 25).” 11.8% (6 persons) of the organizations which received assistance chose “felt burdened enough to obstruct their core business,” and 31.4% (16 persons) chose “core business was not obstructed, but felt burdened.” In total, 43.2% (22 persons) felt burdened (Figure 25).




Figure 25. (left) Did you support or receive the external aid organizations coming into the local area to provide assistance on the ground after the Great East Japan Earthquake?
(right) If you answered “Yes,” have you felt burdened with a job of accepting them?
(67 valid respondents)¹²⁵

■ We received the following comments from the local organizations:

- When they did not work with us, they pursued their business without our permission. This increased our extra work, including taking care of the aftermath and recovering trust from the residents (Remarks).

- Individual external aid organizations entered the disaster areas in their own right without making any coordination with other groups. Because of this, we, aid recipients, were compelled to respond to all the groups one by one and confused by increased burdens they created (Iwate).

- Some aid organizations preferred covering a wider area to focusing on a single area for their activities. These groups increased our work to coordinate and accept them (Hearing).

Another comment reports that when highly specialized human resources accepted volunteers, “they had volunteers do more than what they were expected to do without their permission and caused disorder. Activities which needed expertise, such as listening to the elderly and providing psychological care, were also performed by those volunteers who were not used to these activities. That situation also caused disorder (Miyagi).”

¹²⁴ Core business of the organizations participating in the workshops include; activities to prevent the elderly from being isolated, operations handled by a local government, agriculture, etc.

¹²⁵ Those who answered “Yes” in this question but did not make it clear whether they felt burdened or not were described as “Unknown.”

(5) WHAT MADE ASSISTANCE BURDENS ON LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS?

CAUSE 1. DIFFICULTIES FELT BY LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN REFUSING ASSISTANCE EVEN IF IT WAS UNNECESSARY

Among the local organizations that answered “felt burdened” in accepting assistance, 63.0% (17 persons) said that “could not refuse offers of assistance/collaboration from the external aid organizations, even if they actually wanted to.”¹²⁶

For this reasons, 75.0% (12 persons) each said they could not refuse the offer “considering that they came here with good intentions” or “feared the possibility that we would not be able to receive future assistance, if we refused it once,” and 62.5% (10 persons) said it was difficult “due to human relations with them” (Figure 26).




Figure 26. Reasons why they could not refuse offers of assistance/collaboration from external aid organizations, even if they actually wanted to.
(multiple answers allowed. 16 valid respondents, 38 valid responses)

CAUSE 2. BURDENS WITH PROCEDURES FOR SUBSIDIES AND FINANCIAL AID

Many of the local organizations did not have their own fund enough to implement their activities. Therefore, they had no choice but to rely on funding from external donors. However, it is pointed out that some sorts of subsidies and financial aid limited the scope of their activities (Iwate, Miyagi). The figure below shows what kind of funds which they had difficulties in using (Figure 27).




Figure 27. If you have ever accepted or condiered assistance from external aid organizations, please select the options which were true for funding from external aid organizations.
(multiple answers allowed. 50 valid respondents, 99 valid responses)

The local organizations which chose “external aid organizations imposed on them many reporting responsibilities for their funding” accounted for 40.0% (20 persons), the third largest number among the respondents (Figure 27). This is most likely because that financial assistance by the external organizations often came with heavy reporting responsibilities, but many local organizations were founded and started their operations

¹²⁶ the number of valid respondents: 27

only after the disaster this time so that they were not accustomed to reporting responsibilities for subsidies and financial aid.




Figure 28. Organizations' attributes and time of foundation
(68 valid respondents)

CAUSE 3. LACK OF SPECIALTY AND DIVISION OF ROLES

The respondents pointed out the following reasons why the external aid organizations caused confusion in their own specialized area of assistance: “Coordinators cannot use experts appropriately, because they have no expertise (Miyagi)”; “Experts cannot make full use of local coordinators (Miyagi)”; “Experts have no code of conduct, which should be used when they engage in activities as volunteers (Miyagi)”; “It is not sure who are coordinators and what they can do (Miyagi)”; and “Position as an expert is not clearly defined (Miyagi).”

(6) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (DO NO HARM TO LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS)

MEASURES 1. MAKE COORDINATION BETWEEN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES.

- Individual aid organizations should not enter the disaster areas in their own right, but provide “assistance as a whole,” while collaborating with other groups through information sharing, activity coordination, etc. (Hearing)
- Intermediary support organizations and alike should play a role of liaison office to assist in distributing assistance activities and building a network among organizations (Fukushima).
- At an emergency stage, administrative bodies are also affected by a disaster and experience hardships. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy organizations and human resources that can connect residents and aid workers to coordinate and distribute their works, in place of administrative bodies (Iwate).

MEASURES 2. HAVE PREPARATORY TRAINING BEFOREHAND.

- External aid organizations should take training on providing assistance which pay attention to a local area, on a routine basis (Fukushima).

MEASURES 3. SUPPORT RECIPIENT ORGANIZATIONS.

- It is necessary to assist recipient organizations on the ground. Human resources were dispatched from NGOs to SWCs in Miyagi Prefecture in response to this earthquake disaster. This could be a good example for the future disaster (Hearing).

MEASURES 4. INFORM DONORS OF THE RESIDENTS' NEEDS.

- NGOs and other aid organizations are positioned between donors/sponsors from which they are funded and the residents or beneficiaries. They are required to enhance their “translation skill” to inform the situation and needs on the ground to their donors correctly (Miyagi).

MEASURES 5. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.

- It is necessary that NGOs provide assistance or consulting service in enhancing the ability to fulfill accountability of local organizations (Miyagi).

MEASURES 6. BUILD A RELATION WITH DONORS BEFORE DISASTER HAPPENS.

- It is necessary that local organizations, NGOs and donor organizations build a relation of trust beforehand so that they can discuss appropriate procedures in response to a disaster (Miyagi).
- Donors should suggest another form of explanation which helps convince their beneficiaries so that they can fulfill their accountability to their beneficiaries (Miyagi).

3.3.4. DISCUSSION (DO NO HARM)

POOR RESPONSE TO THE RESIDENTS WHO COOPERATED IN SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS

In the Great East Japan Earthquake, the residents were reportedly burdened with repeated hearings and surveys done by many organizations. Those organizations include external aid organizations which conducted needs assessment surveys and hearings for a research purpose and the news media which came to collect information of the residents or cover them. Moreover, there were no follow-ups made after those interviews, which is a likely cause of the residents' exhaustion.

As some call these phenomena “knocking pollution,”¹²⁷ the residents were “fed up with many interviews” like these. Behind all of these, it is assumed that there was lack of information sharing between external aid organizations engaging in activities in the same area.

3.3.5. CONCLUSION (ASSISTANCE BROUGHT ANY FURTHER DAMAGE TO THE PEOPLE?)

It can be highly evaluated that many of the relief activities intended to stand by the disaster victims and provide direct or indirect assistance to recover their independent spirit in this disaster. These activities often aimed to provide the residents with a place where they could find some work and activities, or ensure an environment with job opportunities to offer by supporting local industries. As a result, they were expected to bring about positive effects, which would allow the residents to feel “satisfied” with their life and positive about their future life. They offered a variety of programs which covered different people and made necessary arrangements for different situations. However, some relief activities with good intentions became the cause of hindering recovery. As a conclusion, we would like to point out the following points:

[COPING STRATEGIES AND RESILIENCE]



Some assistance helped recovery and reconstruction, making full use of local power. On the other hand, some of the activities including delivery of supplies often deprived local people of their independent spirit and dignity, because aid workers lacked this perspective.

[DO NO HARM]

Overlapped investigation and volunteers' words and actions distressed the residents, while inequality in aid caused conflict between them. Some assistance resulted in creating burdens for the residents. Moreover, local organizations sometimes felt burdened in accepting assistance.

¹²⁷ “Report on Improvement of the Local Governments' Websites” P.11

3.4. ACCOUNTABILITY TO BENEFICIARIES FULFILLED?

Justification for selecting this theme					
It is getting a global common sense that the accountability of aid providers to beneficiaries is as important as their accountability to donors. ¹²⁸ The aid providers are expected to promote the local partners to fulfill this accountability.					
					
Assessment method					
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.					
<table><tr><th>Indicator</th><th>Verification in this joint review</th></tr><tr><td>Establishing and delivering on commitments¹²⁹</td><td>Was sufficient information about aid organizations and their programmes communicated to local residents, organizations and the Social Welfare Council?</td></tr></table>		Indicator	Verification in this joint review	Establishing and delivering on commitments ¹²⁹	Was sufficient information about aid organizations and their programmes communicated to local residents, organizations and the Social Welfare Council?
Indicator	Verification in this joint review				
Establishing and delivering on commitments ¹²⁹	Was sufficient information about aid organizations and their programmes communicated to local residents, organizations and the Social Welfare Council?				
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Theme 5's [Participation] and [Handling complaints] are also important factors in providing high quality assistance and for organizations to meet their accountability requirements.• Accountability to donors (fund providers) is discussed in Theme 10's [Collaboration.]					
					
Conclusion					
<p>While 90% of external aid organizations had believed to have fulfilled their accountabilities, 20% of local residents had complaints or doubts over insufficient explanation being provided about the organizations and their programmes. Over 20% of residents were also unaware about major elements of aid programmes, such as if their complaints or suggestions (concerning activity end-date or the contents of the assistance provided) were ever registered and reflected onto the programmes.</p> <p>Local organizations and the Social Welfare Councils didn't always have a clear grasp of how long each of the external aid organizations was to stay or to what they were committed.</p>					

¹²⁸ The HAP standard points out the importance of fulfilling accountability to the beneficiaries, despite the common misbelief those organizations are only accountable towards their donors.

¹²⁹ "The organization sets out the commitments that it will be held accountable for, and how they will be delivered."

3.4.1. RESULTS (ESTABLISHING AND DELIVERING ON COMMITMENTS)

(1) DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVE THEY HAD FULFILLED THEIR ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE BENEFICIARIES?

To the question “were you able to fulfil your accountability to the beneficiaries?” 90.0% (54 groups) of the external aid organizations answered “we were able to” or “we were somewhat able to” (Figure 29).




Figure 29. Were you able to fulfil accountability to the beneficiaries (residents, etc.)?
(60 valid responses)

(2) DID THE RESIDENTS UNDERSTAND WELL THE CONTENTS OF AID PROGRAMMES?

For complaints or doubts regarding the aid programmes, 20% (49 persons) of local residents answered that they were not briefed about the programmes (Figure 19).

For appropriateness of the termination timing of the aid programmes, 26.1% (64 persons) of the residents said that they didn't know when the programmes had ended (Figure 36).

To the question if they were able to submit suggestions to and complaints against the external aid organizations, 52.9% (118 persons) answered they didn't because they didn't know where to submit the complaints (Figure 30). To the question if the suggestions or complaints were reflected as a subsequent change in the programmes, 23.0% (14 persons) replied that they didn't know (Figure 31).




Figure 30. [left] Were you able to communicate suggestions and/or complaints to external aid organizations when you had one?
(223 valid respondents)

Figure 31. [right] If you were able to communicate suggestions and/or complaints, were they reflected in subsequent relief activities?
(61 valid respondents)¹³⁰

¹³⁰ Although only 69 answered they were able to communicate in the first question, 81 responded to the second question.

(3) WHY DID ORGANIZATIONS FAIL IN ACCOUNTABILITY TO BENEFICIARIES?

CAUSE 1. INSUFFICIENT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND AWARENESS

- Some 68.4% (182 persons, 266 of valid respondents) of the local residents who responded to the questionnaire hadn't known about NGOs and NPOs prior to the earthquake.
- Some 19.8% (50%, 253 of valid respondents) answered "Yes" to the question: "Have you ever felt mistrust or anxieties about external aid organizations?"
- "It was difficult to explain the difference between an NGO and a volunteer work," "too many organizations had English or Western names which made local elderly avoid them (Tokyo / NGO)"
- Because we had never worked with an NGO/NPO before the earthquake, we didn't know what roles they could fulfil or what functions they could perform. As a result, we ended up asking them to handle simple and non-specialist tasks like the coordination of soup kitchen; we weren't able to take advantage of their strengths. (Hearing / SWC)

CAUSE 2. CONFUSION CAUSED BY THE OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF RELIEF ACTIVITIES

- It was difficult for local residents to find out which relief items came from whom. When we go abroad on our missions we often wear uniforms with the name of the organization on it; we also bring big banners and make clear who is responsible for which provision. But we avoided doing that since in Japan people generally have reservations about such self-appeal. That might have resulted in us failing to pick up on some complaints and suggestions (FGD / NGO).
- As a leader of a group, I needed to judge if each organization came out purely to help or had an evil intention. But so many groups came all at once; it was very difficult to judge. (Remarks / a representative of a temporary shelter)

CAUSE 3. OBJECTIVES AND EXIT STRATEGIES WERE NOT PREDETERMINED BY AID ORGANIZATIONS.

To the question asking if they had predetermined objectives and exit strategies for their programmes, 39.0% (23 groups) of the external aid organizations said that they started without one and determined them along the way (Figure 32). Issues such as the difficulties associated with the initial needs assessment at the time (Hearing) and the restrictions imposed on use of funds – time restriction as well as permitted expenditure items (Tokyo) – have been raised.




Figure 32. Did you predetermine the objectives and an exit strategy at the planning of the assistance programme?
(59 valid respondents)

An NGO worker working on compiling a map of organizations and their activities in a certain area in Miyagi was asked by the local organizations and the SWC to list "how long" each was going to stay as well as "who" did "what" in "where." They probably wanted to work with organizations which would stay long-term, but the aid organizations didn't have a clear idea as to how long they would continue, so they couldn't provide clear answer (Hearing / NGO).

(4) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (ESTABLISHING AND DELIVERING ON COMMITMENTS)

MEASURES 1. CAREFUL AND DETAILED COMMUNICATION

- Communication between aid providers from outside the area and residents needs to be detailed and thorough and must be managed carefully; it should be started by building a mutual understanding. Avoiding foreign words and expressions that the aid recipients are unfamiliar with will help improve efficiency (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT TO ENCOURAGE FEEDBACKS.

• A resident who had a problem with an aid programme said that although he/she couldn't voice the problem at the time, he/she was able to approach a staff afterwards, since the staff wore a colorful uniform that stood out, and speak honestly in private (FGD).

3.4.2. DISCUSSION (ESTABLISHING AND DELIVERING ON COMMITMENTS)**NOT ALL RESIDENTS KNEW ABOUT A WHOLE PICTURE OF THE AID PROGRAMMES.**

The comparison of the results (1) and (2) suggests that, although the external aid organizations had believed that they had fulfilled their accountability, the residents chose "don't know" on a number of questions about the relief activities, showing their lack of awareness about the key elements (contents, organizer and duration) of various aid programmes. It appears that it was particularly difficult for the recipients to grasp the source of emergency relief goods as they arrived en masse. The results also indicate a possibility that lack of sufficient explanation had caused frustration and doubts among the recipients.

Cause No. 3 of result (3) suggests that many of the organizations were unable to determine or announce how long they intended to continue with their programmes. It's a matter of great interest to the beneficiaries as it impacts their life planning. Scheduled end-dates for aid programmes, therefore, must be communicated thoroughly as soon as it becomes available.

SOME RESIDENTS DIDN'T KNOW TO WHOM THEY SHOULD SUBMIT THEIR COMPLAINTS OR SUGGESTIONS.

Some 52.9% of residents (118 persons) didn't know to whom they should submit their complaints or suggestions. Even among those who had managed to submit them, 23.0% (14 persons) didn't know if they had been properly handled.

CLARIFICATION THROUGH DOCUMENTATION

The first benchmark of HAP Standard Requirements states that "The organization sets out the commitments that be held accountable for, and how they will be delivered." Although this review had focused on how much about the aid activities were understood by the stakeholders and did not consider the documentation status, it is desirable that aid organizations produce a written accountability framework to clarify the commitments they'd be accountable for and how they will be delivered to all stakeholders (in particular the aid recipients), and install a quality management system for the delivery.

A written framework and its production process generally help a) the organization itself to review the matter and enhance internal awareness, b) external parties to understand about the organization and its activities, and c) coordination with other groups and organizations. However, in the Q&A working group, cases in which written statements were produced but not adhered to and those in which accountability was fulfilled through appropriate communication even without having things in writing, have been discussed, suggesting that the provision of a written framework does not automatically produce the results.

UNCLEAR POSITION TOWARDS NUCLEAR ACCIDENT



We will discuss this more in Theme 8 [Health, safety and security] but many organizations might not have a clear policy on response to nuclear accident or could not show it to the public. Few organizations publicized their position paper on this issue, which other organizations are encouraged to follow to fulfill their accountability.

3.4.3. CONCLUSION (ACCOUNTABILITY TO BENEFICIARIES FULFILLED?)

While 90% of external aid organizations had believed they had fulfilled their accountabilities, 20% of local residents had complaints or doubts over insufficient explanation being provided about the organizations and their programmes. Twenty percent of residents were also unaware about major elements of the programmes, such as if their complaints or suggestions (concerning activity end-date or the contents of the assistance provided) were ever registered and reflected onto the programmes.

The local organizations and the SWCs didn't always have a clear grasp of how long each of the external aid organizations was to stay or to what they were committed.

3.5. OPINIONS OF THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS CONSIDERED AND REFLECTED?

Justification for selecting this theme	
In order to improve the quality of aid programmes, and for their providers to be accountable, it is important that opinions and suggestions from local stakeholders are registered and reflected on the activities. Without such efforts, assistance matching the needs cannot be provided; instead, the assistance provided will likely become unilateral with no ownership exhibited by local stakeholders.	
	
Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicator	Verification in this joint review
Handling complaints	Did organizations register complaints about the assistance they provided and reflect them on to their programmes?
Participation	Did local stakeholders participate in decision-making process on all stages from the initial needs assessment to planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation?
<p>[Handling complaints] The following viewpoints were employed for this verification.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Did the residents have complaints and doubts over aid programmes and if they did, were they able to communicate them? 2. Were the complaints and doubts of the residents reflected as changes in programme contents? <p>[Participation] The following viewpoints were employed for this verification.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Were the local stakeholders able to participate in decision-making on needs identification and planning in early stage of assistance? 2. Were the local stakeholders able to participate at the implementation stage? 3. Were the local stakeholders able to participate in monitoring and evaluation? 	
	
Conclusion	
<p>[HANDLING COMPLAINTS]</p> <p>Mechanisms to take up questions and complaints were insufficient to begin with, and no subsequent actions, such as to make a dedicated complaints window, were observed. Although 90% of external aid organizations believed they were able to reflect suggestions and complaints they had received from the beneficiaries, only 40% of the residents shared this view. A possible cause may lie in the internal communication structures of aid organizations, which had little capacity to share the registered complaints and to adjust or amend their programmes accordingly.</p> <p>[PARTICIPATION]</p> <p>Participation by the local stakeholders occurred to an extent in the initial needs assessment, activity planning and implementation phases. However, in latter monitoring and evaluation phases, and in deciding the end-date, the wishes of the local stakeholders weren't always respected.</p>	

3.5.1. RESULTS (HANDLING COMPLAINTS)

(1) DID THE LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE COMPLAINTS AND DOUBTS ABOUT THE AID PROGRAMMES?

Only 46.5% (114 persons) had no complaints or doubts about the assistance they'd received from non-governmental groups from outside the region; the rest, 53.5% (131 persons), was dissatisfied in one way or another (Figure 19).

As for the contents of complaints and doubts, 31.0% (76 persons) said that they felt the distribution of relief goods was unfair, while 20% (49 persons) were unhappy that they'd received no explanation about assistance programmes. Some 16.3% (40 persons) had problems with numerous hearings and interviews by various groups and 14.3% (25 persons) had been offended by a volunteer that came with aid organizations. 10.2% expressed frustration that free relief goods and relief activities had hampered the local economy (Figure 19).

(2) WERE THE RESIDENTS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THEIR COMPLAINTS AND DOUBTS?

Although more than half of the residents had complaints and doubts, only 27.8% (62 persons) were able to communicate them.

Of the residents who had complaints etc., 52.9% (118 persons) said that they did not know where to submit the complaints, whereas 19.3% (43 persons) said they knew how and where but chose not to (Figure 30).

(3) WHY COULDN'T THE RESIDENTS COMMUNICATE THEIR COMPLAINTS?

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- I couldn't say anything because I felt bad about complaining against those who came to help out of kindness (Remarks).
- I didn't think the outsiders would be able to understand the problems even if we'd talked to them (Remarks).
- It's easier to talk to the local people. You can't ask things of people coming from the outside (Remarks).
- There were many youths I'd never met before and I was too frightened to make a complaint (Remarks).
- Although the aid programmes were there, I didn't have the chance to directly engage and talk to the people of the aid organizations (Remarks).
- There was no complaints window for aid programmes (FDG).
- Complaints against aid programmes were sent to the Social Welfare Council, even for cases which it wasn't involved (FDG /NGO).

(4) WERE CONTENTS OF AID PROGRAMMES CHANGED TO REFLECT SUGGESTIONS AND COMPLAINTS BY THE RESIDENTS?

Asked if they felt that their complaints had been reflected as changes in programmes, around forty percent answered "Yes," with 18.0% (11 persons) choosing "yes, they were reflected" and 26.2% (16 persons) choosing "yes, to an extent," and 24.6% (15 persons) replied by choosing "no, they weren't really reflected," while 8.2% (5 persons) chose "no, they weren't reflected at all," and 23.0% (14 persons) chose "don't know" (Figure 31).

Among the external aid organizations, on the other hand, about 90% had selected "yes" with 29.0% (18 persons) stating that they were able to reflect the complaints and suggestions to and adjust their activities, and 66.1% (41 persons) selected that they were "somewhat able to" (Figure 33).




Figure 33. The difference of awareness regarding handling complaints between aid organizations and the residents
 External aid organizations: Were you able to take up suggestions and complaints from the beneficiaries (local residents, etc.) and reflect them on to the decisions concerning and/or revisions of your activities? (62 valid respondents)
 Residents: For those of you who were able to communicate your suggestions and complaints, did you feel that they were reflected upon the contents of relief activities? (81 valid respondents)

3.5.2. DISCUSSION (HANDLING COMPLAINTS)

THE RESIDENTS WERE NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THEIR COMPLAINTS ENOUGH.

The reserved nature of the people in the northeast, senses of gratefulness and guilt among the recipients, and lack of trust left some residents feeling unable to voice their complaints to the staff of aid organizations.

Asked for the reason why they were unable to turn down offer of assistance or request for cooperation from external organizations, 62.5% of local organizations (10 groups) have stated that they couldn't as they feared doing so may damage their social relationships. Some 75.0% (12 groups) said that they found it difficult to decline offers with good intentions, while a similar proportion of respondents stated that they feared they will not be offered further assistances if they'd declined then (Figure 26), suggesting not just the residents but local organizations also had problems voicing their doubts and complaints.

PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

Nearly sixty percent of residents didn't feel that the complaints they had communicated were reflected on to the contents of aid programmes, while over 90% of the external aid organizations believed that they had reflected complaints on to their activities; this fact shows a significant perception gap between the two parties. According to the HAP standard, the residents' lack of awareness of whether or not their complaints had been reflected (27.2%) itself indicates an accountability failure.

INSUFFICIENT SHARING OF COMPLAINT INFORMATION WITHIN THE AID ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ABSENCE OF A DEDICATED COMPLAINTS WINDOW

It is desirable for aid organizations to involve local stakeholders in all stages, including needs assessment, monitoring and project formulation (See Theme 5 "Participation"). HAP standard describes the needs for a feedback mechanism involving local stakeholders, such as a compliant window to help pick up the response of the beneficiaries.

The concentration of complaints to the SWCs even for the cases they were not involved was mainly due to insufficient awareness among the residents about the involvement of external entities. However, lack of effort by the external groups to actively engage with residents' complaints by setting a dedicated window had probably contributed to it.

It is not to say that the residents are always right or that desired improvements are feasible, however, the total of 32.1% of the residents stating that their complaints were "not really reflected" or "not reflected at all" indicates an issue with handling complaints. This was most probably caused by lack of dedicated complaints window (FDG) and insufficient sharing of information within different aid organizations (See Theme 1 "Relevance").

3.5.3. RESULTS (PARTICIPATION)

(1) WERE THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN INITIAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT PLANNING?

■ Local organizations raised the following opinions:

- We worked together with an international aid organization. They said that since it was the first time for them to be running projects in Japan so they'd like to start from a scratch together with us. We were anxious to begin with, but they listened to us well, and that gave us confidence to accept their offer (Hearing).
- There was a group that would ask us what we (a local organization) wanted to do and implement it together; that was very helpful (Remarks).
- I've been running a support facility for persons with disabilities in this area from before the earthquake. Following the earthquake, external organizations came and offered to cooperate. As a result, we regularly exchange information and they provide financial support for our programmes (Hearing).
- It was difficult to reflect opinion of a local organization since direction of activities of the external aid organizations were already determined at headquarters level in Tokyo (Hearing / local organization).
- We did not collaborate many external aid organizations which only insisted on what they want to and believe to be right to do (Hearing / local organization).

• I had feelings that the external aid organizations just came to conduct assistance activities they want to do (Hearing / local organization).

• Our NPO, which deals with social welfare issues, believes self-reliance is ultimate goal of assistance. It is important to support self-reliance of the residents. The external aid organizations, however, had no rules nor think about autonomy of the residents, and did whatever volunteers thought right or predetermined things (Hearing / local organization).

(2) WERE THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSISTANCE PROJECTS?

■ With regard to this, the following opinions were obtained:

Case	Content
Cooperation with the heads of residents associations	• Although it's not easy to engage with all residents, we were able to engage with the head of residents association at a temporary housing site as we supplied relief goods. For subsequent elderly support and care programmes, we asked him to mediate and he communicated to us the opinions and wishes of the residents (Remarks / external aid organization).
	• We asked everybody who involved in assistance in temporary housing to submit notification. Upon submission, we were sometime able to provide proper advice as "there were similar activities recently so other plans were more preferable" and/or "free service is not good and better charge a little fee for the services you provide," when we were consulted by a person in charge whether their assistance was appropriate (Remarks / chairman of neighborhood association of a temporary housing).
Operations with proactive participation	• We made sure to involve the local stakeholders and encouraged their initiatives in the running of a community space. Organizing the Christmas event, we asked the local participants to organize the food instead of ordering a catering service. The community space will be managed by an NGO till the end of March 2014, so we're trying to make sure that local participants can continue with similar programmes in a different form (Remarks / external aid organization).
	• We assigned such roles to the residents as showing a model exercise in front, giving commands or cleaning up, in Radio Exercises (Remarks / external aid organization).
Locally hired staff	• We hired several staff locally for our activities that ended in March 2012. Some of these staff lived in temporary housing and they were well aware of the residents' needs. To decide activities and future policies, we first had a local meeting with staff from Tokyo and local staff and then made the proposals to the HQ (Remarks / external aid organization).
	• We hired a local unemployed due to the disaster as project accountant, since his health status was not good enough to conduct active outside activities. We thought this served as training as well but it was far beyond his capacity to handle special or unique transactions of ours. Now, we think we should assign our own specialized staff to this kind of task with grave responsibility unless we have enough resources to spare for through training of newly hired staff (Remarks / external aid organization).

(3) WERE THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION?

Twenty-nine percent (18 groups) of external aid organizations stated that they were able to take up suggestions and complaints by the beneficiaries and reflect them upon decisions and revisions concerning their programmes, and 66.1% (41 groups) said that they were "able to reflect them to an extent" (Figure 33).

While more than half of the residents (53.5%)¹³¹ had complaints and doubts (Figure 19), only 27.8% (62 persons) said they were able to voice their complaints (Figure 30).

A locally hired staff had commented that he/she couldn't voice his/her opinion concerning the project end date as it had already been decided based on available budget, while a local resident noted that he/she was handed a questionnaire after the relief activities had ended (Remarks).

¹³¹ The proportion among the 131 individuals who answered "had no particular complaints or doubts" out of 245 valid respondents.

■ With regard to this, the following comment was obtained:

- I advised the representative of an external aid organization that I had a good relationship with as they had better cautious about their activity that might harm local initiative and self-reliance if it continued for a long time (FGD / SWC).

3.5.4. DISCUSSION (PARTICIPATION)

THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS WERE INVOLVED TO AN EXTENT IN EACH PHASE, BUT EXCLUDED FROM DECISION-MAKING IN SOME CASES.

Local residents and organizations were able to participate in decision making processes of different phases including the initial needs assessment, project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Cases in which the local stakeholders not only communicated their needs but also began taking ownership in some of the programmes were confirmed. The comment by a locally-hired staff that he/she wasn't able to participate in deciding the project end date and felt left out suggests that there were situations in which local stakeholders had a little say.

However, there were cases where decision on assistance programme was solely made by the external aid organizations without any inputs from local stakeholders. The comment as locally-hired staff were not part of decision-making on project termination also suggests the possibility that local stakeholders' opinion was not taken seriously.

CREATE A SYSTEM TO ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION INSTEAD OF WAITING FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION.

Guide to the 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management states, "Because of the context or pre-existing power differentials (based upon gender, race, class, caste, or other characteristics), participation may not occur spontaneously. Instead, participation may need to be stimulated and facilitated.¹³²" And in such facilitation, a mechanism to review even the negative opinions and comments by the local participants is essential to improving the quality of the assistance provided.

"Participation" is often believed to be the process of obtaining informed consent from the beneficiaries; that sometimes is interpreted as the process in which aid organizations present their proposals and obtain consent, however the idea should also include participation by beneficiaries from the programme design stage.

However, this cannot be achieved only with responses after the disaster happened. There is not enough time for making consensus with local stakeholders at a time of mega disaster like this time. It is important to consult local stakeholders beforehand to make agreement in plans for emergency response measures.

3.5.5. CONCLUSION (OPINIONS OF THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS CONSIDERED AND REFLECTED?)

[HANDLING COMPLAINTS]


The external aid organizations had lacked sufficient mechanisms to take up and register complaints and doubts of the residents. Nor was there a concrete action, such as to provide a dedicated complaints window. While 90% of the external aid organizations believed that they had reflected complaints and suggestions by the residents on to their programmes, the view was shared by only 40% of the residents. Possible causes include the internal communication structures of aid organizations lacking sufficient mechanism to share and act on registered complaints.

[PARTICIPATION]

Participation by local residents and groups was achieved to an extent in the initial phases (needs assessment, planning and implementation) but the opinions and wishes of the local stakeholders weren't always respected particularly in the latter phrases (monitoring, evaluation and termination of programmes).

¹³² Bibliography 3-29

3.6. REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT CONSTANTLY MADE?



¹³³ Bibliography 3-14

3.6.1. RESULTS (LEARNING AND CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT)

(1) WAS THERE A CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT?

■ The following comment was obtained:

- We are quite aware of the need for monitoring and review of the activity, but we sometime failed to do them (Tokyo).

Only 44.3% (27 persons) of the residents who made complaints believed that their complaints had been reflected (or had been reflected to an extent) on to changes in aid programme contents, while 32.8% (20 persons) stated either they weren't really reflected or that they weren't reflected at all (Figure 31).

Aid organizations, on the other hand, mostly believed that they were able to reflect the complaints and suggestions of the beneficiaries on to their activities, or that they were able to do so to an extent (95.1%, 59 persons). Only 4.8% (3 persons) stated that they weren't really able to, or were not able to at all (Figure 33).

(2) WHY WAS THERE NO CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT?

In workshop sessions, the large number of aid organizations that lacked necessary monitoring system for a continual improvement of their programmes was discussed. As possible causes, the following were obtained:

CAUSE 1. LACK OF MANPOWER AND FUNDING IN AN ORGANIZATION

- Only a limited number of staff could accurately understand the progress of programmes and take appropriate actions (Tokyo).

Some 49.1% (28 groups) of aid organizations stated that project managers were particularly in short (Figure 34) and this was apparently due to insufficient time, resources and funding to perform necessary training (Tokyo).




Figure 34. What kind of personnel were in shortest supply?
(multiple answers allowed. 57 valid respondents, 149 valid responses)

CAUSE 2. INSUFFICIENT SHARING OF INFORMATION WITHIN EACH ORGANIZATION

- Even when staff on site run monitoring programmes, there were no clear structure/processes through which the results could be delivered to the HQ (Tokyo).

Inadequate communication between the site and the HQ led to inadequate aids being provided (See Theme 1's "Cause 2").

CAUSE 3. THE USE OF FUNDS HAD MANY RESTRICTIONS AND IT WAS DIFFICULT TO CHANGE.

- To make flexible adjustment of the usage of the fund according to constantly changing needs was difficult, as human resources and labor required for persuading the donors and obtaining their consent to change the use of funds were short in supply (Tokyo, See Theme 1's "Cause 3").

CAUSE 4. NO GOALS AND INDICATORS WERE DEFINED BEFORE STARTING A PROJECT.

- We had no objectives or indicators defined at the start of our programmes which made it impossible to monitor the progress (Tokyo).
- Lack of exit strategy and programme design without monitoring, and lack of indicators needed for monitoring had diluted the impacts of some aid efforts (Tokyo).

(3) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (LEARNING AND CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT)

MEASURES 1. CARRY OUT STAFF TRAINING.

- Send only the central players of the team/organization for training and then having them share the experience later to save time and resources (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. BUILD A MECHANISM TO SHARE INFORMATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION.

- A mechanism to share individual experiences among the organization should be enhanced (Tokyo).
- Enhance internal information sharing by having field staff visualize their information by documentation (Tokyo).

MEASURES 3. TRY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE DONORS.

- Have a close communication with donors to create room for a certain amount of flexibility with the use of funds (Hearing).

3.6.2. DISCUSSION (LEARNING AND CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT)

THE BACKGROUND FOR THE PERCEPTION OF RESIDENTS THAT THEIR OPINIONS WERE IGNORED

According to the Result (1) above, there was a perception gap between aid organizations and the local residents in terms of how much of the programmes reflected the wish of the residents.

It is not realistic for aid organizations to try and meet every individual need and expectation of beneficiaries, who outnumber the staff. In addition, with certain types of relief goods, responding to the demands of beneficiaries could result in preventing them from turning to their own initiatives, so individual demand had to be carefully examined. In the absence of systematic structures for both monitoring and feedback,¹³⁴ organizations and their staff did not have the capacity to deal with the feedback, which led to the dissatisfaction of the residents.

Not having a goal that clearly defines what subjects should be brought to what status by when for their programmes¹³⁵ probably made the decision of whether to respond to or dismiss complaints, as well as providing justification for their decisions, more difficult.


3.6.3. CONCLUSION (REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT COSTANTLY MADE?)

The monitoring process, to give accurate indications of progress, was at times inadequate. The irrelevance is believed to be due to insufficient communication within different organizations, limited use of funds, shortage of skilled personnel who could perform appropriate monitoring, and the shortages of capacity of organizations who couldn't afford to provide more training for their staff.

¹³⁴ See Theme 5's "Handling complaints" and "Participation."

¹³⁵ See Theme 7's "Connectedness."

3.7. SHORT-TERM ASSISTANCE LED TO LONG-TERM ASSISTANCE?

Justification for selecting this theme	
Once through the emergency response phase, local residents of disaster-hit areas face numerous challenges during recovery and reconstruction phases. Since most aid organizations run programmes for a limited amount of time, it is vital that short-term aids provided take into accounts the long-term needs in their plan ¹³⁶	
Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicator	Verification in this joint review
Connectedness	Did the short-term aid during the emergency response period take into account the transition to long-term programmes? ¹³⁷
 <p>Figure 35. Transition of the constituents of aid providers: from external aid organizations to local organizations</p>	
<p>[Connectedness] is verified in the following 4 points.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Did the short-term programmes end at appropriate times? 2. Did local stakeholders understand and agree with the end of short-term aid programmes? 3. Was appropriate handover to local stakeholders organized? (Handover here includes fostering of local organizations and its staff and handing over of the running of some programmes so humanitarian efforts in the area may continue even after external aid organizations have left)? 4. Was there any problem with the handover to local stakeholders? 	
Conclusion	
<p>Many of the external aid organizations, local organizations and local residents stated they didn't know if the timing with which the short-term aid programmes ended was appropriate. While the external aid organizations didn't see any major issues with the ways in which their programmes ended, 20% of local organizations disagreed. Around half of the local organizations who'd been handed over programmes from aid organizations had issues with the process, with some pointing out insufficient training. Local organizations had lacked sufficient capacities and required additional human resources and capacity development trainings before they could take over the programmes, however the external aid organizations did not have sufficient time or resources for the preparation. One of the reasons for this is that the external aid organizations had not chosen their objectives and exit strategies with a long-term view.</p>	

¹³⁶ Bibliography 3-3, pp. 27: humanitarian aid during the emergency response phase is said to provide a framework for the long-term aid.

¹³⁷ Bibliography 3-14

3.7.1. RESULT (CONNECTEDNESS)

(1) WAS THE TIMING WITH WHICH THE PROGRAMMES ENDED APPROPRIATE?

■ The following comment was obtained:

• Since government grants depend on NPO corporate status and previous records, having external aid organizations support the young organizations during its infancy until it obtains enough credibility will add to the chances of programmes surviving. It is alright that programmes for which there are no needs should go, but there are programmes which get terminated despite the existing needs (Hearing).

Asked if they thought the timing with which the programmes ended were appropriate,¹³⁸ 45.9% of the external aid organizations (17 groups) said that they didn't know, followed by "appropriate (37.8%, 14 groups)," while 13.5% (5 groups) thought they were "too early" and 2.7% (1 group) said, "they could have ended a little earlier."

To the same question, most of the local organizations also selected "don't know" (35.6%, 21 groups), while 20.3% (12 groups) thought they were "appropriate," and 18.6% (11 groups) selected "the timings were appropriate, but there were problems with the way they ended," which was the least popular option among the external aid organizations (Figure 36).

As for local residents, 26.1% (53 persons) chose that they didn't know when the programmes had ended (Figure 36).




Figure 36. Response on the timing to end external aid programmes by respondent type¹³⁹
(valid respondents: 37 external aid organizations, 60 local organizations, 245 local residents)

(2) WERE THERE APPROPRIATE HANDOVERS OF AID PROGRAMMES?

■ The following comments have been observed in the review:

• We implemented an aid programme in 2011 as part of employment projects, led by an international NGO. Since locally hired staff of the project launched a new NPO, we worked on their capacity enhancement from May 2012 (Hearing).

¹³⁸ There were 37 valid respondents to the question, while 40 respondents didn't answer. All questions including this was presented with a phrase "this question is intended for those who have completed the whole or part of a program" which was possibly misunderstood by respondents, as when 3 respondents who didn't answer were asked why, they replied that they did so because their programmes were still ongoing.

¹³⁹ External aid organizations were not presented with the option of "don't know when they ended."

- We were required to revise our programmes and gradually shift its base to a long-term vision, but we couldn't do so (Iwate).
- We should have briefed local organizations on how to plan an exit strategy and handed over other matters when we ceased our programme (Tokyo).

To the question if they had handed over part of the whole of their programmes to a local organization, only 36.8% (14 groups) answered “yes” (Figure 37).¹⁴⁰

The external aid organizations which did not handover their programmes gave their reasons as follows: “Although it was desirable to hand over, there was no appropriate local organization (7.9%, 3 groups)”; “There was no need for a handover as the needs attended by the programme was covered by a programme of another group (7.9%, 3 groups)”; and “other reasons (47.4%, 18 groups).”

Out of those who selected “other reasons,” 38.9% (7 groups) said that their programmes were still ongoing, 16.7% (3 groups) said that some programmes were handed over while others weren't (couldn't), and very few (5.6% or 1 group each) had selected “programmes were handed over to the SWC or a volunteer center,” “programmes were terminated as the initial objectives had been achieved,” and “the necessity and feasibility of handover will be evaluated in the future.”

Local organizations that asked if they had taken over the whole or part of aid programmes provided by external organizations, 28.8% (15 groups) said, “yes,” while 71.2% (37 groups) said, “no” (Figure 37).




Figure 37. Question for external organizations¹⁴¹: Did you hand over part or the whole of your programme(s) to a local organization?

Question for local organizations¹⁴²: Were you handed over part of the whole of programme(s) from an external aid organization?

(valid respondents: 38 external organization, 52 local organizations)

(3) WHAT PROBLEMS DID INSUFFICIENT HANDOVER CAUSE?

■ The following comments were obtained:

- There was no handover or training of local staff by external organizations. Many of the local organizations are particularly in short of fund-raising skills. Unless you train them to at least be able to write a proposal to obtain government grants, none of the local organizations will be able to sustain themselves (Hearing).
- NGOs had a little awareness of the needs to train local staff; once assistance from the outside dries out, knowhow and skilled staff will end up leaving as local organizations will be unable to pay for their salaries; and thus programmes can't continue (Iwate, Miyagi).
- A local organization which used to obtain help to raise funds from external sources became unsustainable as the external aid ended before it acquired the knowhow (Iwate).

(4) WAS THERE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE HANDOVER TO LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS?

Asked if there were any problems with the handover (for those who handed over their programmes), 30.4% of external aid organizations (7 groups) said, “yes” (Figure 38).

Asked the same question, 53.3% of local organizations (8 groups) or about a half of them said, “yes,” there were problems with handover, while 46.7% (7 groups) said, “no” (Figure 38).

¹⁴⁰ Out of 77 respondents, 38 gave a valid response whereas a greater proportion, 39 persons, skipped or did not answer this question.

¹⁴¹ Of those who answered “no,” 7.9% (3 groups) said that no handover was needed as the needs were covered by another programme by another organization and the other 7.9% (3 groups) said that they wanted to, but couldn't as they couldn't find an appropriate organization to takeover.

¹⁴² Local organizations weren't presented with the “others” option.




Figure 38. Were there a problem with a handover (if there was one)?
(valid respondents: 23 external aid organizations, 15 local organizations)

■ With regard to this, the following comment was given:

• There was an external aid organization that painted a picture in which local organizations launch profitable social businesses to sustain their programmes and to keep answering to the local needs. But in reality, such an initiative leaves the local parties facing a very difficult task under an enormous pressure, created by the expectations of both the external aid organization who had provided so much help and the local residents, which may become too much of a psychological burden (Hearing).

(5) WHAT WERE THE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE HANDOVER?

CAUSE 1. INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

The problems that the external aid organizations have encountered during their handover¹⁴³ are as follows: local organization's human resources shortage¹⁴⁴ (50.4% or 4 groups), lack of local organization's willingness to takeover (37.5% or 3 groups), the external aid organization's insufficient funding (37.5% or 3 groups), the external aid organization's staff shortage (37.5% or 3 groups), local organization's insufficient funding (25.0% or 2 groups), time shortage (25.0% or 2 groups), and others (including "too different a mentality" and "insufficient capacity" of the local organizations) (Figure 39).

The answers of the local organizations to the same question are as follows: the local organization's insufficient funds (80.0% or 8 groups), followed by the local organization's staff shortage (60.0% or 6 groups), time shortage (30.0% or 3 groups), and the external organization's staff shortage (10.0% or 1 group) (Figure 39). Comments for others include "couldn't obtain understanding on their activities" and "We received financial help but no direct assistance. In case of Fukushima, not many intermediary support organizations from other prefectures came, and in some places assistance ended without problems being solved."




Figure 39. What problem did you encounter when to hand over programmes?
(multiple answers allowed. valid respondents: 8 external aid organizations, 10 local organizations.
valid responses: 19 external aid organizations, 20 local organizations)

¹⁴³ Multiple answers were allowed.

¹⁴⁴ In the workshops in all three of the Tohoku Prefectures, staff shortages were brought up as a major problem. Suggested causes included ageing of communities along the north-eastern coast which was accelerated after the earthquake. PC literate younger generations mostly left the regions for education of their children or for work and even the ones still in the area are too busy making their living.

CAUSE 2. ABSENCE OF AN EXIT STRATEGY

Asked if they had defined objectives and an exit strategy for their programmes, 39.0% (23 groups) of the external aid organizations stated that they had started without either, but defined them along the way (Figure 32).

CAUSE 3. FUNDING AFFECTED THE TERMINATION OF PROGRAMMES.

Asked what had affected their decision to end their programmes, 47.4% of the external aid organizations (18 groups) said it was the available funding, while only 26.3% (10 groups) listed the feasibility of handover to a local organization as a factor (Figure 40).




Figure 40. Select everything that had affected your decision to terminate your programmes (multiple answers allowed. 38 valid respondents, 93 valid responses)

■ Concerning this matter, the following comments were captured by the review:

- We could not hold a long-term prospect since our activities depended on a single-year grant (Tokyo).
- Our purpose became to continue the group and its activities, which made it difficult to decide on when to end it (Tokyo).
- Many local organizations lacked solid organizational foundation since they had only been founded after the earthquake (Tokyo).
- We should have included capacity development of local organizations in our project, but the donors didn't understand the importance of hand-over and we couldn't obtain the funding (Tokyo).
- As of 2013, government grants is declining and it's becoming more and more difficult to obtain them (Hearing).
- For a certain number of new organizations which were founded after the earthquake, their means had become their ends;¹⁴⁵ some ended up running projects for the sake of continuing with the organization, by formulating programmes based not on local needs but on criteria for government grants (Tokyo).

(6) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (CONNECTEDNESS)

MEASURES 1. ACQUIRE STAFF FROM THE OUTSIDE.

- Hire I-turn and U-turn population (Miyagi).
- Accept more interns and thereby increase the number who would stay on (Miyagi).
- Create a platform for staffing (Work for Tohoku¹⁴⁶) (Fukushima).

¹⁴⁵ Not only local organizations but also external aid organizations have been criticized for running projects for the sake of continuing the organization. Local stakeholders commented that the aid organizations believed there will always be needs as long as they continued with their programmes so they didn't think when they should end the programmes, and that they had continued with programmes without deciding on the output, that there was a perception gap between the provider and the recipient of the aid, of the needs and future development, and that the fund was difficult to obtain for the handover.

¹⁴⁶ A project which aims to dispatch human resources needed by the disaster-hit areas from the outside.

MEASURES 2. TRAIN THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS.

- In order to enable local organizations to continually operate, various capacity enhancement programmes for them, including strengthening of the chain of command, enhancement of accounting knowledge and IT skills, clarification of roles, training of liaison personnel, and dispatch of specialists, should be included in the project (Fukushima).

- Have more NPOs work on the intangible aspects (Miyagi).
- External organizations should include local staff training in their project design and foster human resources in their programmes (Miyagi).
- Private donations to aid organizations including funds from overseas decrease rapidly within two or three years, while local organizations are needed to maintain operation for 5 to 10 years if they are to look after later phases, including transfer of the residents to permanent public housing. One way in which a local organization may obtain funding after external aid organizations have left would be to win contracts for government-sponsored projects. Some large-scale NGOs were trying to spend its entire grant within a given timeframe, but they should be able to cooperate with relevant public bodies and run a long-term project to foster local organizations (Hearing).

MEASURES 3. IMPROVE THE PROFITABILITY OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS.

- To commercialize operations of local organizations, more fundraisers and human resources who could run commercial business are needed. A framework should be built for a programme specializing in creating businesses (with emphasis on profitability) separately to community assistance of care programmes for elderly, etc. (Miyagi)
- Grants from external aid organizations or the government mostly forbid profit generation and so once grants cease to be issued, local organizations are left with no money. Relaxation of restrictions associated with use of grants, and allowing organizations to retain 5 to 10% internal reserves should them to build a sustainable foundation (Hearing).

MEASURES 4. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OVERSEAS EXPERIENCES TO IMPLEMENT LONG-TERM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS.

Of external aid organizations mobilized for the Great East Japan Earthquake, many were specialists of long-term domestic and overseas development projects, who didn't specialize in emergency response. Given their experiences, some of these organizations came in for a long-term assistance with the timeframe of 5 to 10 years, or some even saying "until all temporary housing are vacated and all residents have moved into a permanent housing," instead of giving a 3-year timeframe to complete and transfer programmes to local entities, and these groups are still there providing a long-term assistance. It would be good to have such organizations to start slowly, so they don't use up all their energy and resources in the emergency response period, and instead are able to take charge of mid to long-term programmes (Hearing).

MEASURES 5. BUILD A RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS FROM AN EARLY STAGE.

- Given their limited timeframes, external aid organizations should engage in building a cooperative relationship with various sectors in the local area (government, social welfare councils and other local organizations) from an earlier stage with a view of handing over their programmes and networks to local entities (Fukushima).
- Capacity building programmes for disaster risk mitigation should be provided to existing local entities (neighborhood associations, PTA, social welfare councils, regional comprehensive support centers, community centers, women's association and fire prevention clubs) (Miyagi).

3.7.2. DISCUSSION (CONNECTEDNESS)

Given the greater number of non-responses compared to the number of valid responses, analysis of the results of the questionnaire on end of aid programmes requires care. Nevertheless, the following points have been extracted from not only the questionnaire results but also workshop discussions and hearings.

THEY DON'T KNOW IF THE TIMING OF TERMINATION OF SHORT-TERM PROGRAMMES BY EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS WERE APPROPRIATE.

Although significant proportions of external aid organizations and local organizations stated that the timings with which aid programmes ended were appropriate, greater proportions stated “don’t know if they were appropriate” or “don’t know when they ended.”¹⁴⁷

This suggests a possibility that aid organizations only had vague ideas of the requirements which must be fulfilled before programmes may be terminated and weren’t able to run appropriate monitoring scheme for their own activities.

BE CONSCIOUS ABOUT HANDING OVER THE AID PROGRAMMES TO LOCAL RESIDENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS.

Various organizations and networks formed in the affected area after the disaster, some based on pre-disaster connections of civil societies and others based on brand new initiatives. Nevertheless, considering the dwindling size of budget and donations including those from overseas,¹⁴⁸ an important decision, to transfer the initiatives to local entities for the community building phases including recovery and reconstruction, may be needed.

FUNDING AFFECTED THE DECISION ON WHEN TO END THE PROGRAMMES.

While the proportion of external aid organizations who saw problems in the short-term nature of their programmes remained at 13.5% (5 groups), among the local organizations, 16.9% (10 groups) saw problems in the short-term nature of programmes provided. According to comments obtained by the review, there also were local organizations which couldn’t sustain the necessary funding once external aid organizations had gone. As many of the local organizations had only been founded after the earthquake, they lacked in essential capacities, such as fundraising skills, and government grants are dwindling.

External aid organizations, who should have been aware of this from an early stage and therefore worked on developing the capacity and human resources of local entities, but this wasn’t always possible. One of the reasons for this came from the project formulation of aid organizations, which didn’t take into account the needs for the handover of programmes to local entities, and therefore had not secured the necessary funding. In order to improve the situation, it is vital that all relevant parties, including the external aid organizations, local organizations and the donors, appreciate the importance of the capacity development as well as time and resources it requires.

It had been pointed out that some local organizations who continued on needless programmes for the sake of maintaining the organization. It is desirable that external aid organizations share the knowhow and skills associated with needs-based project formulation and monitoring, as well as those associated with fundraising.

In many cases, external aid organizations had mobilized themselves before they had clearly defined objectives or an exit strategy, so the decision as to when to end their programmes had to be taken under various limitations, including the available budget. This resulted in the hand over process not being given the priority it deserved.

CONSIDER THE CAPACITY OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS TO HAND OVER PROGRAMMES.

Some external aid organizations had painted a picture in which, as the emergency response phase ends and local economy begins to recover, local organizations who took over their programmes start on a profitable project to make up for diminishing donations and to sustain its own activities, and at this point in time, there are some apparently successful cases. However, given the tough economic climate of the affected areas, it is not appropriate to assume such profitable commercialization or even the continuation of programmes is always possible. External aid organizations should be careful as to not to make local stakeholders believe in a fantasy.

3.7.3. CONCLUSION (SHORT-TERM ASSISTANCE LED TO LONG-TERM ASSISTANCE?)

Many external aid organizations, local organizations and local residents stated they didn’t know if the timing with which the short-term aid programmes ended was appropriate. While the external aid organizations didn’t see any major issues with the ways in which their programmes ended, 20% of local organizations disagreed.


¹⁴⁷ Those among local organizations who believed “they were appropriate” together with those who said, “the timings were appropriate but there were problems in how they ended” make up about 40% of the whole.

¹⁴⁸ It gets affected by the occurrence of other disasters, such as typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in Nov 2013 (Hearing).

Around half of the local organizations who'd been handed over programmes from aid organizations had issues with the process, with some pointing out insufficient training. Local organizations had lacked sufficient capacities and required additional human resources and capacity development trainings before they could take over the programmes, however the external aid organizations did not have sufficient time or resources for the preparation. One of the reasons for this is that the external aid organizations had not chosen their objectives and exit strategies with a long-term view.

3.8. STAFF'S SAFETY SECURED?

Justification for selecting this theme	
Staff working in emergency response end up undertaking long hours of work in risky environment, facing the suffering of the victims. Organizations must protect both physical and mental health of their staff from unnecessary risks. ¹⁴⁹	




Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicator	Verification in this joint review
Health, safety and security	Were aid organizations able to provide appropriate staff safety management?

[Health, safety and security] was verified from the following four points of view.

1. Safety concerning overwork and mental health
2. Safety management particular to high-risk areas¹⁵⁰
3. Safety management concerning the nuclear accident
4. Other safety management aspects

“Staff(s)” here refers to all staff including volunteer staff, drivers and translators as well as paid staff.



Conclusion
<p>External aid organization workers were placed in both physically and mentally harsh conditions that some became unable to continue. While some organizations had systemized care for staff, many left it up to the individual staff to manage his/her own health and safety.</p> <p>Some 60% of the staff saw problems in long hours of work, out of which 40% felt their organization took some sort of a countermeasure. Safety measures particular to high-risk areas, such as distribution of helmets and masks, were taken up by around half of organizations, based on a manual either already existed before or created after the earthquake, while the other half didn't have a manual. With the problems of radiation, about forty percent said they didn't have a clear standard as they engaged in their work.</p>

¹⁴⁹ This has been pointed out by a number of international standards including the Sphere Standard, IASC and the standard of People in Aid.

¹⁵⁰ The item includes minimum precautions listed generally by the Social Welfare Councils etc., to volunteers, which recommends helmets in areas where there are risks of building collapse or falling objects, steel-plated insole for shoes to prevent piercing of feet by nails sticking out of debris (and to prevent consequential tetanus infection) and dust masks against asbestos from damaged buildings.

3.8.1. RESULTS (HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY)

(1) WERE THERE APPROPRIATE SAFETY MEASURES AGAINST OVERWORK AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS?

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- There were a number of staff working on-site who became too mentally and physically unwell to continue their work (Hearing).
- The HQ lacked in both the willingness and practice to provide specialist care like counselling (Tokyo).
- The project manager and other field staff were under a lot of stress having to confront the tragedies and severe conditions of the victims all the time (Tokyo).

To the question to the external aid organizations, “did you or your colleague(s) experience problems associated with long hours of work when to provide humanitarian aid?” 25.4% (18 persons) answered that they often did. Together with those who said that they occasionally had problems (36.6% or 26 persons), around sixty percent in total had experienced some kind of a problem (Figure 41).




Figure 41. Did you or your colleague(s) experience problems associated with long hours of work (ill health due to overwork or psychological stress) when to provide humanitarian aid?
(71 valid respondents)

Out of the 60% who answered that they had often or occasionally experienced problems, 13.3% (6 persons) stated there was a sufficient measure taken/consideration shown in response to the long hours, whereas 40.0% (18 persons) said there was some sort of a response, 37.8% (17 persons) said there was a little response and 8.9% (4 persons) were provided with no response at all. While more than half of the staff had felt that there was some sort of a response or more, the remaining half (46.7%) felt there was a little or no response.

A field staff of an NGO who had experienced a sufficient measure and consideration in response to his/her problems said that a counselor had visited the field staff every month or so. “Staff from the HQ also came regularly and took us out for meals and things. I’m not sure how effective they were, but you felt that they cared (Remarks).”

(2) CAUSES FOR INADEQUATE SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONCERNING OVERWORK AND MENTAL HEALTH

■ The review captured the following comments on the matter:

- The reality of Japanese NGOs and NPOs is that they don’t even have decent working conditions compared to other ordinary businesses, even under normal circumstances. In an emergency response time, we didn’t even have a rule to allow time-off (Tokyo, Hearing).
- Having been in direct contact with the victims and their needs, I felt too responsible and couldn’t be in a mindset to ask for a time-off (Tokyo).
- Immediately following the onset of the disaster, workload for all our staff jumped up with disaster-response tasks being piled on top of the regular tasks. Even though the organization was aware of the importance of labor management, we couldn’t enforce it (Tokyo).
- We didn’t have specialist staff who could deal with labor management during a disaster (Tokyo).
- Adequate communication with the HQ couldn’t be maintained, so field staff occasionally had to decide on matters you would usually consult and check with the HQ, which became a psychological burden (Tokyo).

- We underestimated the situation because it was a domestic case (Hearing).
- Was carried away by the missions in front of our eyes, everyone was working through the nights, not just field but also HQ staff, so we'd left field staff to manage their own health, which we shouldn't have (Hearing).

(3) WERE SAFETY MEASURES SPECIFIC TO HIGH-RISK AREAS TAKEN?

Asked to select all applicable options concerning safety management policies and manuals (dust masks against harmful substances and helmets against dangerous objects, etc.), 20.6% of the external aid organizations (13 groups) said that they'd used the whole or part of guiding materials they already had and 27.0% (17 groups) selected the option stating that although there was no material available at the onset of the disaster, one was created for the occasion, showing that about half of the organizations had some kind of a manual to follow.¹⁵¹

Some had their own manuals compiled for their overseas operations, and others had prepared, learning from the experience of Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, while some compiled a manual for the first time for this occasion (Hearing).

Some 27.0% (17 groups) said that although they didn't have the manual as of then, however they had planned to produce one in the future, while 25.4% (16 groups) said they neither had a manual or an intension to produce one.

■ With regard to this, the following comments were obtained:

- We don't have a manual or a plan for disaster response, labor or safety management. Perhaps we have one in a general sense, but we don't have one that can immediately be put into action (Iwate).
- Perhaps due to less concrete structural damage compared to Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (most damaged structures were wooden) or perhaps due to other issues like the nuclear accident, the media didn't really warn about asbestos, so the volunteers were unaware. Some took their masks off in the midst of removing rubble (Remarks).

(4) WERE SAFETY MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE NUCLEAR DISASTER-RELATED RISKS?

A comment was made by a local organization concerning the small amount of external aid being provided in Fukushima: "We felt abandoned by the external aid organizations. You'd expect NGOs to behave based on guidelines and policies, so they should disclose what decisions they made based on which standard. If they had a standard according to which they couldn't send people to Fukushima, we wish they'd shown that clearly (Hearing)."

Asked how they made decisions concerning safety for sending staff or running aid programmes given the nuclear accident and its effect, most (more than 40%) stated that they carried on with their efforts without any sort of definitive standard (Figure 17). The following details were given by those selected "others": "considered the impact of radioactive fallouts when to select which area to go to," "used JANIC guideline and others as a reference," "made decisions based on information collected by ourselves," "avoided risky areas," "no staff were sent to areas where safety couldn't be confirmed," and "made case by case decisions."

■ With regard to this, the following comments were obtained:

- Because our organization had no standard on radiation, we left field staff who carried Geiger counters to make their own decisions to withdraw or evacuate (Hearing).
- Neither the manual available from before the earthquake nor one produced after its onset was good enough, so we defined a new standard based on expert advices. We take routine radiation measurement every month and submit the results for the organization to check, so we're not too worried (Remarks).

(5) CAUSES FOR INADEQUATE SAFETY MANAGEMENT AGAINST THE NUCLEAR RISKS

■ With regard to this matter, the following comments were obtained:

- The effects of radiation on human health and safety standards are controversial subjects over which even the experts disagree each other. It's an issue of advanced science and no amount of research was able to produce a definitive answer (Fukushima).

¹⁵¹ 63 valid respondents.

- It was difficult to believe in anything as government's announcement or media reports often changed later, with new facts coming out all the time. Including the issue of contaminated water, the problem changed every day and a plan became useless after six months as it no longer fitted the situation. It was very difficult to make decisions (Fukushima).
- Like the government, NGOs and other citizens groups hadn't expected a nuclear accident, so they didn't have a manual. We couldn't judge whether to send people to Fukushima, or if it was sensible to recommend people to stay in Fukushima (Fukushima).

(6) WERE OTHER ASPECTS OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT ADEQUATE?

■ In addition to the above, the following opinions were raised:

- When female staff visited a male household alone as part of a care service for the elderly or relief goods distribution they occasionally felt unsafe especially when the recipient of goods or services was a drunken male, although no incidents had occurred. Later, the organization ensured female staff work in pairs when they visit households (Hearing / NGO).
- Staff locally hired in Miyagi in 2011 used a house of which even the upper floor had been inundated by water during the tsunami as her office with no evacuation plan if another tsunami shall hit (Hearing).

(7) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY)

MEASURES 1. OVERWORK AND MENTAL HEALTH OF STAFF

- If you have more staff, the amount of burden per person is reduced and you can run a shift. Ideally, you should send replacement staff to the site routinely so field staff can take time-off. However, unless staff are good, such effort would just end up increasing the workload even more. So it's important to come up with an idea of how to attract competent staff more (Tokyo).
- Systemize the human resource management (Tokyo).
- From during the normal times, efforts should be made to foster those who can see the whole picture (Tokyo).
- From during the normal times, enhance self-management skills of staff (Tokyo).
- Organizations should take the initiative to systemize mental care for their staff (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. STAFF SAFETY IN RELATION WITH THE NUCLEAR DISASTER

- Instead of relying completely on the governments, citizens groups should install their own monitoring posts, exchange information with journalists and include a diverse range of views to provide a second opinion (Fukushima).
- Create a realistic post-accident contingency plan, with a presupposition that a nuclear accident will happen and implement prevention/mitigation plans and trainings (Fukushima).
- Local NPOs should consider who they will connect to and how if a nuclear accident shall happen (Fukushima).

3.8.2. DISCUSSION (HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY)

AID ORGANIZATIONS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR STAFF SAFETY BUT FEW ADEQUATE MEASURES WERE TAKEN.

In the humanitarian relief efforts following the earthquake and tsunami, staff had to work in areas full of collapsed buildings and risks of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident, which added to the severe physical and mental strain of confronting the devastations in the affected areas. However, the situation described by the testimonies that a number of staff became unable to continue with their work due to physical and mental stress, likely had rooms for improvements. If staff is unable to continue with his or her work, a replacement must be hired and a handover must be arranged, which creates a lot of overhead for the organization too, and the situation is best avoided.

During the chaos of emergency relief, there are times when staff inevitably have to manage their own safety, in which case, aid workers must prioritize the management of their own welfare and safety. With the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, overwhelming staff shortages resulted in inexperienced staff being sent to the site,

often without sufficient guidance. Considering the complexity involved in decisions concerning safety, especially in relation with the nuclear accident, about which the opinions were split even among the experts, aid organizations should have alerted the staff of the risks and provided necessary assistance.

It is desirable that aid organizations create a standard concerning their staff treatments, referring to materials such as Code of Good Practice by People In Aid and Action Sheet 4 from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency settings.

INSUFFICIENT DISCLOSURE OF THEIR STANCE OVER THE NUCLEAR SITUATION

A comment from an organization in Fukushima, “We’d like to see clear explanation from the external aid organization if they determined not to send their staff to Fukushima showing their standard” should be taken seriously as organizations’ accountability. Some groups had created a position paper describing the organization’s stance about the nuclear accident and had them published on their websites. An organization is also responsible for clearly explaining it to its own staff.

SAFETY MEASURES AGAINST RISKS OF AFTERSHOCKS WERE NOT REVIEWED.

Aftershocks of the Great East Japan Earthquake still continue to occur. Japan Meteorological Agency had announced that, although they are on a decline, aftershocks with seismic intensity greater than 1 had occurred more than 10,000 times before the end of 2013, among which 300 have exceeded the seismic intensity of 4. The number of earthquakes with magnitudes on the Richter scale greater than 4 during 2013 was 4.7 times that occurred in 2010, and there have been eight aftershocks with magnitudes on the Richter scale greater than 7.

Records from overseas show the potential impacts of major aftershocks. In an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra (2004), the aftershock that occurred 6 years later caused up to tsunami with 8 meters of the maximum height, killing 400 people along the coastline.



In this review, we were unable to elucidate if the aid workers had secured their own evacuation route or what safety measures had been prepared (emergency communication plan, arrangement of hospitals, etc.), which will hopefully be addressed by future reviews.

3.8.3. CONCLUSION (STAFF’S SAFETY SECURED?)

External aid organization workers were placed in both physically and mentally harsh conditions that some became unable to continue. While some organizations had systemized care for staff, many left it up to the individual staff to manage his/her own health and safety.

Some 60% of the staff saw problems in long hours of work, out of which 40% felt their organization took some sort of a countermeasure. Safety measures particular to high-risk areas, such as distribution of helmets and masks, were taken up by around half of organizations, based on a manual either already existed before or created after the earthquake, while the other half didn’t have a manual. With the problems of radiation, about forty percent said they didn’t have a clear standard as they engaged in their work.

3.9. ORGANIZATIONS HAD ENOUGH CAPACITIES?

Justification for selecting this theme	
Capacity of aid organizations is an important factor determining the quality of aid that can be provided. For many of the issues discussed in this review, insufficient capacities of relevant organizations have been listed as a cause.	
	
Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicator	Verification in this joint review
Human resources and management ¹⁵²	Did organizations have appropriate staffing to enable effective operation?
Funding base	Did organizations have appropriate funding to enable effective operation?
<p>[Human resources and management] was verified on the following two points:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Were the organizations able to secure adequate number of staff? 2. Did they have adequate internal communication system? <p>[Funding base] was verified on the following two points:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Was there shortage of funding? 2. Were adequate uses of the funds allowed? 	
	
Conclusion	
<p>[HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT]</p> <p>Over 70% of external aid organizations had felt that their staff numbers were in short, particularly of project managers, staff with local knowledge and other specialist staff. Although more than 70% of aid organizations believed their communication between the site and the HQ was good enough, some information such as the needs of the victims, were not always shared.</p> <p>[FUNDING BASE]</p> <p>More than half of the external aid organizations felt they lacked sufficient funds, not only in terms of amount but also in terms of the freedom associated with it, since much of the funding had limited use or time period. Insufficient funding had significant impacts; the greatest factor in determining when the external aid organizations ended their programmes is said to be the funding, although there were organizations which had leftover funds, showing the difference in fund-raising skills of different groups.</p>	

¹⁵² Based on the definition (Evaluators should pay attention to: the level of experience/expertise of field staff; recruitment procedures; staff turnover; field–HQ relations and communication) of Bibliography 3-3

3.9.1. RESULTS (HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT)

(1) WERE THE ORGANIZATIONS ABLE TO SECURE MANPOWER?

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- Although we advertised, we couldn't secure adequate number of staff with the right kind of qualifications or experiences (Tokyo).
- It was very difficult to secure the kind of staff who could make an immediate difference; it caused problems with implementation of our projects and their expansion (Tokyo).
- There weren't many staff who could design and manage projects suitable to the context of Tohoku, Japan (Tokyo).
- Organizations became overloaded following the onset of the earthquake and needed additional staff, however, the staff with right experiences and qualifications were difficult to find and it caused problems in implementation and expansion of the projects (Tokyo).
- Although we were aware of the residents' needs for health management, mental and psychological care, legal consultation, care for persons with disabilities, care for psychological stress among children, we couldn't hire appropriate staff (Tokyo).
- We were unable to propose a project (as it required a specialist who couldn't be found) (Tokyo).

Some 77.5% of external aid organizations (55 groups) had "strongly felt" and "somewhat felt" that they were short-staffed (Figure 42).




Figure 42. Did you at any point in providing humanitarian aid feel you were short staffed?
(71 valid respondents)

Those who answered strongly felt or somewhat felt were asked what kind of staff they were in short of. Their responses were as follows: project managers (49.1% or 28 groups), staff from the area or those with local knowledge (38.6% or 22 groups), long-term staff (36.8% or 21 groups), specialists (31.6% or 22 groups), and short-term (project-based) contract staff (15.8% or 9 groups) (Figure 34). There was no significant difference in the above response between HQ staff and field staff.

(2) THE CAUSES FOR THE SHORTAGES OF MANPOWER

CAUSE 1. EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS WAS POOR.

• NGO and NPO workers in Japan are generally employed on fixed-term contracts for less wages than the employees of commercial businesses, so there already was an imbalance between the kind of staff demanded by aid organizations and the conditions they were able to offer. And even if they had found staff, he left possibly due to severe working conditions right after the onset of the disaster, or some capable staff were headhunted by other organizations (Tokyo).

- One of the reasons why NPOs in Japan cannot secure good staff is the low wages (Tokyo).

CAUSE 2. AVAILABLE LOCAL MANPOWER WAS IN SHORT.

• The coastal region of Tohoku had a few NPOs before the earthquake, so there were no local organizations or staff. That made it difficult for us to find staff with the local knowledge (Tokyo).

CAUSE 3. EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS WERE UNPREPARED.


- Most organizations hadn't expected to be working domestically; they had no recruitment, allocation or training plans for a domestic disaster (Tokyo).

CAUSE 4. SYSTEM TO SUPPLY HUMAN RESOURCES WAS INSUFFICIENT.

- There weren't sufficient system to match the human resource needs of aid organizations with those who wished to help (Miyagi, Fukushima).

(3) DID THEY HAVE ADEQUATE INTERNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM?

Out of 59 organizations who engaged in humanitarian effort following the earthquake and tsunami, about eighty percent (47 groups) had staff dedicated for the disaster response. Of these, 53.2% (25 groups) had less than 5 dedicated staff, while the sum of those who had less than 10 staff came up to 70.2% (33 groups).



Source : Survey by JANIC (Nov, 2011)

Figure 43. The number of dedicated disaster-response staff (47 valid respondents)

To a question if the communication between field and HQ staff suffered from problems, 25.8% (17 persons) of the external aid organizations answered either “suffered very much” or “suffered to an extent” (Figure 12). Of these, 73.9% (17 persons) chose the local needs as the type of information that suffered communication problems (Figure 13).

Looking at the same question by category of the staff, 22.4% (3 persons) of those who worked on logistic support from the HQ chose either “suffered very much” or “suffered to an extent,” whereas 21.0% (9 persons) of field staff chose the same (Figure 44).



Figure 44. Those who selected either “suffered very much” or “suffered to an extent” asked if the communication between field and HQ staff suffered from problems by respondent type.
(valid respondents: 14 head office staff, 41 field staff)

(4) CAUSES FOR INTERNAL COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS**CAUSE 1. FIELD STAFF WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ORGANIZATION'S MANAGEMENT.**

- Since many of the field staff were employed on short-term project-basis after the earthquake, they often didn't know how the management worked (Hearing).

CAUSE 2. HQ STAFF WERE OVERLOADED.

- Workload for HQ staff increased significantly after the earthquake with existing tasks from before the earthquake, and some organizations had to dispatch HQ staff to the site. As the HQ was overloaded, it was difficult to spend time communicating with field staff (Tokyo).

(5) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT)

MEASURES 1. BE PREPARED.

- Prepare by producing management manuals and guidelines for domestic disasters, training existing staff, and by specifying recruitment scheme for disaster times and training programmes for personnel employed after the onset of the disaster (Tokyo).
- A disaster plan should be formulated including discussions on communication structure and the possible number of staff to be dispatched (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. STRENGTHEN THE NETWORK.

- Cross-sector and cross-organizational database of personnel should be created (Tokyo).
- Roster system (personnel registration system)¹⁵³ should be prepared (Tokyo).
- A system under which many organizations can cooperate, like the Joint Committee for Coordinating and Supporting Voluntary Disaster Relief Activities (*Shien P*),¹⁵⁴ should be created (Tokyo).
- From during the normal times, try and engage with specialists in mental care and safety managements who will be needed in disaster response (Tokyo).
- Form a cooperation scheme with businesses¹⁵⁵ for disasters during the normal times (Tokyo).
- Build a network with specialists so their opinions can be gathered swiftly in an emergency situation (Tokyo).

MEASURES 3. IMPROVE THE EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS.

- Increase in the absolute number of staff and improvement of employment conditions are needed for the whole NGO sector in Japan (Tokyo).

MEASURES 4. DEVELOP STAFF CAPACITY.

- To solve the problem of the shortage of specialist staff, organizations should send their existing staff to training for specialized skills and the knowledge needed in disaster responses.

3.9.2. DISCUSSION (HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT)

STAFF SHORTAGES AFFECTED THE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

In a survey taken among NGOs working in international cooperation, the communication with the field staff and hiring of staff was named as the greatest difficulties they had experienced (Figure 15).

In this review, more than 70% of external aid organizations said they had staff shortage problems (Figure 42) and project managers were particularly in short (comments in workshops, Figure 34). Such staff shortages are believed to have created additional difficulties in formulating projects matching the local needs (Theme 1) and continual improvement of programmes through monitoring (Theme 6).

ALTHOUGH INTERNAL COMMUNICATION WAS MOSTLY GOOD, THERE WAS A PROBLEM TO SHARE NEEDS.

More than 70% of the organizations believed that they had a smooth internal communication; however, about twenty percent found problems in the flow of information, particularly of those concerning needs assessment (Figure 12). This is believed to be one of the causes of the difficulties in providing assistance to match needs (See Theme 1).

¹⁵³ This is a system under which those who seek a position among international organizations register their CV. In cases of vacancies international agencies refer to the registry to recruit a matching candidate.

¹⁵⁴ It is a network organization comprising of NGOs, NPOs, the Social Welfare Councils, Community Chest and others. It was established within the Central Community Chest of Japan in Jan 2005 following the Niigata Chuetsu earthquake in 2004.

¹⁵⁵ In 2011 earthquake and tsunami, businesses sent their staffs to NGOs or encouraged volunteer participation as part of CSR.

CONSIDER PREPARING HIRING REGULATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE.

Having organizations prepare regulations for sending staff hired in response to an earthquake to the affected area, including wages, benefits and conditions, may help simplify the hiring process in emergency response and help alleviate staff shortage.

CONSIDER PERSONNEL REGISTRATION USING “JICA PARTNER.”

Some specific evaluations concerning the roster system, mentioned as one of the possible measures against staff shortages, have already been started. According to a spokesperson for Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)’s international cooperation personnel registration site PARTNER, the progress is as follows:

JICA, the handler of Japan’s overseas aids and NGOs are considering strengthening their cooperative relationship in regards with disaster prevention and mitigation under NGO-JICA Council. The evaluation of possible introduction of a “Disaster-response personnel registration system (tentative name)” began in the second session of the council held on September 30, 2013. This is a system in which NGOs are allowed to utilize JICA’s PARTNER website to call on its registered members during major disasters to swiftly secure required human resources. Although PARTNER website had been designed for international cooperation and not intended for domestic disasters, it was temporary deployed in the Great East Japan Earthquake to match between the staff needs of NGOs and registered members with experiences of overseas aid projects.

A mechanism to accommodate a swift use of the same system is currently under consideration. Such mechanism should help bring overseas experiences of aid workers to domestic disasters, and the experiences gained by which in turn is expected improve overseas assistance efforts. Although the current system allows users to access registered members on one-by-one basis, it cannot be used, for instance, to call on all members with water hazard related experiences. A possible improvement currently under consideration includes having members tick boxes if they wish to join humanitarian efforts during a domestic disaster and if they wish to be contacted for possible roles in emergency response to a domestic disaster, and allowing NGOs to send messages to a bulk of members.

The following two issues need to be solved to before this mechanism is implemented:

- Since JICA has international cooperation as its mandate, it cannot be used to maintain a permanent system for emergency response in a domestic disaster, and therefore a threshold above which the mechanism comes into effect must be defined. Identifying the scale of domestic disasters for which NGOs start to be involved would allow for more concrete design of the mechanism.
- To prevent access from suspicious third parties to the registered members, a management system by an organization familiar with NGOs and others must be assigned.

3.9.3. RESULTS (FUNDING BASE)

(1) WAS THERE SHORTAGE OF FUNDING?

■ The following comments were obtained:

- We occasionally ended up prioritizing projects that could be completed within the period to match available funding (Iwate, Miyagi).
- While there were organizations who struggled to obtain funds, there were others who had more than they could spend (Tokyo).
- The initial fundraising didn’t go well as we had no previous experience of earthquake relief (Tokyo).
- Extension of project period or expansion of its scope was determined by available fund (Tokyo).

Among the external aid organizations, 67.6% (46 groups) said that they either “strongly” or “somewhat felt the shortage of funding.” Despite the majority facing shortage of funding, 4.4% (3 groups) said there sometimes were more than enough of donations and grants (Figure 45).




Figure 45. Did you ever feel your organization lacked sufficient funding?
(multiple answers allowed for different situations in different phases. 68 valid respondents, 75 valid responses)

Among the external aid organizations, 47.4% (18 groups) said that the funding affected the decision as to when to terminate the programmes. This was the most popular answer amongst other factors influencing the decisions including the cessation of needs of the victims (42.1% or 16 groups) and completion of the initially planned project period (39.5% or 15 groups) (Figure 40).

(2) WERE THE FUNDS USABLE?

The largest number of the external aid organization, 48.9% (22 groups), chose the support fund from the national, prefectural or municipal government as the least usable source of funding (Figure 46).




Figure 46. Select the last usable source of funds
(45 valid respondents)

As for the reason for the poor usability, 66.7% (28 groups) of external aid organizations and 60.0% (30 groups) of local organizations chose “restrictions on the use.” The second and third most popular answers for both groups were “too much report requirements” and “limited timeframe (single-year grant)” (Figure 47).




Figure 47. (Q. for external aid organizations) What was the reason for selecting the least usable source of funds?
(Q for local organizations) On financial support from external aid organizations
(multiple answers allowed. valid respondents: 42 external aid organizations, 50 local organizations. valid responses: 73 external aid organizations, 88 local organizations)

(3) HOW DID SHORTAGE AND POOR USABILITY OF FUNDING AFFECT THE ASSISTANCE?

PREVENTED FROM HAVING A LONG-TERM PROSPECT

- The funding being short-term (semiannual or single-year) prevented us from having a long-term prospect (Tokyo).

RESTRICTED PROJECT PERIOD AND SCALE

- Timeframe and scale of deployment of our projects were determined by available funding (Tokyo).

HINDERED TO SECURE SUFFICIENT STAFF

- As seen in Theme 9 [Human resources and management], low wages paid by NPOs in Japan is a reason why competent human resources can't be secured (Tokyo).

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FUNDS HINDERED FLEXIBLE USE.

- As seen in Theme 1, limited use of funds sometimes prevented flexible response to the changing needs in the disaster-hit areas (Tokyo).

DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN FUNDS TO DEVELOP CAPACITIES OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

- As seen in Theme 7, it was difficult to obtain funding for the capacity development of local organizations or handover to them (Tokyo).

DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN FUNDING FOR INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT

- It was difficult for intermediary support, such as to coordinate actions of different organizations, to obtain funding (Tokyo).

(4) WHAT CAUSED FUND SHORTAGES?

CAUSE 1. DIFFERENCE IN ABILITIES TO ACQUIRE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND GRANTS

While many organizations had experienced shortages of funding, some had more than they could spend (Figure 45). The cause of such polarization partly lies in the availability of the organizational capacity to deal with reporting requirements and others (Theme 1).

CAUSE 2. THE TYPE OF FUNDING DIDN'T MATCH THE PROGRAMMES.

- It wasn't the absolute amount of the funding that was in short, but it was the type of funding with enough flexibility to match our objectives that we didn't have enough of (Hearing).
- Acquired funding was a single-year grant and needed to be fully spent, which led to patches of over and under-funding (Hearing).

CAUSE 3. THE INFORMATION ON FUNDING OPPORTUNITY WAS NOT SHARED ENOUGH.

- Insufficient information sharing resulted in imbalance of funding opportunities (Hearing).

(5) MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (FUNDING BASE)

MEASURES 1. STRENGTHEN FUNDRAISING CAPABILITIES.

- Organizations which had struggled to raise funds should enhance their capacity by sending their staff to trainings on fundraising and donor needs (Hearing).

MEASURES 2. WORK ON A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DONORS FROM NORMAL TIMES.

- Aid organizations which intends to participate in domestic disaster response should work on information exchange and try to build mutual understanding with donor organizations and allow the favorable relationship to help speed up fund acquisition at the initial phase of emergency response (Tokyo).

MEASURES 3. MAKE PROPER MATCHING OF DONORS AND AID ORGANIZATIONS.

- Intermediary support organizations should try and address the imbalance of funding in matching aid organizations with donors (Hearing).


3.9.4. DISCUSSION (FUNDING BASE)

FUNDING SHORTAGES WERE A COMMON PROBLEM, WHICH POSSIBLY AFFECTED THE ASSISTANCE.

More than half of the external aid organizations said that they experienced shortage of fund, which was affected their activities. Shortage of fund was the most important factor determining the timing for the organizations to end their programs (Figure 40). The type of available funding with different levels of flexibility also affected their programmes.


While some groups struggled to obtain enough funds to start or expand their programmes, other groups are reported to have more funding than they could spend.¹⁵⁶

The income and expenditure in relation to the earthquake for NGOs participated in the relief efforts following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the greatest proportion of organizations said that both their income and expenditure exceeded 100 million yen; 31.4% (16 groups) made and 27.5% (14 groups) spent more than 100 million. The percentage of organizations with less than 10 million yen of income or expenditure each came up to 39.2% of the whole (20 groups) (Figure 48), showing the polarization into the two extremes of groups, with one working above the scale of 100 million yen and the other in a relatively small scale operations of less than 10 million yen.¹⁵⁷ With 45.9% (17 groups) of these organizations, the scale of relief operation exceeded more than half of its financial capacity, showing many organizations had devoted large scale finance into the relief efforts (Figure 49).



Source : Survey by JANIC (Nov 2011)

Figure 48. Income and expenditure of NGOs in response to the earthquake
(51 valid respondents)



Source: Survey by JANIC (November 2011)

Figure 49. Financial scale of relief effort compared to organization's financial scale
(37 valid respondents)¹⁵⁸

Such polarization was caused by smaller organizations not having sufficient capacity to run information gathering for fundraising, to write applications and reports or to cater for human resources required in negotiation

¹⁵⁶ Bibliography 1-2.pp.105

¹⁵⁷ Bibliography 1-2

¹⁵⁸ 5 groups (14%) spent more than 100% of their budgets.

with donors, such as English-speaking personnel to obtain funds from overseas,¹⁵⁹ so larger organization was able to sweep up grants from donor organizations as well as collect personal donations to end up with more than enough.¹⁶⁰

SHORTAGE OF AMOUNT OF FUNDS AS WELL AS THEIR FLEXIBILITY INFLUENCED THE ASSISTANCE.

Most likely not just the amount of funding but other factors such as its flexibility or restriction on the usage and available timeframe influenced the assistance. Improving this requires close communication and mutual understanding with different funding organizations such as donors and governments who each has different internal policies and situations.

Financial assistance from external aid organizations had similar problems; the majority of local organizations felt funds provided by external aid organizations had too much restrictions for them to be really usable (See Theme 1's [Relevance] "Cause 3").

Considering the above, it is also important to secure a various source of funding. One comment regarding this was that "Although we were initially alarmed by religions groups, thinking they had their own ends they sought for, we later realized that they mostly depended on their own fund so that they could often provide highly flexible funds¹⁶¹ (Fukushima)."

ENHANCING FUNDRAISING CAPACITY OF SMALL ORGANIZATIONS IS REQUIRED.

In order to obtain funding, one must research about grants, write applications and reports, dedicate a certain amount of human resources into negotiations with donor groups, and correspond in English if the donor is from overseas.¹⁶² While all these form too much a burden for smaller organizations, larger organizations had the personnel dedicated to fundraising, the PR power to attract private donations and donors tended to feel secure given the size of the organization (Bibliography 1-2, pp.96). In the future, it is desirable to implement capacity enhancement programmes so smaller/local organizations can improve their fundraising skills, and to devise mechanisms to ease fund raising for smaller organizations.

DONOR ACTION EXAMPLES WHICH MAY LEAD TO IMPROVED ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Japan Platform (JPF) and Nippon Foundation may be good examples. JPF distributed funds to works on community assistance, provision of safety nets in areas which cannot be covered by the government alone, and job creation to promote the self-reliance of victims.¹⁶³ Nippon Foundation's ROAD project used funds donated by individuals and organizations to support emergency-response infrastructure projects, such as water distribution, foot-bath projects in temporary housing sites, needs assessment survey in temporary housing, and matching of specialists with projects.¹⁶⁴ Both organizations have redistributed the funds that they have collected from businesses, other organizations and private persons to a diverse range of projects based on prioritized needs of the victims.

3.9.5. CONCLUSION (ORGANIZATIONS HAD ENOUGH CAPACITIES?)

[HUMAN RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT]

Over 70% of external aid organizations had felt that their staff numbers were in short, particularly of project managers, staff with local knowledge and other specialist staff. Although more than 70% of aid organizations believed their communication between the site and the HQ was good enough, some information such as the needs of the victims, were not always shared.

¹⁵⁹ The bar for fund acquisition was particularly high for local NPOs founded after the earthquake; an NPO corporation status and achievement records were often asked for, but not all could answer (Miyagi C, Miyagi E).

¹⁶⁰ Bibliography 1-2, pp. 96

¹⁶¹ Unlike specialist donor groups, religious groups had much less reporting requirements and therefore less of a burden for the recipient of their support. Two local organizations participated in the workshop testified that the funding from religious groups was the most usable. Religious groups could cause alarms given their usual methods of PR, however with groups deeply rooted in the area or supports provided under jointly by more than one sect, local organizations were able to accept the offer with little concern (Iwate).

¹⁶² The bar for fund acquisition was particularly high for local NPOs founded after the earthquake; an NPO corporation status and achievement records were often asked for, but not all could answer (Miyagi).

¹⁶³ Bibliography 1-8

¹⁶⁴ Bibliography 1-9

[FUNDING BASE]

More than half of the external organizations felt they lacked sufficient funds, not only in terms of amount but also in terms of the freedom associated with it, since much of the funding had limited use or time period. The impact of insufficient funding had significant impacts; greatest factor in determining when the external aid organizations ended their programmes is said to be the funding, although there were organizations which had leftover funds, showing the difference in fund-raising skills of different groups.

3.10. COLLABORATED AND COOPERATED WELL WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS?

Justification for selecting this theme
There are limits for one agency to act alone in case of disasters extending to wide-areas. Liaison/cooperation with other organizations or agencies will enhance the effectiveness, comprehensiveness and validity of assistance.



Assessment method	
The conclusion for the theme was derived from the results and discussion based on the verification of the following indicators.	
Indicators	Verification in this joint review
Information sharing and coordination	Was necessary information shared among stake holders? Based on the shared information, was appropriate coordination made to provide assistance needed by the beneficiary?
Collaboration	Were the planning/implementation of assistance done in collaboration with concerned people? ¹⁶⁵
<p>[Information sharing and coordination]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information sharing and coordination with other concerned organizations were verified (Refer to theme 5 for the information sharing with beneficiaries). <p>[Collaboration]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collaboration with other concerned organizations (local organizations, government agencies, the Social Welfare Council, private companies, donor agencies) was verified. 	



Conclusion
<p>[INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION]</p> <p>A lot of information was shared through information exchange meetings. However, due to institutional constraints such as the Personal Information Protection Law, specific information needed for the provision of assistance was not properly shared. In addition, information sharing did not lead to specific coordination which made some participants doubt the purpose and participation to information exchange meetings.</p> <p>[COLLABORATION]</p> <p>In general, collaboration among concerned organizations went well. However, in terms of collaboration with local organizations, assistance to small-scale organizations was insufficient. In terms of collaboration with local municipality and the Social Welfare Council, there was insufficient mutual understanding due to irrelevance in explaining about the organization and assistance contents.</p> <p>Since many organizations relied heavily on the subsidies and financial assistance to implement their activities, private companies and donor agencies were considered important and led to high satisfaction for the collaboration. However, unfamiliarity in reporting tasks or mismatch in receiving assistance which did not meet the needs of the organization led to hindering their activities.</p>

¹⁶⁵ Bibliography 3-15, Core standard 2.

3.10.1 RESULTS (INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION)

1. WAS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE DONE?

■ The following responses were given:

- Lack of information sharing led to increasing burden on the local residents and created uneven distribution of assistance (Miyagi).
- I have participated in several information exchange meetings, but failed to obtain any useful information or possibilities for the meeting to develop any further. I have decided that it is a waste of time and manpower, and did not participate in the meetings actively after that (Remarks).
- During information exchange meetings, each organization only reported about their activities and there was no report on the progress or coordination of assistance, and the same problems were raised during each meeting which were not solved (Miyagi).
- The functions of information exchange meetings were limited (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).
- Convening of information exchange meetings was delayed during the emergency period (Iwate).

2. WHAT HINDERED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE?

CAUSE 1. DUE TO THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION LAW, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SHARE THE NEEDS OF BENEFICIARIES.

- There was limitation in information sharing due to the Personal Information Protection Law (Iwate).
- Because of the Personal Information Protection Law, it was difficult to collect the information on those needing assistance. In particular, it was difficult to collect the information on those living in their own homes or rented apartments (Iwate).

CAUSE 2. PRIDE GOT IN THE WAY DURING INFORMATION SHARING.

- During information exchange meetings, there was a tendency for organizations to only talk about their success stories and not wanting to disclose their problems or concerns (Iwate).

CAUSE 3. LOW PRIORITY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION SHARING

- There was no impediments in the immediate work without the information of other organizations. Therefore, they did not find it necessary to provide information of their activities at information exchange meetings (Iwate).
- There was no enough time and manpower to spare for information exchange, particularly right after the disaster (Miyagi).
- The Social Welfare Council was affected by the disaster and lacked personnel to convene information exchange meetings (Iwate).

CAUSE 4. INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETINGS WERE NOT WIDELY NOTIFIED.

- Although we wanted information on who was providing what kind of assistance in which area, they were not clear (Iwate).

CAUSE 5. LACK OF EXPERTISE IN CONVENING INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETINGS

- Nobody was sure who should take initiative to hold an information exchange meeting (Iwate).
- There was no opportunity to make preparations for convening information exchange meetings (Iwate).
- There was no expertise among intermediary support organizations to coordinate information exchange meetings (Iwate).

(3) WERE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES COORDINATED?

Around sixty percent of staff of external aid organizations and local organizations who participated in information exchange meetings answered “the information exchange meetings that I have participated functioned to coordinate the activities of participating organizations to reduce overlapping assistance/reduce areas without assistance” (Figure 50).




Figure 50. Did the information exchange meetings you have participated functioned to coordinate the activities of participating organizations?

(valid response: 48 external aid organizations, 45 local organizations)

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- Most information exchange meetings did not have functions to follow-up/coordinate after the meeting (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).
- Most information exchange meetings ended up in reporting success stories only. I wanted more information on how small grass-root organizations were implementing their activities and their needs, so that further coordination/collaboration could be made. However, the meetings did not provide such opportunities (Remarks).

4. CAUSES THAT ACTIVITIES WERE NOT COORDINATED

The following are the reasons for those who answered that information exchange meetings “did not function well” in Figure 50 (Figure 51).




Figure 51. Reasons why information exchange meetings/liaison committees did not have the function to coordinate activities (multiple answers allowed. valid respondents: 21 external aid organizations, 22 local organizations. valid responses: 31 external aid organizations, 36 local organizations)

CAUSE 1. LACK OF COORDINATORS

Excluding the response “the meeting purpose was not to coordinate activities,” the most common response was “there was no coordinator/coordinator did not function well” with 46.2% of local organizations (6 persons out of 13) and 63.6% of external aid organizations (7 persons out of 11) answering yes to the question (Figure 51).

When the respondents were asked what kind of person is appropriate as a coordinator, the most common response was the “person who is knowledgeable expert on local situation” (local organizations 82.1%; external aid organizations 71.4%). On the other hand, many people also selected “person who does not have any conflict of interest on local affairs” as the response (local organizations 60.7%; external aid organizations 36.5%) (Figure 52). For the latter response, there was a remark that “it takes time for an outsider to gain trust, but once the trust is gained, since the person has no conflict of interest, s/he is suitable as a coordinator (Remarks).”




Figure 52. What kind of person is appropriate as a coordinator?
(multiple answers allowed. valid respondents: 63 external aid organizations, 56 local organizations.
valid responses: 103 external aid organizations, 125 local organizations)

CAUSE 2. ORGANIZATIONS WANTED TO PROTECT THEIR OWN SCOPE OF WORK.

Although only 9.1% (1 person out of 11) from the external aid organization answered that “organizations wanted to protect their scope of work,” 53.8% (7 persons out of 13) of local organizations responded yes to this question (Figure 51). This is related to the comment that “each organization’s egoism and assumption that their activities are important led to not wanting to coordinate with others (Iwate).”

Some listed the cause of this as “after the emergency assistance period, for both external aid organizations and local organizations, acquisition of subsidies became their goal. They became competitive and addressing the needs of beneficiaries was forgotten, and they may have become more focused on securing their position and interests. This made it difficult to coordinate activities. In particular when the activity areas and fields were similar, they became more competitive (Iwate).”

CAUSE 3. INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOT GIVEN THE ROLE OF COORDINATION.

- Host organizations and intermediary support organizations were not given the role of coordination, and division of roles among NGOs/NPOs, volunteer organizations and private companies were unclear (Miyagi).

CAUSE 4. INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS COULD NOT FUNCTION AS A COORDINATOR.

- Intermediary support organizations specialising in facilitating partnerships or experts in this area were limited (Fukushima).

- In principle, intermediary support organizations were supposed to handle logistics, but they failed to fulfill their roles and provided direct assistance on the site (Fukushima).

The following was pointed out as a reason for the above: it is difficult to use subsidies for intermediary assistance, since visualisation of their achievement is difficult. Intermediary support organizations therefore acquired subsidies for direct assistance and could not focus on their primary role as a coordinator (Fukushima).

CAUSE 5. LACK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

- There was lack of mutual understanding or trust with collaborating organizations (Tokyo, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).

The following were pointed out as reasons for this: “over-confidence or pride on their own activities by each organization (Miyagi),” and “distrust arising from not knowing well the activities of other organizations (Tokyo).”

5. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION)

MEASURES 1. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BENEFITS FOR EACH ORGANIZATION.

- It is important to establish relationships and develop mutual understanding among concerned organizations before disaster happens. However, it is difficult for organizations to spare their limited time and manpower to prepare for unpredictable disasters. Rather than aiming for such an ideal relationship, it is more realistic to establish a collective body based on each other’s benefits. The benefits do not have to be related to disaster management. This is the same for the actual implementation of assistance activities. The aim is not to increase the number of meetings, but to have meetings beneficial for all participating organizations at a minimum cost (Hearing in Iwate).

MEASURES 2. PREDETERMINE THE FOCAL POINT ORGANIZATION IN CHARGE OF COORDINATION.

- For an effective coordination, it is important to decide from the beginning, which organization will facilitate overall coordination on what criteria. In this way, all organizations can have the correct understanding of the coordinating organization and its activity contents (FGD).

3.10.2 DISCUSSION (INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION)**FEW INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETINGS AIMED AT COORDINATION.**

Most information exchange meetings/committees did not consider coordination as the top priority. If there were other venues for coordination this may not have been a problem. However, since intermediary support organizations was not given the role as a coordinating body from the start (Cause 3), there was no institutional guarantee, and only limited examples of coordination existed due to lack of capacity and awareness of intermediary support organizations (Cause 4).

For external aid organizations and local organizations to work well to implement disaster response, it is important to designate a leading organization as a coordinator/facilitator and strengthen their competencies in advance.

ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION LAW

There were reported cases that information necessary for providing assistance such as the address of the evacuees was not shared to aid organizations, because of restriction imposed by the Personal Information Protection Law. On the other hand, some mayors made the decision to share the personal information to aid organizations based on the interpretation of the Law that disclosure of personal information is allowed in emergency cases to protect human lives/personal assets. Under the Law, it is allowed to disclose personal information in exceptional cases, but this fact was not widely known.¹⁶⁶ Reflecting on such mistakes and requests from civil society, many stakeholders are reviewing the system and the scope of operation during disasters.¹⁶⁷ It is hoped that such developments are feasible and will become reality soon.

IT IS DESIRABLE FOR INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS TO FUNCTION AS A COORDINATOR.

Intermediary support organizations are expected to function not only as a coordinator among private aid organizations, but also to bridge the gaps between various concerned organizations such as private and government sectors. In order to do so, it is important to facilitate coordination by maintaining equality and taking into account circumstances of each organization and the burden placed on them.

¹⁶⁶ In general, each local authority has the information on the people requiring assistance during a disaster, and the handling of the personal information is based on each municipal ordinance. Under the Personal Information Protection Law, there is a provision on the unintended use/information provision to the third party. Appropriate interpretation/ application of this provision enables information sharing on the people requiring assistance during a disaster among concerned people (“Guidelines for evacuation support of people requiring assistance during a disaster” - Committee to discuss evacuation support to people requiring assistance during a disaster; March 2006).

¹⁶⁷ After the Great East Japan Earthquake, Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was amended as follows: “The list of people requiring assistance during a disaster prepared by local municipality (cities, towns, villages) will be provided to the evacuation assistance organizations in advance, with a prior consent of each individual on the list. In the case of actual disaster or likelihood of disaster occurrence, the list can be submitted to aid organizations without the consent of each individual.” In addition to this amendment, in 2012, the Cabinet Office reviewed the “Guidelines for evacuation support of people requiring assistance during a disaster” as a result of the report submitted by the “Committee to discuss evacuation support to people requiring assistance during a disaster.” According to this review, it makes recommendations for each local municipality to make an agreement with various organizations such as commissioned welfare volunteers, Social Welfare Council, organizations supporting persons with disability, consultation support service, NPOs, other private organizations etc., which are trustworthy and have capability to conduct appropriate safety confirmation. These agreements should be made widely available among concerned parties (Special committee on NPOs etc. by LDP’s policy research council; 6th June, 2013).

3.10.3 RESULTS (COLLABORATION)

1. DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATE WELL WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS?

Excluding the twelve respondents from local organizations who answered “they were not involved with collaboration with external aid organizations,” 84.0% (42 persons out of 50) chose “collaboration went well.” The factors made good collaboration possible were as follows: “Collaboration with NGOs went very well. Unlike government agencies, since they are private organizations started as a disaster volunteer center, they may have lacked expertise or funds, but they taught us from the scratch”; “Organizations based in other prefectures gave us support until we received our own subsidy. This enabled us to focus on our activity implementation”; and “We were thankful to receive assistance from the external aid organizations on the activities we wanted to implement.”

Excluding the eight respondents from the external aid organizations who answered “they were not involved in collaboration with local organizations,” 93.3% (56 persons out of 60) chose “collaboration went well” (Figure 53).




Figure 53. Did collaboration go well between local organizations and external aid organizations?
(valid respondents: 68 external aid organizations, 62 local organizations)

2. WHAT KIND OF PROBLEMS EXISTED BETWEEN LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS?

■ The following comment was obtained:

- Although external aid organizations tried to provide assistance to small-scale organizations or organizations with no track records which could not receive assistance from local stakeholders, but they could not do so (Tokyo).

Refer to Theme 7 for the relationship between external aid organizations providing relatively short-term assistance and local organizations providing long-term assistance.

3. WHAT WERE THE CAUSES OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS?

CAUSE 1. EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS SHIED AWAY FROM CHALLENGES FOR THE FEAR OF FAILURES.

- Since external aid organizations had the responsibility toward donors, they were afraid of failures and tended to select organizations or activities likely to have success. However, the selection did not necessary meet the needs of beneficiaries (Iwate).

CAUSE 2. LACK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

- External aid organizations wanted to work together with local organizations which had a grasp on local needs, but did not have much information on local organizations and found it difficult to select good local partners (Tokyo).

- Local organizations did not have much information on organizations based outside their prefecture, and did not know where and how they could assist them (Hearing).

CAUSE 3. DISTRUST AGAINST EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS

- Local organizations suspected that external aid organizations came to collect donations or memberships (Hearing).

- External aid organizations were told by locals “do not be involved in local issues since you will return home soon (Hearing).”

- Local organizations were wary of external aid organizations with a lot of funding coming to their local area may have a bad effect on their own activities (Tokyo).

- Each organization wanted to protect their own turf of work (Tokyo).
- There was a cause for concern when it became apparent that an external organization had an obscure usage of funding (Hearing).

4. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COLLABORATION WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS)

MEASURES 1. CONDUCT DETAILED INFORMATION GATHERING TO ASSIST SMALL-SCALE ORGANIZATIONS.

- To support small-scale local organizations, detailed information gathering by external aid organizations, offering information from local NPOs, and establishing good working relationships beforehand are effective in fostering mutual understanding (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).

MEASURES 2. MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS RELATIONSHIP.

- It is necessary to develop mutual understanding before disaster happens. In particular, it is necessary to strengthen the competencies of service providers to establish continued network with NGOs/NPOs (Miyagi).

5. DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATE WELL WITH THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION?

Among the external aid organizations, 12.1% (8 persons) answered that collaboration with the municipal administration (cities, towns, villages) did not go well while 65.2% (43 persons) answered that it went well (Figure 54).

For the national government, 15.4% (10 persons) said collaboration went well with it whereas 6.2% (4 persons) said, “it didn’t go well” and 78.5% (51 persons) had nothing to do with it (Figure 54).




Figure 54. Did collaboration with the administrative agencies go well?
(valid respondents: 65 for collaboration with central gov. 66 for collaboration with municipal gov.)

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- Some NGOs were refused collaboration from government administration (Miyagi).
- It was difficult to establish a relationship between the administration and private sectors such as NGOs to share useful information for both parties. Information related to administration did not reach NGOs and NGOs also failed to convey information acquired through their activities or their expertise opinions (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).
- Failure to establish collaborative working relationship with the administration led to failure in sharing useful information for both parties (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).
- When we requested to issue a special highway permit during the emergency period, the same procedure was applied as general volunteer workers, which took much time to obtain it (Tokyo / external aid organizations).

6. WHAT WERE THE CAUSES FOR THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS NOT BEING ABLE TO COLLABORATE?

CAUSE 1. EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS WERE NOT WIDELY RECOGNISED AS A STAKEHOLDER IN DISASTER RELIEF.

- The roles of NGOs were not clearly specified in the disaster risk reduction plan and their roles and responsibilities were unclear. There was no budget allocation for the collaboration (Tokyo, Miyagi).

- In general, most people considered disaster management to be the role of government agencies, and did not recognise external aid organizations as part of it (Tokyo).

- Apart from specific organizations specialising in disaster risk management or disaster recovery, civil society organizations (CSOs) in general have not participated in the discussion on domestic disaster management issues with the government administration. For this reason, it was difficult to voice their concerns during this disaster (Hearing).

- NGOs/NPOs have not been sharing information on their activities to the administration before the disaster, which led to lack of understanding by the administration (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima).

- Even if the administration did recognise the existence of external aid organizations, they failed to examine which organizations were good or what and how activities are implemented by them (Tokyo).

CAUSE 2. AFTER THE DISASTER, THE ADMINISTRATION DID NOT HAVE TIME TO BUILD-UP RELATIONSHIP WITH EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS.

- The local stakeholders were tasked with both day-to-day routine work and disaster management work which overloaded their capacity, and they could not afford time to build-up new relationship or coordinate with external aid organizations (Miyagi, Fukushima).

CAUSE 3. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR COLLABORATION.

- Since the Government administration is organised vertically and they rarely cooperate with other sections/divisions, staff tended to think that tasks other than their routine work is outside their scope of work (Iwate).

- The staff-in charge at the local administration/the Social Welfare Council frequently changed, and by the time they have established relationship, the staff is transferred to other sections/divisions. This made it difficult to establish and maintain relationship (Tokyo, Iwate).

7. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COLLABORATION WITH GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION)

MEASURES 1. STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE DISASTER HAPPENS.

- Establish regular relationship with administration through training of NPO staff as part of civil servants' staff training programme or recognise the activities of NPOs by awarding organizations with excellent track records (Iwate).

- The Government should establish a system/focal point at national as well as local level to have regular dialogue between the administration and NPOs, taking USA's disaster management network between the government and NGOs/NPOs as an example (Fukushima).

MEASURES 2. PROMOTE UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH PROACTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS.

- External aid organizations should not just go about implementing their day-to-day activities, but must strengthen their PR activity especially by highlighting their activities which the administration cannot handle (Iwate, Miyagi).

- The private sector should organize meetings to voice the concerns of aid organizations to the administration, like the Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN) (Fukushima).

MEASURES 3. SHARE CASE STUDIES.

- Compile good examples of good collaboration, and confirm each other's benefits on working together/collaboration (Iwate, Miyagi).

MEASURES 4. COMPILE THE INFORMATION ON EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS SO THAT THE INFORMATION CAN BE EASILY OBTAINED.

- Establish an easy-to search system for the administration to search/examine information on the expertise of each NGO/NPO through the library information system (Iwate).

MEASURES 5. ESTABLISH AN INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM TO GIVE PREFERENCES TO NGOs/NPOs WITH PREPAREDNESS FOR DISASTER.

- Give preferences to NGOs/NPOs working on disaster management for example by establishing a system that subsidy is only given to organizations which have prior planning for disaster management (Fukushima).

MEASURES 6. EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS ASSIST THE TASK OF ADMINISTRATION.

- Lessons learned from this disaster is that it is effective for the staff of NGOs/NPOs to join in to work at the office of the administration/ the Social Welfare Council from the early stage of emergency period to build-up relationship (Miyagi).

MEASURES 7. DO DISASTER PREPAREDNESS.

- NGOs/NPOs should include the assistance to disaster victims in their articles of incorporation, and make preparedness for large-scale disasters (Fukushima).

8. DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATE WELL WITH THE SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL?

Among external aid organizations, 74.2% (49 persons) answered “the collaboration with the Social Welfare Council went well,” while 22.7% (15 persons) answered “not involved in collaboration” and 3.0% (2 persons) answered “collaboration did not go well” (Figure 55).




Figure 55. Did collaboration with the Social Welfare Council go well? (66 valid respondents)

■ Good examples in collaboration with SWC are as follows:

- SWC was thankful to receive assistance from external aid organizations which dispatched their staff to support the tasks of SWC on a long-term basis. The staff had a good understanding of terminology and worked well as a liaison (FGD).
- A particular SWC made sure to inquire the length of assistance period to external aid organizations, and made a commitment to work together by sharing all information to prepare a two year plan together (FGD).
- From a certain period, they were able to entrust external aid organizations to coordinate all the operation of soup kitchens, which led to reducing the work load of SWC (FGD).
- In a particular area, NGOs/NPOs and SWC made concessions with each other and shared and managed available resources together (FGD).
- Disaster volunteer centers (disaster VC) operated under SWC were forced to make a lot of difficult decisions on the spot, such as whether they should let the volunteer workers work on rainy days or not, for the fear of radiation effect. They were thankful that staff of NGOs assisted them in such cases (FGD).
- NGOs became the focal point on the site and functioned to coordinate/filter visitors (FGD).
- NGOs supported the operation of disaster VCs by dispatching two staff members who had the experience of operating the centers to SWC located in a city with large damage. The staff assisted in setting up disaster VCs as well as a system to receive volunteer workers (Hearing).

■ Bad examples of collaboration with SWC are as follows:

- SWC declined to collaborate with the external organization (Tokyo).

- The external organization could not liaise well with SWC to implement activities (Tokyo).

9. CAUSES FOR FAILURE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL AND EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS

CAUSE 1. THERE WAS CONFUSION WITHIN SWC.

- Since SWC itself suffered damages from the disaster, they lacked manpower and experienced decline in office functions (FGD).
- Communication with the municipal government stopped thus the business operation stopped (Hearing).
- Since individual and group volunteer workers from NGOs/NPOs all came to the disaster VCs operated under SWC, SWC did not have enough time for collaboration with other organizations (Hearing).
- Some people feared that dealing with external aid organizations will increase their workload (Hearing).

CAUSE 2. PREPAREDNESS FOR DISASTERS WAS INADEQUATE.

- SWC was confident enough to set up disaster VCs, but did not expect so many NGOs to come to the area (Hearing / SWC).

CAUSE 3. THERE WERE SOME ACTIONS WHICH CAUSED DISTRUST.

- They have never worked with NGOs before. They could not trust them just by hearing the organization name (Hearing).
- There were some organizations with connection to politician who intended to use the information and circumstances of disaster victims to the politician's advantage, or organizations which tried to put pressure on them using the politicians name (Hearing).

CAUSE 4. LACK OF EXPLANATION ON THE BACKGROUND OF ORGANIZATION AND ITS ACTIVITY

- When the staff of SWC talked with NGO staff for the first time, they could not understand them well since NGOs used a lot of jargon (FGD).

CAUSE 5. LACK OF INFORMATION RELATED TO SWC

- External aid organizations did not understand the existence of SWC, its organizational characteristics nor internal procedures (Hearing).

10. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COLLABORATION WITH THE SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL)

MEASURES 1. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP BEFORE DISASTER HAPPENS.

- From now on, in order to improve the relationship between external aid organizations and the Social Welfare Council, it is necessary to establish good working relationship before disaster happens and to implement trainings together (Hearing).

MEASURES 2. ASSIST THE ACTIVITIES OF SWC.

- It is effective for NGOs to provide assistance by dispatching personnel to disaster VCs or SWC itself (Hearing).

MEASURES 3. DIVERSIFY THE OPERATION OF DISASTER VCS.

- It is necessary to make changes to the current system of disaster management volunteer centers for SWC to operate alone. The current operation system of disaster VCs is based on the experiences from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake which was intended for the use within a specific area, and not appropriate for wide-area disasters. It is not necessary for SWC to operate disaster VCs alone. To reduce the burden on SWC, other concerned organizations can also take up the operation responsibility such as matching of volunteer workers. SWC should concentrate their efforts on reviewing the system such as the management of NGOs which they have made agreement for collaboration, or coordination with municipal government located in other prefectures, or coordination with various organizations providing assistance in a smaller area than the municipal area (Hearing).

11. DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATED WELL WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES?

To the question to external aid organizations, “Which financial assistance/subsidy was the easiest to manage?” the top answer was donation from individuals followed by financial assistance from private companies which consisted 20.7% (12 persons) of the total response (Figure 56). Out of the 12 persons who answered that financial assistance from private companies was the easiest to manage, 5 persons answered it was because “the financial amount was large” (Figure 57).




Figure 56. The easiest financial assistance/subsidy to manage (58 valid respondents)




Figure 57. Reasons for the easy-usage of financial assistance/subsidy (multiple answers allowed, 58 valid respondents, 95 valid responses)

Among 8.9% (4 persons) of the external aid organizations who said financial assistance from private companies was the most difficult to manage, 2 out of 4 persons chose “limited usage purpose” as its reason (Figure 47).

Financial assistance from private companies had benefits such as “in many cases there was no obligation to make complicated activity reports.” However, some commented a negative aspect of it as “when private companies provide assistance, there are various implicit motives, which sometime did not meet the local needs and resulted in putting a lot of burden on the receiving organization for coordination (Tokyo).” The reasons that was raised was “lack of knowledge of private companies on NPOs’ activities or lack of knowledge of NGOs on the motives of private companies in providing assistance (Tokyo),” and “lack of capability or techniques to introduce private company’s expertise to the local level (Tokyo).”

12. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COLLABORATION WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES)

MEASURES 1. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE DISASTER HAPPENS.

- To build a good working relationship between NGOs/NPOs and private companies for a better assistance, it is important to develop mutual understanding before disaster happens (Tokyo).
- Private companies and CSOs should discuss together beforehand, to make an agreement to dispatch personnel in cases of disasters. Discussions on what kind of assistance private companies can provide during disasters utilising their expertise, will improve the quality of assistance (Tokyo, Hearing).

13. DID EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS COLLABORATE WELL WITH DONOR AGENCIES?

Responded to the question “did the collaboration with overseas donor agencies go well?” 42.4% (28 persons) of the external aid organizations answered “it went well.” Only 1.5% (1 person) replied, “did not go well” (Figure 58).




Figure 58. Did collaboration with overseas donor agencies go well? (66 valid respondents)

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- Donor agencies made a huge contribution to the Japanese civil society organizations with very limited self-funding (Hearing).

14. WAS ACCOUNTABILITY TO DONOR AGENCIES FULFILLED?

For accountability to donors, 40.0% (26 persons) answered that they “fulfilled their accountability,” and 55.4% (36 persons) answered “almost fulfilled,” totaling 95.4% of external aid organizations said that they have fulfilled their accountability to donor agencies (Figure 59).




Figure 59. Did you fulfill your accountability to donor agencies? (65 valid respondents)

■ With regard to this, the following comments were given:

- Requirements from donor agencies make a big difference for the recipient organization. There are differences in requirements from overseas donors or domestic donors (private companies, administration, funding agencies). They each require different levels of accountability in quantity and quality (Remarks).

- There were certain trends in the provision of financial relief activities welcomed by donors and more likely to receive financial support were those easy to explain the activity contents as well as its necessity, activities with clear achievements, activities which can be easily shown in figures, and activities completed within short-term period (six month/within a fiscal year). On the other hand, activities to invest in the future such as supporting the livelihood of residents, or intermediary support, found it difficult to obtain financial assistance (Hearing).

- Donor agencies felt at ease in providing funding to large-scale organizations. Large-scale organizations also received a lot of donation from individuals and they had more than enough funding to implement their activities (Hearing).

15. WERE OPINIONS/CONCERNS CONVEYED TO DONOR AGENCIES AND REFLECTED IN THE SUBSEQUENT ASSISTANCE?

To a question to the external aid organizations, “did you inform your opinions/concerns/complaints to donor agencies, and were they reflected in the subsequent decision making or revisions for the assistance contents?” 51.7% (30 persons) chose “yes” while 6.9% (4 persons) chose “no” and 41.4% (24 persons) replied as having no dissatisfaction or complaints (Figure 60).




Figure 60. Did you inform your opinions/concerns/complaints to donor agencies and were they reflected in the subsequent decision making or revisions for the assistance contents? (valid respondents 58)

■ With regard to this, the following comment was given:

- Overseas donor agencies hired Japanese staff to conduct local surveys, therefore it was possible to negotiate on the site (Remarks).

16. WHAT WERE THE CAUSES FOR LACK OF COLLABORATION WITH DONOR AGENCIES?

CAUSE 1. REPORTING TASK WAS TOO MUCH OF A BURDEN.

- Organizations receiving funding from overseas donor agencies found the reporting task burdensome. On the other hand, overseas donor agencies felt frustrated that they did not receive reports as they expected, which caused problems between the donors and the recipients (Hearing).
- Although the collaboration went well, we were troubled with frequent mismatches in local needs and donor’s needs. Submission of reports in English took up a lot of our time and efforts (Remarks).
- When organizations prepared financial application forms or activity plans, they tended to prioritise activities and implementation duration which were more likely to receive funding (Hearing).

CAUSE 2. GAPS BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS BY DONOR AGENCIES AND THE COMPETENCY LEVEL OF AID ORGANIZATIONS

- There was a large gap in the level of expectation from overseas donor agencies and the reality of Japanese civil society organizations in terms of the level of information sharing, accountability, reporting capability, and quality of proposal writing (Tokyo).

17. MEASURES FOR IMPROVEMENT (COLLABORATION WITH DONOR AGENCIES)

MEASURES 1. ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE DISASTER HAPPENS.

- In order to improve the relationship between Japanese civil society organizations and overseas donor agencies, it is desirable to establish relationship before disaster happens so that the civil society organizations which know local needs and context well can exchange opinions with overseas donor agencies on an equal level (Tokyo).

MEASURES 2. INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS TAKE UP THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REPORTING TASK AND OTHERS.

- If an intermediary support organization which has knowledge of both parties intervened as an advisor at times of submission of applications or reporting, it may reduce the stress for both parties (Hearing).

MEASURES 3. MAKE THE USE OF SUBSIDIES FROM DONOR AGENCIES MORE FLEXIBLE.

- It is desirable for donor agencies to offer more flexibility in terms of the duration of implementing activity and the usage of budget so that aid organizations can provide more personalised assistance based on the local needs and context (Tokyo).

3.10.4 DISCUSSION (COLLABORATION)

COLLABORATION WITH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS

Relationships between external aid organizations and local organizations remained well, but there is a high possibility that small-scale organizations may have been excluded from receiving financial assistance. This can be analysed from the figure that almost twenty percent (19.4%) of local organizations replied as having no relationship with external aid organizations or collaboration with them did not go well (Figure 53). The underlying cause for this was external aid organizations' unwillingness to take the risk of supporting small-scale organizations and mutual distrust due to lack of information.

Once the disaster happens, there is no time to spend on fostering trust; the accountability of organizations will not drastically increase. There is a need to establish a system to swiftly collect and disseminate information after the occurrence of disasters. These concerns need to be tackled and prepared before the disaster.

COLLABORATION WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The fact that 80% of the external aid organizations dealt with local government while only 20% of them did so with the central government suggests that partnership with local government is more crucial at the time of disaster (Figure 54).

Constraints that hindered a good collaboration with the government is similar to those with local organizations, but it is noteworthy that the current disaster risk management system in Japan being led by the government doesn't officially recognise the roles of civil society organizations. This system needs to be reviewed.


COLLABORATION WITH THE SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL

There were many reported success stories of collaboration with SWC and 74.2% of the external aid organizations replied as collaboration with SWC went well proves this. This may be the achievements from the series of efforts made by concerned parties since the Niigata Chuetsuoki Earthquake in 2007.

On the other hand, 25.7% of external aid organizations replied as having no relationship with SWC or collaboration with them did not go well. The causes relating to this are similar with the above mentioned two types of agencies. Particularly noteworthy relationship with SWC is related to the overwhelming number of external aid organizations which tried to use the system to coordinate volunteer workers originally intended for the use of individual volunteer workers. This resulted in system malfunction and caused chaos. Suggestions from concerned parties of SWC to diversity the operation of disaster VCs (Measures 3 in Section 10) should be taken up for consideration and its further development is expected.

COLLABORATION WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES


During a survey conducted by JANIC in 2011 showed that private companies made a lot of contribution and worked together with civil society organizations in many ways such as supplying of goods, dispatching personnel to civil organizations, sending staff as volunteer workers, or providing assistance in the field of their expertise such as logistics and IT technology. The largest area of cooperation between private companies and external aid organizations was the supplying of goods followed by sending volunteer workers (Figure 61).



Source: Survey by JANIC (November 2011)

Figure 61. Areas of cooperation between private companies and NGOs
(multiple answers allowed. 15 valid respondents (companies), 51 valid responses)¹⁶⁸


When private companies were questioned about the satisfaction level of collaboration with international NGOs, 90% answered “satisfied,” including the answers as “very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied.” When the same question was asked to NGOs, 90% answered “satisfied,” including the answers as “very satisfied” and “fairly satisfied” (Figure 62).



Source: Survey by JANIC (November 2011)

Figure 62. Evaluation on the level of collaboration by NGOs/private companies
(valid respondents: 15 private companies, 22 NGOs)¹⁶⁹

The response from NGOs regarding the question on the collaboration with private companies, those replied “slightly satisfied” and “average” totaled 36.4%, thus the overall satisfaction level has decreased (JANIC 2011). For the question about future collaboration, the desire is slightly lower for NGOs (Figure 63).



Source: Survey by JANIC (November 2011)

Figure 63. Will you consider future collaboration with NGOs/private companies?
(valid respondents: 18 private companies, 20 NGOs)

¹⁶⁸ Out of 142 private companies, 21 companies responded. Out of 21 companies, 15 companies worked together with NGOs

¹⁶⁹ 15% out of 125 JANIC members replied. 14% out of 142 private companies replied.

The same comment was given at each workshop that it was difficult to secure personnel with expertise to implement long-term recovery assistance. According to the questionnaires distributed to JANIC members and private companies, 22% (11 companies) of private companies wanted to collaborate with external aid organizations in the area of their expertise. However, it revealed that only 4% (2 organizations) of NGOs wanted to collaborate in the area of expertise of private companies.¹⁷⁰ The reason for NGOs to collaborate with private companies was for financial assistance in the form of “donation/subsidy/assistance to specific projects/events/seminars/campaigns” or “donation/subsidy/assistance without restriction on the fund usage.” These request exceeded the needs of private companies’ offer of pro bono support.¹⁷¹

COLLABORATION WITH DOMESTIC DONOR AGENCIES

Japan Platform Foundation (JPF) is top on the list as the Japanese funding agency with 6 billion yen support to NGOs/NPOs (as of end of October, 2011). They provided funding of 5 billion 260 million yen to 55 activities implemented by NGOs, and 320 million yen to 56 activities implemented by private organizations like NPOs through the “*Tomoni ikiru* (Stand by together) fund.” The Red Feather Community Chest Movement provided 2.9 billion yen funding through the “Disaster relief volunteer and NPO support fund” (as of 18 September, 2011), and the Nippon Foundation provided 4.3 billion yen funding through the “ROAD Project” (as of end of November, 2011). These funding were provided by existing funding organizations as a special fund to assist the recovery activities related to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Other contributions from private companies and individuals for the Great East Japan Earthquake totaled 250 billion yen. Out of this total sum, most was given directly to the residents in the affected areas as a donation. However, also a substantial amount was given to NGOs/NPOs, and we estimate 37.3 billion yen was directly provided to NGOs/NPOs implementing activities relating the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, various overseas donor agencies also provided funding to organizations providing assistance to the disaster management activities of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

COLLABORATION WITH OVERSEAS DONOR AGENCIES

In 2011, Japan became the world largest aid recipient country; thanks to the financial contribution from various countries worldwide for the Great East Japan Earthquake. In many cases, the amount of financial assistance from overseas donor agencies was large. Financial assistance made a great contribution to the Japanese civil society organizations, which have very limited ways of coming up with their own source of funding.

There are two categories for the financial assistance from overseas donor agencies. The first category is the case of agencies which has a branch office in Japan, for example, Save the Children, World Vision, the Salvation Army, and others. These organizations provided direct financial assistance collected by the Japan branch. The second category is the case of agencies without a branch office in Japan. These organizations made a survey whether it is possible to set up a temporary office to implement direct assistance, or to choose an indirect assistance. As a result, some overseas donor agencies without a branch in Japan decided to implement indirect assistance. For example, they dispatched their staff to Japan for several weeks to seek promising NGOs/NPOs to work with, and provided financial assistance in the form of donation as oppose to subsidy. Religious organizations in middle income countries without any ties with large-scale aid agencies in developing countries fit such case (JANIC 2011).

Overseas donor agencies made a huge contribution in providing assistance for the Great East Japan Earthquake. However, there were comments that a large gap existed in the level of expectation from overseas donor agencies and the reality of Japanese civil society organizations in terms of the level of information sharing, accountability, reporting capability, and quality of proposal forms. In addition, reporting task became a burden to organizations implementing activities, and only half of the external aid organizations (55.4%) replied that they fulfilled accountability to donor agencies to some extent (Figure 59), shows that there were problems at both ends.

JANIC acted as a link between overseas donor agencies and domestic aid organizations during the disaster management. What we can say from our past three year experience is that, overseas donor agencies also went through a lot of hardship under Japan’s unique environment. It is true that their demands were considered high for the Japanese aid organizations, but it was only because the donor agencies had to fulfil their accountability to those who made donation in their home country, and the level required was higher than that of in Japan. Immediately after the occurrence of the disaster, we were inundated with requests from overseas donor agencies to

¹⁷⁰ Bibliography 1-2, pp. 88

¹⁷¹ Bibliography 102

introduce trustworthy local organizations with medium to long-term working vision. However, it was difficult to find organizations meeting such request due to the following reasons:

- Originally, not so many local NPOs were based in the Tohoku (northeastern) region. Many are newly established after the disaster.
- Organizational structure of civil society organizations in Japan are vulnerable, and have relatively low accountability compared to organizations in the West.
- Immediately after the disaster, there was virtually no civil society organizations with medium to long-term working vision.
- There was no agency which had all the information on civil society organizations working on the disaster relief.

Looking into the future, in order to reduce the above mentioned gaps and concerns, donor agencies need to understand the regional/country context. In addition, to reduce excessive burden on the recipient organizations, the level of expectation needs to be lowered (e.g. reduce the burden on reporting task, co-fund organizations implementing same activities, etc.) As for the civil society organizations in Japan, improvements to organizational/individual capacity development and increasing accountability are desirable.

3.10.4 CONCLUSION (COLLABORATED AND COOPERATED WELL WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS?)

[INFORMATION SHARING AND COORDINATION]

A lot of information was shared through information exchange meetings. However, due to institutional limitation such as the Personal Information Protection Law, specific information needed to provide assistance was not shared. In addition, information sharing did not lead to effective coordination which made some question the purpose and participating to these meetings.

[COLLABORATION]

Collaboration with concerned personnel went relatively well. However, assistance to small-scale local organizations was insufficient and it was difficult to establish mutual understanding with local municipalities or the Social Welfare Council due to the failure of providing sufficient information on the concerned organizations and their activity contents.

Since many aid organizations relied on subsidies and financial support to implement their activities, private companies and donor agencies played an important role. This led to high level of satisfaction for collaboration. On the other hand, unfamiliar tasks such as report writing or receiving assistance which did not meet their needs hindered their activities.

CHAPTER 4

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CAPACITY
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANIZATIONS**

CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

In this chapter, recommendations will be made on the capacity development needed for civil society organizations to prepare for future large-scale disasters, based on the contents verified in chapter 3.

BACKGROUND

“Personnel” is the key in effective implementation of providing assistance. However, many civil society organizations including international NGOs found it difficult to secure a massive number of personnel needed for dealing with the aftermath of Great East Japan Earthquake both in terms of quantity and quality. Even after securing the personnel, they also encountered numerous problems.

The number of personnel (both regular and non-regular employees) NGOs assigned can be counted as at least between 312 to 488 persons.¹⁷² Many NGOs replied that they have assigned 3 to 10 employees to deal with disaster management.¹⁷³ However, they could not afford to assign their regular staff; therefore most personnel were newly recruited temporary staff. For some NGOs, the number of staff doubled after the disaster. This figure is only applicable for NGOs and if we include domestic NPOs, the number of personnel will increase even more.¹⁷⁴ Lack of personnel was most serious in Fukushima prefecture due to the hazards from radiation.¹⁷⁵

Causes of this human resource shortage of NGOs are twofold: (1) poor utilization of potential human resources, and (2) inadequate capacity development of existing human resources.

It can be assumed that lack of personnel will become an issue again in case of future large-scale disasters. In order to secure a mass number of personnel immediately, it is recommended to (1) set up a human resource center (roster system/utilisation of existing personnel); and (2) capacity development of human resource (new personnel) before disaster happens. From a long-term point of view, it is essential to make improvements both in quality and quantity. Which means capacity development will not only improve individual competencies but also increase the overall number of personnel. Many NGOs are already tackling on this issue.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, it was pointed out that available potential resource was not utilised.¹⁷⁷

Taking into account above mentioned circumstances, area of fields or organizational structure which need to be strengthened are summarised in below eleven categories.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Many aid organizations lacked personnel who had an expertise in project management (preparing an activity plan/proposals/application forms, schedule management, budget management, accounting, personnel management, report writing etc.) At local disaster management volunteer centers, core staff was drastically lacking. JANIC implemented capacity development programs using a framework of “Joint Committee for Coordinating and Supporting Voluntary Disaster Relief Activities (*Shien P*),” but only four NGOs participated in the programme. This shows that organizations could not afford to second their own staff to other organizations. Fostering personnel with an expertise on project management is effective not only for strengthening their own organizations, but will lead to raising the overall standard of personnel involved in disaster management through direct seconding and others.

¹⁷² Survey by JANIC in November 2011. Valid response 47 organizations (59 JANIC members implemented activities relating to disaster recovery activities). The number of volunteers is not included in this figure.

¹⁷³ Survey by JANIC in November 2011

¹⁷⁴ Currently, around 650 organizations are members of Japan Civil Network for Disaster Relief in the East Japan (JCN).

¹⁷⁵ Initiatives to mitigate such problems only started at the time of recovery period. Entrepreneurial Training Innovative Communities (ETIC) set up a “Right-hand person dispatch program” to dispatch young personnel to NPOs working in the disaster affected areas. Government administration enabled a mass employment of local personnel, although on a short-term basis, to work on disaster recovery activities. However, problems were reported for employing a large number of people with no experience.

¹⁷⁶ For example, currently JANIC collaborates with Church World Service (CWS) to implement “Capacity building project for NGOs to build resilience to disasters.” JANIC also implements projects to promote international standard on humanitarian assistance such as HAP or Sphere, by forming a working group with more than ten NGOs working on international cooperation. JANIC is drafting a capacity development program for disaster risk management in collaboration with JPF and Mercy Corps.

¹⁷⁷ Recruiting a staff using JICA’s recruitment website “JICA Partner” was limited to open recruitment only. The process of selecting one person took at least two weeks from accepting an application to employment. Therefore, it was difficult to respond to urgent needs.

NEEDS ASSESSMENT

According to the questionnaires, about 20% of residents felt that the assistance given was inadequate, and 30% felt there was unnecessary assistance. This shows that some assistance did not meet the needs of residents. Adding to this, 70% of external aid organizations replied that it was difficult to grasp the needs of residents. In order to counter-measure such problems, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity for needs assessment. However, since excessive needs assessment will put a burden on the residents, it is also necessary to set up a system to share the assessment results with other organizations, or conduct joint needs assessments.

CONSTANT IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH MONITORING/EVALUATION

In order to respond to various kinds of needs or changing needs depending on the stages of disaster, it is necessary to monitor the impact of activities to make evaluation and improve assistance contents. For the evaluation, each organization should have an exit strategy which should become the basis of evaluation as well as establish an information sharing system within the organization. It is therefore necessary to develop personnel with an expertise on project management and the skill to measure the effectiveness of activities implemented.

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS (PREPARATION OF MANUALS ETC.)

According to the questionnaire distributed to external aid organizations, about seventy percent of respondent replied that they were not prepared for the activities for disaster management within Japan. As this shows, many organizations provided assistance with insufficient preparation. This led to delays in providing assistance and decline in the quality of assistance. As a counter-measure to this, it is necessary to prepare flexible and effective manual to determine the roles and responsibilities of each staff in cases of emergency assistance.

SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

There were reported cases of staff not being able to continue with their work due to damages to their physical and psychological state of health. Among the 60% of external aid organizations who answered the questionnaire replied that there were problems with excessive working hours for themselves as well as among their colleagues. This shows that there were problems regarding overwork, physical safety and mental health. Self-management is of course important, however, each organization should also be held responsible for managing their staff. To deal with large-scale disasters such as this, many organizations had the problem with lack of massive number of personnel and were forced to send their staff for emergency relief without sufficient briefing. Each organization should be responsible for preparing labour management standards and strict implementation of the standard as well as professional mental-health support for the staff. Many staff had to work with people facing a lot of psychological trauma, therefore mental support was important. Despite this, there were limited experts in this field within Japan and could not meet their needs. It is recommended for the concerned people to acquire and disseminate the knowledge of psychological first aid (PFA).¹⁷⁸

For the safety management in cases of dealing with hazardous substances such as radiation or asbestos, many organizations left each individual to make their own decision and did not have any organizational criteria. It is recommended to prepare manuals for such cases in collaboration with safety management experts.

ACCOUNTABILITY

There are two categories of accountability. The one is the conventional meaning of accountability to donor agencies. The other is the accountability toward beneficiaries which is becoming increasingly important.

As for the accountability to donor agencies, there were reported cases that Japanese aid organizations did not reach the level of accountability or reporting expected by donor agencies. On the other hand, organizations receiving subsidy or financial assistance felt the reporting task to be a huge burden. As a counter-measure, it is recommended to establish a good relationship with donor agencies before disaster happens as well as strengthening the report writing capacity.

¹⁷⁸ National Center of Neurology and Psychiatry (NCNP), CARE Miyagi and Plan Japan prepared a Japanese version of WHO's Psychological First Aid (PFA) manual and implemented its training. Currently, JANIC collaborates in the dissemination of PFA. Child Fund Japan localized and disseminated the manual for the psychological care of children developed after the 9.11 in the USA.

As for the accountability to local organizations/residents, 90% of external aid organizations replied to the questionnaire that they fulfilled their accountability to residents. However, 20% of residents who were unsatisfied with the assistance from external aid organizations replied that they did not receive any explanation on the assistance activities. Local organizations also gave comments that some organizations suddenly disappeared abandoning their activities without sufficient explanation. As a counter-measure, it is recommended to familiarise the international standard on accountability to beneficiaries.

PR/INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

In some cases, assistance from external aid organizations was not easily accepted due to lack of their recognition from local organizations, municipal governments or residents. One reason for this is that only 30% of the residents knew the existence of NGOs/NPOs and they were suspicious and could not trust organizations they have never heard of. As a counter-measure to this, it is recommended to strengthen information dissemination activities including PR as well as strengthening a focal point to collect the opinions of local stakeholders.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Apart from the labour management specified under the section on “safety management and psychological care,” aid organizations failed to recruit personnel who understood their mission as well as personnel with experiences and competencies. Therefore they had problems with training of the new recruits which took up a lot of their time and efforts, and delays in communication and information sharing between field staff and staff at the headquarter. As a counter-measure to this, it is recommended to strengthen human resource management such as capacity development of younger staff as well as management level staff, personnel exchange with other sectors such as private companies, setting up human recourse rosters, etc.

FUND RAISING

Some 70% of external aid organizations who answered the questionnaire replied that they lacked funding. This shows that many organizations had difficulties securing funding for their activity implementation. It is recommended to strengthen organizational capacity for operation management and the skills to secure self-funding/fund-raising capacity so as not to be affected by donor agencies’ intentions. It is also necessary to strengthen the reporting capacity after the acquisition of funding.

PROTECTION AND GENDER

From the questionnaires, almost thirty percent of the residents answered that the assistance did not reach to the people with special care/needs. Almost twenty percent answered that the assistance was not gender sensitive. In some cases these concerns go beyond the responsibilities of civil society and require the involvement of government administration. However, it is recommended to reflect the point of view on vulnerable people as well as gender on the manuals and others, in collaboration with experts in these areas.

COORDINATION OF ASSISTANCE

Coordination among aid organizations to avoid duplication of activities or areas without any assistance is essential. However, problems in the functions of coordination system such as information exchange meetings, lack of mutual understanding or organizations wanting to protect their own scopes of work led to not being able to offer effective assistance or share information. As a counter-measure for this, it is recommended for aid organizations to establish working relationships beforehand to share information and to develop and publicise a system to promote smooth coordination. In addition, capacity development of personnel with good coordination skills is also necessary.

The following table summarises various stages that need for a specific area of capacity development was discussed (Table 16).

Table 16 Areas needing capacity development

Areas	Expected programs	Tokyo	Iwate	Miyagi	Fuku-shima	Inter-views	FGD	Ques-tion-naires
Project management	• Strengthen project management competencies	○				○		
Needs assessment	• Strengthen assessment competencies • Develop information sharing system	○	○	○	○			○
Continued improvement through monitoring/evaluation	• Strengthen activity monitoring competencies	○				○		
Advance preparation (e.g. develop a manual)	• Develop flexible and effective manual	○			○			○
Safety management	• Develop labour management manual • Strict implementation of the labour management manual • Cooperation with experts	○			○	○		○
Accountability	• Strengthen accounting competencies	○						
	• Establish relationship with donor agencies beforehand • Strengthen reporting competencies	○					○	○
	• Strict implementation of accountability standards	○	○	○	○	○	○	
PR/Information dissemination	Strengthen focal point for PR/information dissemination	○	○	○	○	○		
Human resource management	• Develop younger staff/management level staff • Personnel exchange with other sectors such as private companies • Develop human resource infrastructure (e.g. roster system) • Foster volunteer workers • Strengthen cooperation network	○				○		○
Fundraising	• Strengthen self-funding competencies	○						○
	• Establish relationship with donor agencies beforehand • Strengthen reporting competencies	○	○			○		○
	• Strengthen activity management competencies	○		○		○		○
Protection and gender	• Reflect points of views of vulnerable people/gender into manuals etc. • Cooperation with experts	○			○	○		○
Assistance coordination	• Establish relationship beforehand • Establish system beforehand and publicise the existence	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Stages: Tokyo (workshop in Tokyo, 19 July), Iwate (workshop in Iwate Prefecture, 3 Oct.), Miyagi (workshop in Miyagi Prefecture, 8 Oct.), Fukushima (workshop in Fukushima Prefecture, 10 Oct.), Interviews (interview 1 & interview 2), FGD (4 sessions of focus group discussion), and Questionnaires (questionnaire survey with 414 respondents).

Source: prepared by JANIC

APPENDIX

*Original titles, mostly in Japanese, are retained and were not translated to English.

1. REFERENCE FOR CSO ACTIVITIES IN THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE

- 1-1. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC) (2012)『あの日私たちは東北へ向かった』 早稲田大学出版部
- 1-2. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC) (2012)『東日本大震災と国際協力 NGO 国内での新たな可能性と課題、そして提言』
- 1-3. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC) (2012)「支援 NGO 意見交換会議事録 (全 25 回)」
- 1-4. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)「GPDRR 準備ワークショップ用 意見聴取シート (回収済み 15 団体分)」
- 1-5. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)他「東日本大震災被災者支援に関する NGO 向けリコメンデーション」
- 1-6. 山口誠史「東日本大震災における国際協力 NGO の役割と課題」
- 1-7. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)『東日本大震災被災者支援 NGO サポートプロジェクト』
- 1-8. ジャパン・プラットフォーム(JPF)「東日本被災者支援特設サイト」<<http://tohoku.japanplatform.org/>> (2014 年 1 月現在)
- 1-9. 日本財団「ROAD PROJECT」<<http://road.nippon-foundation.or.jp/>> (2014 年 1 月現在)
- 1-10. 「きたかみ震災復興ステーション」<http://kitakamicity.jp/fukkou/?page_id=673> (2014 年 1 月現在)
- 1-11. 株式会社 NTT データ経営研究所(2011)『情報未来「震災復興」特別号「大災害で問われる自治体の震災対策強化の必要性」』
- 1-12. 「宮城県災害・被災地社協等復興支援ボランティアセンター」<<http://svc.miyagi.jp/index.php>> (2014 年 1 月現在)
- 1-13. 「赤い羽根共同募金」<<https://www.akaihane.or.jp/er/p3.html>> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 1-14. 自治体ホームページ向上研究会(2012)「自治体ホームページ向上研究会報告書」
- 1-15. 藤井辰紀(2012)「NPO 法人の存在意義と経営課題」日本政策金融金庫論集第 16 号
- 1-16. 内閣府男女共同参画局(2011)「男女共同参画の視点からの防災対応について 東日本大震災への男女共同参画の視点を踏まえた被災者支援」
- 1-17. 内閣府男女共同参画局(2012)「平成 24 年度 東日本大震災被災地における女性の悩み・暴力相談事業報告書」
- 1-18. 内閣府男女共同参画局(2011)「平成 23 年度 東日本大震災被災地における女性の悩み・暴力相談事業報告書」
- 1-19. シャンティ国際ボランティア会(2011)『緊急救援から復興へ 震災から 180 日 東日本大震災被災者支援活動報告書』
- 1-20. 震災がつなぐ全国ネットワーク(2012)『寄り添いからつながりを 東日本大震災支援活動の声』
- 1-21. 宮城県災害・被災地社協等復興支援ボランティアセンター(2013)『被災地の地域福祉活動方針 (ガイドライン) 明日に向かって!』
- 1-22. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)(2013)「大規模広域災害時における NGO の人材ニーズおよび JICA PARTNER の更なる有効活用案」
- 1-23. NGO-JICA 協議会(2013)「災害対応人材と国際協力キャリア総合サイト『PARTNER』」
- 1-24. 民間防災および被災地支援ネットワーク(2014)「災害支援の手引き」
- 1-25. 日本赤十字国際人道研究センター(2014)「『東日本大震災と国際人道支援研究会』提言書」
- 1-26. 永見光三(2013)「JICA 事業を通じた東日本大震災復興への貢献について-市民参加協力事業による内外一元化の可能性-」
- 1-27. いわて連携復興センター「平成 23 年度事業報告書」
- 1-28. 「みやぎ連携復興センター」<<http://www.renpuku.org/wp/?p=99>> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 1-29. 「ふくしま連携復興センター」<<http://f-renpuku.org/team>> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 1-30. 内閣府(2010)「平成 21 年度市民活動団体等基本調査報告書」
- 1-31. 東日本大震災支援全国ネットワーク(2013)「社会福祉協議会における広域避難者支援の実態に関する報告書」
- 1-32. 地方シンクタンク協議会(2012)「地域研究交流 Vol.28 No.1 日本の再生～地域力の再構築に向けて 2」
- 1-33. 尾島俊之・ボランティア研究班(2008)「災害におけるボランティアの役割」
- 1-34. 日本学術会議社会学委員会社会福祉学分会(2013)「災害に対する社会福祉の役割-東日本大震災への対応を含めて」

2. EVALUATION REPORTS OF THE EXTERNAL AID ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE¹⁷⁹

- 2-1. Care International Japan (CIJ)(2013)「東日本大震災復興支援事業後評価書」
- 2-2. Save the Children Japan (SCJ)(2012)「SCJ プロGRESS・レビュー（2011 年 12 月～2012 年 1 月）」
- 2-3. Child Fund Japan (CFJ)(2013)「東日本大震災緊急・復興支援事業報告書」
- 2-4. World Vision Japan (WVJ)(2013)「東日本大震災緊急復興支援 24 か月活動レポート」
- 2-5. Thomas, M. (2012). *A Review of Church World Service-Asia/Pacific's Partnerships in Japan*. Church World Service-Asia/ Pacific (CWS).
- 2-6. ジャパン・プラットフォーム国内事業部(2012)「評価報告書 ジャパン・プラットフォーム 東日本大震災被害者支援プログラム（緊急 対応期）」
- 2-7. 国際開発センター(IDCJ)(2013)「東日本大震災への海外からの支援実績のレビュー調査」
- 2-8. 本荘雄一・立木茂雄(2013)「災害 NPO・災害ボランティアの受け入れの仕組みについての考察-国際協力 NGO の対応と国内 NPO の対応の比較-」人文科学研究 No.8 pp.95-108
- 2-9. 桑名恵(2012)「緊急期の東日本大震災支援における日本の NGO の外部者性からの考察」
- 2-10. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC) (2011)「NGO マネジメント研修テキスト」
- 2-11. 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC) (2007)「NGO の危機管理・安全管理ガイドライン」

3. REFERENCE FOR REVIEW METHODS AND INDICATORS

- 3-1. Inter-Agency Standing/Committee (IASC) (2012). *Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) Provisional Version March 2012*.
- 3-2. Cosgrave, J., Ramalingam, B., & Beck, T. (2009) *Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action An ALNAP Guide Pilot Version*. ALNAP.
- 3-3. Beck, T. (2006). *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria*, ALNAP.
- 3-4. Harvey, P., Stoddard, A., Harmer, A., & G, Taylor. (2010). *The state of the humanitarian system: Assessing performance and progress: A pilot study*. ALNAP
- 3-5. Haver, K., & N, Rencoret. (2011). *Haiti Earthquake Response: Mapping and analysis of gaps and duplications in evaluations*. ALNAP., & UNEG.
- 3-6. Emergency Capacity Building Project. (2010). *What We Know About Joint Evaluations of Humanitarian Action: Learning from NGO Experiences*.
- 3-7. O'Hagan, P. (2010). *An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response*. Emergency Capacity Building Project.
- 3-8. NPO 法人アーユス(2003)「国際協力プロジェクト評価」国際開発ジャーナル社
- 3-9. 国際開発センター(IDCJ)評価事業部(2013)「NGO 事業評価 10 ステップ エビデンスに基づく NGO 事業評価ガイドライン」
- 3-10. 国際開発センター(IDCJ)評価事業部(2013)「NGO インパクト評価 10 ステップ 質問票とエクセルの操作手順付きですぐ使える小規模事業インパクト評価ガイドライン」
- 3-11. 国際開発センター(IDCJ)評価事業部(2013)「NGO かんたん評価ガイドライン」
- 3-12. 独立行政法人国際協力機構評価部(2012)「『DAC 評価 5 項目の評価視点および判断基準の標準化』報告書」
- 3-13. 経済協力開発機構開発援助委員会(OECD—DAC)援助評価作業部会(Working Party on Aid Evaluation) (2003)「評価と援助の有効性 評価および結果重視マネジメントにおける基本用語集」
- 3-14. HAP インターナショナル (2010)「人道支援の説明責任（アカウンタビリティ）と品質管理（クオリティ）に関する HAP 基準 2010」
- 3-15. The Sphere Project. (2011). *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*
- 3-16. Regers, P., Blenko, M., & Davis-Peccoud, J. (2012). *Decision Insight: Bad decisions in history: Cautionary tales*. BAIN & COMPANY.
- 3-17. UNDP. (2009). *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results*.
- 3-18. UNDP. (2011). *Outcome-level evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators*,

¹⁷⁹ The list includes the evaluation reports that are internal use only and not published to the general public.

- 3-19. Development Assistance Committee (DAC). (1991). *Principles for evaluation of development assistance*.
- 3-20. CARE International., Catholic Relief Services., OXFAM GB., & World Vision International. (2005). *Joint After-Action Review (AAR) of the Tsunami Crisis*. CARE International., Catholic Relief Services., OXFAM GB., & World Vision International.
- 3-21. Emergency Capacity Building Project. (2010). *Report of the joint evaluation of the Indonesian ECB consortium's responses to the West Java and West Sumatra earthquakes*. Catholic Relief Services.
- 3-22. Mary, B. A. (1999). *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-Or War*. Lynne Rienner Pub.
- 3-23. Buchanan-Smith, M., Margie, C., & Bonino, F. (2013) *Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Pilot Guide*. ALNAP.
- 3-24. CIDA. (2004). *CIDA EVALUATION GUIDE*, CIDA Evaluation Division Performance & Knowledge Management Branch
- 3-25. CIDA. (2004). *Gender Equality and Humanitarian Assistance A guide to the issues*, CIDA International Humanitarian Assistance Division Multilateral Programs Branch
- 3-26. IASC(2007)「災害・紛争等緊急時における精神保健・心理社会的支援に関するIASCガイドライン」
- 3-27. IASC(2010)「災害・紛争等人道的緊急時における精神保健・心理社会的支援：保健分野の人道支援に携わる者は何を知っておくべきか？」
- 3-28. PEOPLE IN AID. (2003). *Code of good practice in the management and support of aid personnel*
- 3-29. HAP international. (2010). *Guide to the 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management*.
- 3-30. OECD. (2006). *Guidance for Managing Joint Evaluations*
- 3-31. Longley, C. & Maxwell, D. (2003). *Livelihoods, Chronic Conflict and Humanitarian Response: A synthesis of Current Practice*.
- 3-32. The Seep Network. (2010). *Minimum Economic Recovery Standards*, Public Action Publishing
- 3-33. INEE. (2010). *Minimum Standards for Education Preparation, Response, Recovery*
- 3-34. LEGS project. (2009). *Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards*
- 3-35. The Child Protection Working Group (CPWG). (2012). *Minimum Standards for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action*
- 3-36. UN (2009) *United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration*.
- 3-37. Trunbull, M., Sterrett, L. & Hilleboe, A. (2010). *TOWARD RESILIENCE: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaption*. ECB
- 3-38. Slim, H & Bonwick, A, (2005) *Protection An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies*

4. REFERENCE FOR THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND ITS ASSISTANCE

- 4-1. 「全国社会福祉協議会」 <<http://www.shakyo.or.jp/>> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 4-2. 全国社会福祉協議会(2012)「東日本大震災災害ボランティアセンター報告書」
- 4-3. 外務省「国際協力と NGO」
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/partnership/> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 4-4. パシフィックコンサルタンツインターナショナル(2007)「『防災における行政と市民・NGO の関わりあいと教育の役割』セミナー開催に係る報告書」
- 4-5. 「特定非営利活動促進法」 <<http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htldata/H10/H10HO007.html>> (2014 年 3 月現在)
- 4-6. Kobe の検証「金編」編集委員会(2000)『Kobe の検証シリーズ 2 お金があるぞう!!考えたぞう!! 阪神・淡路大震災から学ぶ：災害とお金とボランティア活動』震災がつなぐ全国ネットワーク
- 4-7. Kobe の検証「金編」編集委員会(2000)『Kobe の検証シリーズ 3 お金があるぞう!!考えたぞう!! 阪神・淡路大震災から学ぶ：災害とお金とボランティア活動』震災がつなぐ全国ネットワーク
- 4-8. Kobe の検証「情報編」編集委員会(2002)『Kobe の検証シリーズ 4 情報があるぞう!!考えたぞう!! 阪神・淡路大震災から学ぶ：いのちとくらしを守る情報とは』震災がつなぐ全国ネットワーク
- 4-9. 名古屋 NGO センター(2013)「2012 年度外務省 NGO 活動環境整備支援事業『国内・海外に共通するグローバル課題の解決をめざす地域 NGO の視点と能力』活動報告書」
- 4-10. 平成 23 年政令第 127 号「東日本大震災に対処するための特別の財政援助および助成に関する法律第二条第二項及び第三項の市町村を定める政令」
- 4-11. 藤井克徳(2012)「東日本大震災と被災障害者 高い死亡率と生活支援を阻んだ背景に何が、当面の課題を中心に」

- 4-12. 季刊誌パパヤチニカ 2012 夏号(2012)「特集『被災地支援』海へとつなぐ絆」
- 4-13. 内閣府防災担当(2012)「東日本大震災における災害応急対策の主な課題」
- 4-14. 内閣府防災担当(2011)「東日本大震災の概要（中央防災会議防災対策推進検討会議）」
- 4-15. 内閣府防災担当(2010)「防災ボランティア活動に関する論点集～より良い活動環境に向けて みんなで考えよう～」
- 4-16. 内閣府(2012)「防災白書」
- 4-17. 内閣府防災担当(2012)「東日本大震災における被災地方公共団体の復興計画の分析調査報告書」
- 4-18. 内閣府防災担当(2012)「地震発生時における地方公共団体の業務継続の手引きとその解説」
- 4-19. 内閣府「防災ボランティアのページ」<<http://www.bousai-vol.go.jp/>>（2014年2月現在）
- 4-20. 国土交通省(2011)「国土交通白書」
- 4-21. 全国社会福祉協議会(2013)「2011.3.11.東日本大震災への社会福祉分野の取り組みと課題・震災から一年の活動を振り返って」
- 4-22. 全国社会福祉協議会「平成23年度における東日本大震災への取り組み状況」<http://www.shakyo.or.jp/saigai/pdf/torikumi_h23.pdf>（2014年2月現在）
- 4-23. 全国社会福祉協議会「社会福祉協議会関係者による被災地支援の取り組み」<http://www.shakyo.or.jp/saigai/torikumi_10.html>（2014年2月現在）
- 4-24. 経済団体連合会社会貢献推進委員会 1%クラブ(2012)「東日本大震災における経済界の被災者・被災地支援活動に関する報告書」
- 4-25. 国際開発センター(IDCJ)「『国際協力NGO次世代リーダー育成』助成プログラム評価事業」
- 4-26. 警察庁(2014)「平成 23 年（2011 年）東北地方太平洋沖地震の被害状況と警察措置」
- 4-27. 東北学院大学「東日本大震災のデータ」<http://www.tohoku-gakuin.ac.jp/about/sinsai/record/chap_7/chap07_07.html>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-28. 気象庁「東日本大震災 ～東北地方太平洋沖地震～ 関連ポータルサイト」<<http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/menu/jishin-portal.html>>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-29. 内閣府防災担当(2011)「東日本大震災における被害額の推計」
- 4-30. 東京電力「福島第一発電所事故 事故の概要」<<http://www.jaero.or.jp/data/02topic/fukushima/summary/>>(2014 年 3 月現在)
- 4-31. 内閣総理大臣「2011 年 3 月 12 日総理指示」
- 4-32. 内閣総理大臣「2011 年 4 月 22 日総理指示」
- 4-33. 内閣総理大臣「2013 年 12 月 18 日総理指示」
- 4-34. 復興庁「被災者支援情報」<<http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/001169.html>>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-35. 厚生労働省(2013)「東日本大震災水道施設被害状況調査最終報告書」
- 4-36. 東日本大震災復興対策本部(2011)「公共インフラに係る復興施策」
- 4-37. 東北電力「東北地方太平洋沖地震に伴う停電について」<<http://www.tohoku-epco.co.jp/emergency/9/index.html?PHPSESSID=636f76d95534c1f38b4a36695cd73d77>>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-38. 経済産業省(2012)「東日本大震災における都市ガス供給の災害対策検討報告書」
- 4-39. 内閣府「インフラ等の被害・復旧状況（岩手県、宮城県、福島県中心）」<<http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/2-shien/1-infra.html>>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-40. 兵庫県(2006)「阪神・淡路大震災一般ボランティア活動者数推計」
- 4-41. 内閣府「防災情報ページ」<<http://www.bousai.go.jp/>>（2014 年 3 月現在）
- 4-42. 財務省(2011)「平成 23 年度補正予算（第 2 号）の概要」
- 4-43. 財務省(2011)「平成 23 年度補正予算（第 3 号）の概要」
- 4-44. 岩手県(2013)「普通会計決算状況 平成 20-24 年度」
- 4-45. 宮城県税務課「平成 22 年度一般会計決算額」
- 4-46. 福島県財政課「財政状況資料集」
- 4-47. 内閣府「NPO ホームページ」<<https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/>>（2014 年 3 月現在）

APPENDIX 2. PARTICIPANTS LIST (IN JAPANESE)

- We had valuable inputs to prepare this book from various stakeholders through interview survey, peer review workshop, questionnaire survey, but contents of this book doesn't necessarily represent official opinion of any of the neither participated parties nor individuals.
- The following lists do not include 414 respondents of our questionnaire survey, unless a particular respondent is listed on another list.
- The organization and position in the following lists are as of the survey dates.

JOINT REVIEW PROJECT REVIEW COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Name	Organization	Position
菊池康子	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	事業部長
木内真理子	特定非営利活動法人 ワールド・ビジョン・ジャパン	東日本大震災緊急・復興支援部 部長
小林毅	特定非営利活動法人 チャイルド・ファンド・ジャパン	事務局長
小松豊明	特定非営利活動法人 シャプラニール=市民による海外協力の 会	国内活動グループチーフ/震 災対応グループチーフ
下田寛典	特定非営利活動法人 日本国際ボランティアセンター(JVC)	緊急支援担当
鈴木さおり	特定非営利活動法人 ジャパン・プラットフォーム(JPF)	海外事業部
玉熊諭	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	緊急支援コーディネーター
津賀高幸	株式会社 ダイナックス都市環境研究所	研究員
寺畑由美	一般社団法人 インターナショナルメディカルコープス	代表理事
中谷美南子	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	東日本大震災復興支援事業部 プログラムマネージャー (事業 モニタリング・評価)

INTERVIEW SURVEY 1. INTERVIEWEE LIST

Name	Organization	Position
池座剛	東日本大震災支援全国ネットワーク(JCN)	現地駐在員宮城
臼澤良一	NPO 法人 遠野まごころネット	副理事
岡村こず恵	社会福祉法人 大阪ボランティア協会	常任運営委員
奥谷充代	特定非営利活動法人 関西 NGO 協議会	事務局長
小野田全宏	特定非営利活動法人 静岡県ボランティア協会	常務理事
鹿野順一	@リアス NPO サポートセンター	代表
鎌田千瑛美	一般社団法人 ふくしま連携復興センター	事務局長
菊池新一	特定非営利活動法人 遠野山・里・暮らしネットワーク	会長
北川進	社会福祉法人 石巻市社会福祉協議会災害復興支援対策課 石巻市ささえあい総括センター	所長 (社会福祉士)
葛巻徹	いわて連携復興センター	事務局長
栗田暢之	特定非営利活動法人 レスキューストックヤード	代表理事
小松真理子	(元) JIM-NET 日本イラク医療支援ネットワーク	
小向浩人	遠野市総務部防災危機管理課長 沿岸被災地後方支援室	
櫻井杏子	AmeriCares	シニアプログラム マネージャー
佐藤正市	社会福祉法人 遠野市社会福祉協議会	常務理事
菅野拓	一般財団法人 パーソナルサポートセンター	中間就労支援部長 企画調査室長
竹内俊之	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)福島事 務所	所長
多田一彦	NPO 法人 遠野まごころネット	理事長

丹波史紀	一般社団法人ふくしま連携復興センター 福島大学行政政策学類	代表理事 准教授
中山大輔	特定非営利活動法人 難民支援協会	復興支援活動 現地統括
西井和裕	特定非営利活動法人 名古屋 NGO センター	理事長
伴場賢一	一般社団法人 Bridge for Fukushima	代表理事
藤岡恵美子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)福島事務所	情報オフィサー
船戸義和	国立大学法人岩手大学 三陸復興推進機構 地域コミュニティ 再建支援班	特任研究員
村井雅清	CODE 海外災害援助市民センター	理事・事務局長
門田一美	特定非営利活動法人 名古屋 NGO センター	
吉野裕之	特定非営利活動法人 シャローム	
ラモナ・バイマ	AmeriCares	日本代表

PEER REVIEW WORKSHOP PARTICIPANT LIST

TOKYO WORKSHOP

Name	Organization	Position
阿部眞理子	認定 NPO 法人 IVY	理事・事務局
石井宏明	特定非営利活動法人 難民支援協会	常任理事（防災士）
上田和孝	特定非営利活動法人 SEEDS Asia	シニアプログラムマネージャー
大橋正明	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	理事長
片山統久	宗教法人 真如苑	救援ボランティア SeRV
菊池康子	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	事業部長
木内真理子	特定非営利活動法人 ワールド・ビジョン・ジャパン	副事務局長 戦略企画室長
木村万里子	公益社団法人 シャンティ国際ボランティア会	緊急救援室／室長
栗林美知子	特定非営利活動法人 ウィメンズアイ	
小出拓己	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	東日本大震災復興支援事業部 部長（プログラム）
小林毅	特定非営利活動法人 チャイルド・ファンド・ジャパン	事務局長
小松豊明	特定非営利活動法人 シャプラニール=市民による海外協力の 会	国内活動グループチーフ／震 災救援活動担当
サイモン・ ロジャース	一般社団法人 ピースボート災害ボランティアセンター	セーフティオフィサー
櫻井杏子	AmeriCares	シニアプログラムマネージャー
佐藤麻衣子	AmeriCares	草の根事業 プログラムマネージャー
柴田裕子	特定非営利活動法人 ジャパン・プラットフォーム(JPF)	海外事業部長
下田寛典	特定非営利活動法人 日本国際ボランティアセンター(JVC)	緊急支援担当
杉本香奈子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	調査・提言グループ
鈴江茂敏	パルシステム生活協同組合連合会	地域支援本部 担当課長
鈴木さおり	特定非営利活動法人 ジャパン・プラットフォーム(JPF)	海外事業部
田所功	宗教法人カトリック中央協議会 カリタスジャパン	事務局長
玉熊諭	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	緊急支援コーディネーター
津賀高幸	株式会社 ダイナックス都市環境研究所	研究員
寺畑由美	一般社団法人 インターナショナルメディカルコープス	代表理事
直江篤志	認定 NPO 法人 AAR Japan[難民を助ける会]	
中谷美南子	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	東日本大震災復興支援事業部

		プログラママネージャー（事業モニタリング・評価）
中村清美	国土防災技術株式会社	技術本部 技術部海外協力グループ 参与（防災士）
成瀬悦子	特定非営利活動法人 WE21 ジャパン	
浜田順子	特定非営利活動法人 WE21 ジャパン	
堀内葵	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	調査・提言グループ
山口誠史	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	事務局長
山本隆	一般社団法人 ピースボート災害ボランティアセンター	代表理事
ラモナ・バイマ	AmeriCares	日本代表

*他、氏名非掲載希望者 1 名

IWATE WORKSHOP

Name	Organization	Position
東洋平	認定 NPO 法人 国境なき子どもたち(KnK)	岩手事務所調整員
阿部敬一	大槌町 NPO ボランティア団体連絡協議会	会長
伊瀬聖子	特定非営利活動法人 カリタス釜石	副理事長 ベース長
宇佐見亜紀	NPO 法人 遠野まごころネット	インターン
臼澤良一	NPO 法人 遠野まごころネット	副理事長
江刺由紀子	おはなしころりん（大船渡）	
菊池新一	遠野山里ネット/東北まち作り実践塾	所長/塾長
葛巻徹	特定非営利活動法人 いわて連携復興センター	事務局長
小松健	特定非営利活動法人 ハビタット・フォー・ヒューマニティ・ジャパン	東北復興支援事業プロジェクトコーディネーター
小向幹雄	ぐるっと大槌	代表理事
金野侑	地域コーディネーターみやこ	代表理事
佐藤一男	米崎小学校仮設住宅自治会/NPO 桜ライン 311	自治会長/副代表
佐藤正市	社会福祉法人 遠野市社会福祉協議会	常務理事
鈴木亮平	一般社団法人 SAVE IWATE	
多田一彦	NPO 法人 遠野まごころネット	理事長
延足圭祐	被災地支援団体うましか	代表
藤原和歌子	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	遠野事務所プログラムオフィサー（教育担当）
船戸義和	国立大学法人岩手大学 三陸復興推進機構岩手大学	地域コミュニティ再建支援班 特任研究員
船橋和花	特定非営利活動法人 難民支援協会	震災支援コーディネーター
八幡幸子	ファミリーショップやはた	代表
若菜多摩英	特定非営利活動法人 母と子の虹の架け橋	理事長
草野祐子 （オブザーバー）	みやぎジョネット	代表
宮下侑子 （オブザーバー）	東北大学大学院情報科学研究科	博士前期課程 2 年

MIYAGI WORKSHOP

Name	Organization	Position
青木淳	公益社団法人 青年海外協力協会 (JOCA)	コーディネーター（岩沼市里の杜サポートセンター）
赤坂美幸	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	東日本大震災復興支援事業部 プログラムスペシャリスト（こどもの保護）

岩田健一郎	特定非営利活動法人 日本国際ボランティアセンター(JVC)	震災支援担当
上田和孝	特定非営利活動法人 SEEDS Asia	シニアプログラムマネージャー
大谷航介	特定非営利活動法人 ハビタット・フォー・ヒューマニティ・ジャパン	東北復興支援事業プロジェクトコーディネーター
大和田学	社会福祉法人 亘理町社会福祉協議会	主任主査
小野寺大志	Tree seed	
加藤拓馬	気仙沼市震災復興・企画部地域づくり推進課	地域支援員 (担い手育成支援事業担当)
菊田忠衛	一般社団法人 ボランティアステーション i n 気仙沼	代表理事
北川進	社会福祉法人 石巻社会福祉協議会 災害復興支援対策課 石巻市ささえあい総括センター	所長
蔵石真	公益財団 共生地域創造財団	
佐藤敬生	社会貢献共同体ユナイテッドアース	東北復興支援責任者
末永博	一般社団法人 KITT 〜きっと〜	理事
菅野拓	一般社団法人 パーソナルサポートセンター	中間就労支援部長 企画調査室長
菅野芳春	協力隊 OV 有志による震災支援の会	代表
塚本卓	特定非営利活動法人 気仙沼まちづくりセンター 気仙沼まちづくり支援センター	センター長
長野高士	外国人被災者支援センター 特定非営利活動法人笑顔のお手伝い	副理事長 事務局長
野津裕二郎	一般社団法人 キャンナス東北	リハビリテーション担当
畠山輔	一般社団法人 ボランティアステーション i n 気仙沼	事務局
馬場照子	NPO 法人亘理いちごっこ	代表理事
日方里砂	石巻市北上地区復興応援隊 (NPO 法人パルシック)	
星 英次	公益社団法人 青年海外協力協会 (JOCA)	理事
堀野正浩	認定 NPO 法人 IVY	理事、IVY みやぎ担当
松本恵理子	特定非営利活動法 SEEDS Asia	プロジェクト・オフィサー
村島弘子	特定非営利活動法人 移動支援 Rera	代表
山本耕輔	公益社団法人 青年海外協力協会 (JOCA)	主任
若林美奈子	仙台市 市民局	市民協働推進部 市民協働推進課 主事
池座剛 (オブザーバー)	東日本大震災支援全国ネットワーク(JCN)	宮城担当
福本潤也 (オブザーバー)	東北大学大学院情報科学研究科	人間社会情報科学専攻 准教授
宮下侑子 (オブザーバー)	東北大学大学院情報科学研究科	博士前期課程 2 年

*他、氏名非掲載希望者 2 名

FUKUSHIMA WORKSHOP

Name	Organization	Position
青田由幸	特定非営利活動法人 さぼーとセンターびあ	代表理事
小沼亮	一般社団法人 Bridge for Fukushima	プログラムオフィサー
加藤裕介	一般社団法人 Bridge for Fukushima	
金谷直子	公益社団法人 セーブ・ザ・チルドレン・ジャパン	会津若松事務所 所長
鎌田千瑛美	一般社団法人 ふくしま連携復興センター	理事
金博子	一般社団法人 全国女性相談研究会	理事

國井順子	社会福祉法人 いわき市社会福祉協議会	地域福祉係長
小林岳紀	放射能測定センター・南相馬	副代表
小林友子	放射能測定センター南相馬	
小松豊明	特定非営利活動法人 シャプラニール＝市民による海外協力の会	国内活動グループチーフ/震災対応グループチーフ
今野由喜	特定非営利活動法人 つながっぺ南相馬	理事長
齊藤 登	NPO 法人 福島県有機農業ネットワーク	理事兼事務局長
澤田和美	特定非営利活動法人 福島県の児童養護施設の子どもの健康を考える会	共同代表
清水義広	NPO 法人 CRMS 市民放射能測定所福島	理事
鈴木亮	東日本大震災支援全国ネットワーク(JCN)	福島担当
関久雄	NPO 法人 りょうぜん里山学校	事務局長
竹内俊之	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)福島事務所	所長
谷山由子	特定非営利活動法人 日本国際ボランティアセンター(JVC)	震災支援担当 (アフガニスタン事業担当兼任)
丹波史紀	一般社団法人 ふくしま連携復興センター 福島大学行政政策学類	代表理事 准教授
千葉英行	つきだて花工房	交流課 課長
直江 篤志	認定 NPO 法人 AAR Japan[難民を助ける会]	
野口時子	3a 郡山	代表
長谷川秀雄	NPO 法人 いわき自立生活センター	理事長
半田将史	認定 NPO 法人 AAR Japan[難民を助ける会]	プログラム・コーディネーター
藤岡恵美子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)福島事務所	情報オフィサー
古山郁	NPO 法人 市民公益活動パートナーズ	代表理事
本田紀生	NPO 法人 元気になろう福島	副理事長・事務局長
吉祥眞佐緒	一般社団法人 全国女性相談研究会	理事
吉野裕之	特定非営利活動法人 シャローム	
渡部直樹	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)福島事務所	アシスタント情報オフィサー
草野祐子 (オブザーバー)	みやぎジョネット	代表
寺畑由美 (オブザーバー)	一般社団法人 インターナショナルメディカルコープス	代表理事
福本潤也 (オブザーバー)	東北大学大学院情報科学研究科	人間社会情報科学専攻 准教授

*他、氏名非掲載希望者 1 名

WORKSHOP ORGANIZING STAFF

Name	Organization	Role
浅羽聡美	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	記録
浅羽雄介	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
飯島邦子	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
伊藤春美	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
伊藤裕美子	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
浦山絵里	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
遠藤智恵	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
尾上昌毅	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
甲州潤	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター

小藤輝正	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
椎木進二	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	記録
鈴木慈子	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
鈴木まり子	特定非営利活動法人 日本ファシリテーション協会	ファシリテーター
伊藤洋子	特定非営利活動法人 CWS Japan	主催者・ファシリテーター
下田寛典	特定非営利活動法人 日本国際ボランティアセンター(JVC)	記録
関口正也	株式会社 オリエンタルコンサルタンツ	記録
玉熊諭	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	記録
田島誠	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	主催者・事務局
芳賀朝子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	主催者・事務局
服部圭介	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター(JANIC)	主催者・事務局

INTERVIEW SURVEY 2. INTERVIEWEE LIST

Name	Organization	Position
阿部眞理子	認定 NPO 法人 IVY	理事・事務局
安達美千代	認定 NPO 法人 IVY	事務局長
秋山映美	株式会社 ラッシュジャパン	チャリティ&キャンペーン
有原領一	社会福祉法人 宮古市社会福祉協議会 田老福祉センター	地域支援係 主査兼専門員
岩浅大輔	助け合いジャパン岩手支部久慈・宮古サテライト	東北マッチングリーダー
大橋庸一	いわき・まごころ双葉会	事務局
香月学	ありがとう	
川上延男	富岡町泉玉露仮設住宅自治会	会長
菅野美智子	浪江ピースの会	代表
黒柳奈緒美	NPO 法人 結人 (被災地障害者センターみやこ)	
齋藤卓磨		元地元団体代表
佐々木長平	志津川中学校仮設住宅自治会	会長
佐々木文弘	佐々木刃物店 平三町目商店会 平七夕まつり実行委員会	会長 委員長
佐々木まきこ	カキ小屋	
佐々木まゆみ	社会福祉法人 山田町社会福祉協議会	地域福祉課 課長
志賀秀範	元豊間中学校 PTA 会長・志賀工務所	
白鳥考太	公益社団法人 シャンティ国際ボランティア会	緊急救援担当
舘敬	勿来まちづくりサポートセンター	理事長
田中美奈子	いわき市在住富岡町民すみれ会	会長
東梅英夫	臼澤鹿子踊り保存会	会長
中野滋	株式会社 中野用品店 平七夕まつり実行委員会	
波岡美紀	特定非営利活動法人 ぐらしのサポーターズ	理事
日塔マキ	女子の暮らしの研究所 (株式会社 GIRLS LIFE LABO)	代表取締役
延足圭祐	被災地支援団体うましか	代表
蛇石治利	特定非営利活動法人 ぐらしのサポーターズ	
本多貴之	葛尾村役場総務課復興対策係	主査
松本智恵子	葛尾村教育委員会	社会教育係長
米山正彦	広野町仮設住宅	集会所管理室

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION PARTICIPANT LIST

GROUP 1. SOCIAL WELFARE COUNCIL

Name	Organization	Position
阿部由紀	社会福祉法人 石巻市社会福祉協議会 災害復興支援対策課	課長補佐
北川進	社会福祉法人 石巻市社会福祉協議会災害復興支援対策課 石巻市支えあい総括センター	
斎藤嘉徳	社会福祉法人 気仙沼市社会福祉協議会 生活支援・障害福祉課	生活支援係 主任
鈴木文俊	社会福祉法人 宮城県社会福祉協議会 震災復興支援局 宮城県災害・被災地社協等復興支援ボランティアセンター	主幹兼所長
須田めぐみ	社会福祉法人 女川町社会福祉協議会	事務局 主事
宮崎克子	社会福祉法人 宮城県社会福祉協議会 みやぎボランティア総合センター	所長
高橋賢一	社会福祉法人 宮城県社会福祉協議会 震災復興支援局	副参事
高橋功	社会福祉法人 東松島市社会福祉協議会 東松島市生活復興支援センター	活動記録プロジェクトリーダー
千葉貴弘	社会福祉法人 東松島市社会福祉協議会 東松島市生活復興支援センター	地域福祉課長 所長

GROUP 2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Name	Organization	Position
五十嵐豪	認定 NPO 法人 AAR Japan [難民を助ける会]	プログラムマネージャー
内田順子	NPO 法人 ADRA Japan	プログラムオフィサー
大竹智子	特定非営利活動法人 CWS Japan	プログラムオフィサー
小野寺亜紀	特定非営利活動法人 CWS Japan	
甲斐聡一朗	特定非営利活動法人 災害人道医療支援会(HuMA)	
佐々木佑	特定非営利活動法人 オックスファム・ジャパン	メディアオフィサー
玉熊論	公益財団法人 ケア・インターナショナル ジャパン	開発・緊急支援 コーディネーター
福田紀子	東日本大震災女性支援ネットワーク	
宮本純子	特定非営利活動法人 災害人道医療支援会(HuMA)	
鈴木さおり	特定非営利活動法人 ジャパン・プラットフォーム	研修事業担当
伊藤衆子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター	能力強化グループ
田島 誠	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター	震災タスクフォース チーフコーディネーター
服部圭介	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター	震災タスクフォース評価プロ ジェクトチームリーダー
松尾沢子	特定非営利活動法人 国際協力 NGO センター	広報グループマネージャー

GROUP 3. WIDE-AREA EVACUEES (IDPS)

* 広域避難者 6名 (福島県双葉郡からの避難者)

GROUP 4. TEMPORARY RENTAL HOUSES

* 生活支援相談員 7名 (社会福祉法人 山田町社会福祉協議会)

PRODUCTION TEAM

JAPANESE EDITION

■ *Editors*

Makoto Tajima, Chief Coordinator, Taskforce for Disaster Response, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Keisuke Hattori, Team Leader of the Joint Review Project, Taskforce for Disaster Response, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) / Urban and Regional Development Dept., Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd.

■ *Assistants*

Masashi Yamaguchi, Secretary General, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Asako Haga, Coordinator, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Rie Watanabe, PR & Communications Group, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Reiya Watanabe, Assistant Researcher, Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd.

Kazuto Arai, Assistant Researcher, Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd.

ENGLISH EDITION

■ *Editor*

Makoto Tajima, Advisor on Disaster Risk Reduction and Response, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

■ *Assistants*

Rie Watanabe, Communication & Public Relations Group, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Satoshi Nakazawa, MA in Peace Education, UN Mandated University for Peace

■ *Original Translation*

Tokyo International Cooperation Service Co., Ltd. (TICS)

The Great East Japan Earthquake: Joint Review on Relief Activities by the Civil Society
—from the Perspective of International Cooperation NGOs—

Published on October 27, 2014

Edited and Published by

Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Avaco Bldgs., 5F, 2-3-18, Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan

TEL: 03-5292-2911 / FAX: 03-5292-2912

E-mail: global-citizen@janic.org

URL: www.janic.org

Publisher: OHASHI Masaaki, JANIC

Editors: Makoto TAJIMA, JANIC

Keisuke HATTORI, Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd.

Sponsored by Give2Asia

Cover page design by Koji MATSUZAWA, Dughouse Co., Ltd.

Printed and bound by Bethel Photo & Printing Co., Ltd.



Edited and Published by

Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Sponsored by

Give2Asia